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This thesis consists of three studies in the investments field, which examines the
interaction between long and short positions and their impact on market participants,
prices and portfolio allocations. In chapter 2, I examine the optimal portfolio composition
for institutional investors when considering liabilities. Institutional investors, by taking
into account their short positions, which in effect are their liabilities, make different asset
allocation decisions (long positions). Important in the optimization in excess of liabilities
is the role of the asset classes in hedging the market value of liabilities. In chapter 3, I turn
to the impact of short positions of market participants on prices by showing that limits to
shorting lead to biased prices. In particular, I find that the presence of short sale constraints
can explain the existence of a premium to Net Asset Value for Real Estate Investment
Trusts. Miller (1977) argues that as short-sale constraints keep more pessimistic investors
out of the market, prices tend to reflect a more optimistic valuation than they otherwise
would. The results of 4 suggest that overpricing caused by the presence of short sale
constraints is not solely due to restriction on negative information but also partly a result
of capitalized lending income. I show that revenue associated with security lending is
capitalization in prices, as investors are willing to pay a premium associated with lending
fees.
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Introduction 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three studies in the investments field that look at the interaction between
”long” and ”short” positions and their impact on market participants, prices and portfolio
allocations. In Chapter 2, we examine the optimal portfolio composition for institutional
investors when considering liabilities. Institutional investors, by taking into account their short
positions, which in effect are their liabilities, make different asset allocation decisions (long
position). Important in the optimization is the role of the asset classes in hedging the market
value of liabilities. In Chapter 3, we turn to the impact of short positions of market participants
on prices by showing that limits to shorting lead to biased prices. In particular, we find that the
presence of short sale constraints can explain the existence of a premium to Net Asset Value
(NAV) for REITs. In Chapter 4, I show that the anticipation of shorting in turn also leads to
higher prices. I show that revenue associated with security lending is capitalization in prices,
as investors are willing to pay a premium associated with lending fees. The results of this
study suggest that overpricing caused by the presence of short sale constraints is not solely
due to restriction on negative information but also partly a result of capitalized lending profits.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will outline the thesis and describe how the studies relate to
the literature.
1.1 The Long Side
Traditional mean variance asset-only analysis predicts an optimal real estate allocation of
20%-30%. Nonetheless, Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1995) and Dhar and Goetzmann (2006) sur-
veyed institutional investors from the U.S. and found the reported allocation among funds who
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invest in real estate to be relatively small between 3% and 5%. The inclusion of real estate as-
sets in mean-variance optimal portfolios resulted in a widespread belief that actual real estate
allocations in investment portfolios fall short.
In Chapter 2, we perform an Asset liability Management (ALM) study on real estate allo-
cations. Asset liability management (ALM) pertains to coordinating the management of assets
and liabilities in order to maintain a surplus of assets beyond liabilities. Pension liabilities are
the starting point in determining the appropriate investment strategies. The ALM approach
focuses on considering risk on a relative basis versus liabilities when making asset allocation
decisions and seeks to maximize the risk adjusted surplus of assets minus liabilities.
We study US data for the period 1984-2008 to quantify the assets’ impact on the pensions
fund’s future funding surplus and quantify the utility that investors with liabilities can derive
from real estate in view of other asset classes. This enables us to determine whether to classify
real estate and other assets as reserve asset, an asset which moves in tandem with liabilities,
or return-generating asset, an asset that merits an inclusion in the portfolio because of its
attractive risk-reward characteristics (see Black and Jones (1988)). We widen the investment
opportunity set by distinguishing between direct and indirect real estate investments.
This chapter differentiates itself from previous studies as Chun et al. (2000) and Craft
(2001, 2005A, 2005B) by the way in which we define the return on liabilities. To compare
the effect of changing accounting practices of the pension liabilities on portfolio allocations
we use different liability return definitions. First, we proxy the traditional book value of
liabilities, which only include actuarial changes, using the changes related to the value of
projected pension obligations (PBOs) in accordance with Chun et al. (2000) and Craft (2001,
2005A, 2005B). Next to this traditional definition of liability returns, we also estimate the
market value of liabilities, in line with fair value accounting. This chapter adds to the existing
literature by examining the liability hedge qualities of real estate in light of liabilities being
denominated at fair value.
1.2 The Short Side
In Neo-classical asset-pricing models it is assumed that market participants can buy, sell and
short sell securities at no cost. In practice, restrictions on short selling a security can make
shorting a stock not as straightforward as simple selling or buying. Miller (1977), Seneca
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(1967), Figlewski (1981), Chen et al. (2002), Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Morris (1996)
all argue that security prices are upward biased when short-sales constraints exist. In the
presence of short sale constraints, negative information will be kept out of the market.
The influence of short sale constraints on prices is examined in chapter 3. Several prior pa-
pers test the overvaluation hypothesis by focusing on the relation between short sales and sub-
sequent returns; a negative ex post calendar time abnormal return is consistent with overvalua-
tion. Figlewski (1981), Brent et al. (1990), Senchank and Starks (1993), Figlewski and Webb
(1993), Aitken et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (2001), Angel et al. (1998), Asquith et al. (2005),
Desai et al. (2002), Boehmer et al. (2008), Diether, Lee and Werner (2009), and Boehmer et al.
(2010) observe a negative relation between stock returns and short interest levels.
However, negative abnormal returns do not automatically imply overvaluation, since a
stock can decline in price without being overvalued. Pessimistic information regarding the
future cash flow outlook of a stock is consistent with a reduction in valuation to a new value
estimate, not necessarily brought about by short sellers or short sale constraints. Similarly, a
stock can be overvalued for sustained periods of time without experiencing negative abnormal
returns. The limits of arbitrage theory of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) focuses on the case where
mispricing may deepen in the short run, even though there is no long run fundamental risk
in the trade. By using the NAV value of REITs, we extend previous findings to statements
about the level of prices and address the importance of relative valuation in the short sale
decision. REITs offer the advantage of being more straightforward to price, as corroborated by
Mu¨hlhofer and Ukhov (2009). We contribute to the literature on short sale and price discovery
by directly linking short sales and short sale constraints to valuation using a unique data set and
by taking advantage of the parallel market valuation of REITs. In addition to providing further
evidence on Millers theory we contribute to the literature on the NAV pricing divergence in
REITs by exploring whether the presence of short sale constraints can explain the existence of
a premium to NAV of REITs. More specifically, we address the question of how much of the
cross-sectional variation in REIT premium can be attributed to short sale constraints?
In Chapter 4, I show that the anticipation of shorting in turn also leads to higher prices. In
the presence of short sale constraints negative information will be withheld from the market
and the marginal investor will be an optimist. Additionally, the price inflation can go beyond
the most optimistic valuation in that it can be attributed to the prospect of the future lending
fees. Duffie et al. (2002) present a dynamic model of asset valuation in which short-selling
requires searching for security lenders and bargaining over the lending fee. They argue that
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an investor is willing to pay more than his valuation, if he expects to profit from lending it
in the future when the opportunity arises. The prospect of lending fees elevates prices above
even the most optimistic buyer’s valuation of the security’s future dividends. The price is the
expected valuation of the marginal investor, plus the expected future revenue associated with
the potential to lend the asset.
Securities lending is defined as a market process whereby securities are temporarily trans-
ferred by one party to another for a fee. The size of the securities lending market has increased
significantly in recent years. At its peak in 2007, the equity securities lending market repre-
sented nearly $850 billion with over $400 billion in U.S. equities alone, according to estimates
of Data Explorers Ltd. As 2007 turned into 2008 and the stock market steadily declined, se-
curities lending revenues and loan volumes reached new highs. Average loan spreads widened
from 20-30 basis points in 2005-2006, to over 60 basis points in 2008. In 2009, the SECs
ban on short sales of financial stocks reduced the security lending market in size, however the
securities lending market regained some of that volume from March to September.
The business of securities lending is a lucrative business for funds with large portfolios
of stocks. Securities lending is therefore increasingly recognized and managed. Dimensional
Advisors for example earned $182 million in net lending revenue for the fiscal year 2008.
The resulting performance enhancement ranged from 0.04% for their US Large Company
Portfolio to 0.66% for their Japanese Small Company Portfolio. Mutual funds reported $1
billion in lending revenue and pension funds added $500 million to their overall portfolio
returns in 2008.
Given that security lending revenue is an additional source of income, I test whether in-
vestors are willing to pay a premium associated with lending fees, in Chapter 4. The purpose
is to examine whether security prices incorporate lending profits. This chapter contributes to
the literature on short sale constraints and valuation and to the literature on the informativeness
of short sales. The results of this study suggest that overpricing is not solely due to restriction
on negative information but also partly a result of capitalized lending profits.
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Chapter 2
Real Estate in an ALM Framework: The
Case of Fair Value Accounting∗
2.1 Introduction
Real estate assets have traditionally been regarded as safe investments with inflation hedging
capabilities that offer diversification potential and high absolute returns. Nevertheless there is
no consensus as to its role within an investment context. In the selection of portfolios based on
means and covariances of returns the role for real estate, as a diversifier in a portfolio, appears
to be substantial. For real estate allocations the mean-variance literature predicts allocations of
at least 20% to be optimal.1 Conversely, institutional investors like pension funds are not solely
aspiring for maximum returns at a selected level of risk in their portfolio choice. Their focus
in making asset allocation decisions is on considering risk on a relative basis versus liabilities
to optimize their risk adjusted surplus. When taking pension liabilities as the starting point
and coordinating the management of assets and liabilities in order to maintain a surplus of
assets beyond liabilities the role for real estate seems much more limited.
Chun et al. (2000) offered the first empirical analysis of real estate allocations within an
Asset Liability Management (ALM) framework. In their research they recognize real estate as-
sets’ correlation and diversification potential with other assets, while simultaneously adjusting
∗This chapter is an extended version of Brounen et al. (2010) and has benefited from the comments of the
anonymous referee, the editor and participants at the 2007 Netspar Workshop and the 2007 European Real Estate
Society Annual Conference.
1For empirical evidence on real estate allocation within mean variance optimizations we like to refer to:
Friedman (1971), Fogler (1984), Brinson and Schlarbaum (1986), Firstenberg (1998), Irwin and Landa (1987),
Ennis and Burik (1991), Hoesli et al. (2003) and Lee and Stevenson (2005).
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for the covariance with the liability stream. The diversification potential on the liability side
as a hedge against inflation turns out to be more limited and accounts for the reduced exposure
to this asset class as witnessed in institutional portfolios. Even so, this earliest achievement
in the asset-liability literature circumvents the imperfections associated with real estate by
focusing on real estate securities (REITs) and as such limits the opportunity set of assets to
include solely indirect real estate. Furthermore, Chun et al. (2000) focus on the reported value
of projected benefit obligations and in the advent of market-based accounting obligations for
pension funds it becomes of interest how real estate performs in hedging the fair value of
liabilities.
This chapter differentiates itself from previous studies as Chun et al. (2000) and Craft
(2001, 2005A, 2005B) by the way in which we define the return on liabilities. With the
introduction of the Pension Protection Act the dynamics of liabilities are likely to change.
To compare the effect of changing accounting practices of the pension liabilities on portfolio
allocations we use different liability return definitions. First, we proxy the traditional book
value of liabilities, which only include actuarial changes, using the changes related to the
value of projected pension obligations (PBOs) in accordance with Chun et al. (2000) and Craft
(2001, 2005A, 2005B). Next to this traditional definition of liability returns, we also estimate
the market value of liabilities, in line with fair value accounting. This chapter adds to the
existing literature by examining the liability hedge qualities of real estate in light of liabilities
being denominated at fair value.2
We study US data for the period 1984-2008 to quantify the assets’ impact on the pensions
fund’s future funding surplus and quantify the utility that investors with liabilities can derive
from real estate in view of other asset classes. This will enable us to determine whether to clas-
sify real estate and other assets as reserve asset, an asset which moves in tandem with liabili-
ties, or return-generating asset, an asset that merits an inclusion in the portfolio because of its
attractive risk-reward characteristics (see Black and Jones (1988)). We widen the investment
opportunity set by distinguishing between direct and indirect real estate investments. This
chapter is the first to include the MIT transaction index in a portfolio optimization problem
following an ALM specification. The Transaction Based Index (TBI) estimates quarterly mar-
ket price changes based on the verifiable sales prices of properties sold from the NPI database
each quarter, avoiding the smoothing and lagging problems of the NCREIF appraisal based
index used in previous studies. Moreover, we compute inflation hedge ratios to determine
2Fair value is an estimated market value of pension liabilities in the absence of a market price, fair value is
thus the best estimate of the market value.
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which asset class provides the appropriate payout structure for indexation policies.
Our results indicate that the portfolio composition differs depending on the definition of
the liability return. When liability returns solely follow actuarial changes the mean variance
efficient portfolio allocations toward direct real estate and fixed income decreases compared
to the asset-only optimization. Once accounting for interest rate risk the hedging benefits of
direct real estate materialize for short term holding periods. However, over longer holding pe-
riods real estate proves to be a poor interest rate and particularly poor inflation hedge. Direct
real estate is a return generating asset class that merits an inclusion in an ALM portfolio be-
cause of its attractive risk reward characteristics and its low correlation with stocks and bonds,
though its role in an ALM portfolio is considerably limited when accounting for inflation risk.
Whereas indirect real estate obtains an allocation in an asset-only portfolio, in an ALM in-
flation hedge portfolio it has no position. Commercial real estate is a perverse inflation and
interest rate hedge and offers pension funds no additional advantage beyond its attractive risk
reward characteristics and diversification potential.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we present a synthesis of the most
relevant theoretical and empirical analysis on real estate allocations and asset-liability man-
agement. In the section 2.3 the methodology and in section 2.4 the data set of the empirical
tests are presented. We initially proceed by quantifying real estate allocations assuming an
asset-only mean variance optimization. In section 2.6, we analyze the liability hedging poten-
tial of various assets classes, compared both to the fair value and to the actuarial denomination
of liabilities. This will allow us to answer the question whether the change in accounting prac-
tices to fair value accounting of pension liabilities will cause a significant change in pension
plan allocations. In section 2.7 we compute optimal ALM portfolios and asses the interplay
between the different weights attached to liabilities, levels of risk tolerance and funding levels
of pension schemes. Subsequently in section 2.8, we calculate inflation hedging capabilities
of the asset classes over various holding periods to asses the desirability of the asset class
with respect to indexation policies. The last empirical test is regarding the influence of re-
turn predictability on ALM portfolios. Finally, section 2.10 summarizes our most important
findings.
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2.2 Literature Review
In the context of real estate allocations Friedman (1971) was one of the first to use the mean-
variance methodology to select optimal direct real estate and mixed-asset portfolios. The in-
clusion of real estate assets in mean-variance optimal portfolios resulted in a widespread belief
that actual real estate allocations in investment portfolios fall short. Bajtelsmit and Worzala
(1995) put forward that on average American pension funds allocate less than 4% of their
assets to equity real estate. In their survey among 96 pension funds the dominant asset classes
were domestic stock (42.6%) and bonds (32%) followed by international stocks (7.2%). More
recently, Dhar and Goetzmann (2006) surveyed leading investment managers from the U.S.
and found the reported allocation among funds who invest in real estate to be relatively small
3%-5%, although a large number of funds announced plans to increase their respective allo-
cations. Hoesli et al. (2003) explicitly compare the actual and suggested weights of real estate
in the institutional portfolio and find that against the classic mean-variance framework, the
predicted allocations are inconsistent with reported allocations.
The discrepancy between actual allocations and theoretical predications in this asset-only
view lead Chun et al. (2000) to examine pension plan investments in an asset-liability frame-
work using U.S. REITs. The relation between assets and liabilities seems to be at the heart
of explaining the limited exposure to real estate. Within the mean-variance framework real
estate plays an important role as a diversifying asset class, but when accounting for liability
obligations real estate seems to offer reduced diversification benefits as a hedge against actu-
arial changes and inflation on the liability side of the balance sheet. The latter diversification
potential accounts for the reduced exposure to this asset class as apparent among institutional
portfolios. Chun et al. (2000) also found cross-sectional differences in REIT allocations. For
overfunded plans the optimal allocation is higher than for underfunded funds.
Following this first empirical ALM study on real estate allocations Craft (2001) further
examined real estate investments by distinguishing between private and public real estate al-
locations, while correcting for appraisal smoothing. The asset-liability framework predicts an
allocation of 12.5% to private real estate and 4.7% to public real estate. And as the returns
increase the private real estate allocation decreases sharply while the allocation to public real
estate decreases at a lower progressive pace. Moreover, in accordance with Chun et al. (2000)
overfunded pension plans are much more likely to hold both private and public real estate than
underfunded counterparts (Craft, 2005A, 2005B). The particular nature and conditions of a
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pension fund apparently influence the optimal allocation decision. Similarly, Booth (2002)
finds considerably different optimal portfolios depending on the liability structure of the pen-
sion funds. For mature U.K. schemes (whose members have already retired) direct real estate
allocations prevail around 10%. For immature pension plans (active members) index-linked
U.K. government bonds and U.S. equities replace real estate allocations.
Finally, another strand of literature by Fugazza and Nicodano (2007) and Hoevenaars et al.
(2008) incorporates predictability of asset returns in the optimal portfolio choice. Fugazza,
Guidolin and Nicodano (2007) explicitly distinguish the time-varying properties of indirect
real estate in light of bonds and stocks. When allowing for linear predictability patterns in
indirect real estate returns the optimal allocation should obtain a weight between 12% and
44%, depending on the risk tolerance, parameter uncertainty and investment horizon. On the
other hand when optimizing returns in excess of liabilities, Hoevenaars et al. (2008) find that
the role for indirect real estate in a liability driven investment portfolio is negligible.
This chapter extends the work of Chun et al. (2000), Craft (2001) and Booth (2002) by
examining the fair value liability hedge qualities of real estate in light of other asset classes.
We explicitly model liabilities as being subject to interest rate risk and summarize the assets’
impact on the pensions fund’s future funding surplus. Furthermore, we contrast optimal ALM
portfolio allocations using various liability denominations to distinguish the impact accounting
practices of liability valuation have on the portfolio composition. To do so, this study applies
a liability framework as developed by Sharpe and Tint (1990), which arises from a traditional
mean-variance optimization problem. More specifically, the objective function follows a stan-
dard asset-only optimization problem, while considering the change in pension liabilities and
their covariance with assets. The latter, also referred to as the liability hedge credit, quantifies
the utility due to assets correlation with a pension fund liabilities. This methodology further
allows for a differential in emphasis attached to liabilities, the level of risk tolerance and the
funding level of pension schemes. This enables us to determine how sensitive the results are
to these factors, but more importantly it permits pension funds to tailor their portfolios to their
particular nature and objectives.3 And most notably, it allows institutional investors to quan-
3The analysis in principal departs from a DB pension scheme but would be also applicable to a DC scheme.
The difference between a DB and DC scheme is who holds the investment risk, in a DB scheme it is the pension
fund and a DC scheme the participant. The portfolio optimization involves a single-period surplus optimization
that links investment opportunities and pension plan obligations, in the sense that we account for the funding level
of funds in the calculation of the liability hedge credit (LHC). The LHC follows directly from the correlations of
the asset return with the liability returns, current asset to liability ratio and the risk tolerance. These parameters
can be adjusted to tailor the portfolio to the nature and objectives of the scheme. Important differences would
be in a DC scheme the valuation is simply the market value of the assets held in the retirement account. The
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tify the liability hedging utility of each asset class both in terms of the estimated fair value
and in terms of actuarial changes. Finally, we model the portfolio trade-offs of long-term
institutional investors who face inflation risk. Institutional investors like pension funds face
inflation risk not solely for real income purposes but also to provide indexation to participants.
We quantify the hedge ratio with respect to inflation and interest rate risk for various holding
periods.
2.3 Methodology
To determine real estates’ role as a reserve asset, asset which moves in tandem with liabilities,
or a return-generating asset we apply a single-period surplus optimization investment frame-
work of Sharpe and Tint (1990) that explicitly links investment opportunities and pension-plan
obligations. The objective of the pension fund is to maximize surplus, defined as:
St+1 = At+1 − kLt+1, (2.1)
where At+1 represents the value of the fund’s assets at t+1, Lt+1 the value of the relevant
liability concept and k the attached importance to it. Choosing k=1 means that full importance
is attached to the liabilities, k=0 corresponds to an asset-only optimization. Denoting the
return on the asset portfolio by RA,t+1 and the growth rate of the liabilities by RL,t+1, the
surplus can be written as:
St+1 = At
[
(1 +RA,t+1)− kLt
At
(1 +RL,t+1)
]
, (2.2)
where Lt
At
denotes the fund’s current inverse funding ratio. Maximizing the expected utility of
St+1 is equivalent to maximizing that of:
Zt+1 = RA,t+1 − k
(
Lt
At
)
(RL,t+1) (2.3)
Accordingly, Sharpe and Tint (1990) formulate the optimization problem of the pension fund
as:
max
[
Et(Zt+1)− 1
λ
vart(Zt+1)
]
, (2.4)
actual size of the DC scheme will depend upon the realized investment performance of the retirement fund, the
interest rate, inflation, and the ultimate wage path of the employee. In this case a DC scheme optimization will
put weight on hedging the active (wage) liability, interest and inflation rate and adjust the optimization according
to its funding level relative to its desired fund size and risk tolerance.
Real Estate in an ALM Framework: The Case of Fair Value Accounting 11
where λ denotes a fund’s risk tolerance. If the portfolio weights to be chosen are denoted by
w, we have RA,t+1 =
∑
iwiRi,t+1, where Ri,t+1 denotes the return on asset i.
Following Sharpe and Tint (1990) let us focus on the second term in (2.4), which can be
written as:
vart
(
RA,t+1 − kLt
At
RL,t+1
)
= vart(RA,t+1) + k
2L
2
t
A2t
vart(RL,t+1)− 2kLt
At
covt(RA,t+1RL,t+1) (2.5)
The second term is irrelevant to the outcome of the maximization problem. The difference
with the standard asset-only optimization problem is concentrated in the last term. It stresses
that the assets’ covariances with the growth rate of the liabilities are key for the optimal allo-
cation. Sharpe and Tint (1990) define the liability hedge credit for any asset i as
LHCi =
2
λ
k
Lt
At
covt(Ri,t+1, RL,t+1), (2.6)
while the LHC of the entire portfolio is simply
LHCa =
∑
i
wiLHCi (2.7)
The total objective function follows a standard asset-only optimization problem, the expected
surplus return minus a risk penalty, while considering the change in pension liabilities and
their covariance with assets (LHCa).
max [Expected Return−Risk Penalty + Liability Hedge Credit]
max
[
RA,t+1 − vart(RA,t+1)
λ
+ LHCa
]
(2.8)
Other things being equal, an asset whose returns are highly correlated with liabilities provide
better liability hedging and receive a greater liability hedging credit. This ultimately results in
a higher weight in the ALM portfolio than under the traditional mean variance optimization.
The optimal portfolio weights in an asset-liability context will be a combination of the global
minimum variance portfolio in an asset-only case, with an asset-liability hedged portfolio.
Finally, we zoom into the risk associated with inflation and measure the extent to which
the various asset classes provide appropriate payout structures for indexation policies. We also
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test whether the degree of inflation protection varies with the investment horizon. We regress
the asset returns on expected and unexpected inflation and vary the horizons from 1 quarter to
10 years, resulting in the following equation:
H∑
h=1
Rt+H = cH+βHEt
[
H∑
h=1
πt+H
]
+ϕH
(
H∑
h=1
πt+H − Et
[
H∑
h=1
πt+H
])
+
H∑
h=1
ξt+h (2.9)
This equation decomposes the H-period return into a constant, two parts related to expected
and unexpected inflation and an unexpected return. The β measures the relation between
expected inflation and the asset return. If β = 1 the Fisher hypothesis holds in that there is
a one-to-one relation between expected nominal returns and expected inflation and expected
real returns are constant.4 The coefficient ϕ is the inflation sensitivity of the asset class with
respect to inflation shocks.
Following, Schotman and Schweitzer (2000) and Brounen et al. (2007) we assume infla-
tion follows an autoregressive process.
πt+1 = c+ απt + ηt+1 (2.10)
We use this to construct an empirical measure of the expected and unexpected inflation com-
ponents in equation (2.9), estimating the unknown coefficients using a rolling window of 40
quarterly observations. In equation (2.10) α represents the inflation persistence and mea-
sures how fast inflation returns to its long term average in the advent of an inflation shock
ηt+1. Subsequently, we use the AR(1) time series model to calculate the hedge ratio of
Schotman and Schweitzer (2000), which quantifies the composition adjustment of the portfo-
lio to reduce inflation risk in order to have the optimal inflation protection for various holding
periods.
The hedge ratio for horizon H is a function of the estimated inflation persistence parameter
α from (2.10), expected inflation hedge parameter β and unexpected inflation parameter φ
from (2.9), and the variance of the error terms of both equations. The covariance matrix of
asset returns and inflation changes with the investment horizon. As the hedge ratio quantifies
the composition adjustment of the portfolio to reduce inflation risk, we can determine which
asset class is capable of providing the appropriate payout structure to hedge interest rate risk
and aid in providing indexation also for longer holding periods.
4Note we do not assume the Fisher effect applies to all assets similarly in describing the link between real
and nominal returns.
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2.4 Data Description
Our study employs data from the United States, as for this country broad data coverage on both
transaction based property indices and property share indices are available. The analysis of
the asset returns is based on the 1984 to 2008 (Q2) period, taking quarterly observations. We
choose an investment feasibility set in accordance with previous papers of Chun et al. (2000)
and Craft (2001), Craft (2005a). The inclusion of additional asset classes will trouble the re-
sults making inferences concerning the contribution of real estate in an ALM portfolio difficult
to ascertain. Furthermore the objective is not to establish the optimal allocation but to asses
the interplay between the various definitions of liabilities, the weights attached to liabilities,
levels of risk tolerance and funding levels of pension schemes on portfolio allocations.
Data on stock returns were taken from Datastream Advance. Stock returns are approxi-
mated by the returns on the MSCI US index. Indirect real estate returns are based on Global
Property Research (GPR) General National index. Direct real estate returns are from the
MIT TBI series. MIT TBI is based on actual transaction prices of properties in the NCREIF
database using advanced econometrics techniques to correct for sample selection bias and
noise filtering. In comparison to the appraisal-based NCREIF Property Index, the MIT TBI
index does not suffer from appraisal biases and has slightly higher volatility, less autocor-
relation, and 1 to 3 years lead in major peaks and troughs (Fisher and Pollakowski (2007)).
This chapter is the first to include the MIT transaction index in an optimization problem in
an ALM setting. The 20-year treasury bond and the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa corporate bond
are in the asset mix (duration matched portfolio) while the 10 year constant maturity bond
is used in the calculation of nominal pension liabilities. Both the 10-year constant maturity
and Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate bond yields, are from the US Federal Reserve Bank
website.5 Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield are averages of daily data within a
given quarter. The 20-year Treasury bond is based on an index from Lehman Brothers.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of the performance of the asset categories that are consid-
ered in our study. The mean returns and standard deviations are computed for the 1984-2008
sample period. We document the highest return for indirect real estate, while direct real es-
tate appears to have outperformed stocks and indirect real estate in terms of the risk adjusted
performance of the asset class. The Sharpe ratio of direct real estate, calculated as annualized
excess return divided by the annualized standard deviation of returns, is 0.52 versus 0.42 for
5http://research.stlouisfed.org/
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stocks and 0.40 for indirect real estate.
We further combine the two fixed income securities, the 20-year treasury bond and the
Moody’s Seasoned Aaa corporate bond, to establish a duration matched portfolio similar to
those of the pension liabilities for the ALM portfolio. This is done to control for the influence
of duration mismatches on the portfolio composition. The duration of the fixed income assets
is calculated as:
Dn,t =
1− (1 + Yn,t)n
1− (1 + Yn,t)−1 (2.11)
where, Yn,t is the log annualized yield of a n-year maturity bond at time t. The average duration
is 12.09 years for the 20 year Treasury bond and 5.67 years for the Moody’s Seasoned Aaa
Corporate bond. To obtain the fraction weight (w) of each fixed income security in the duration
hedged portfolio we solve the following equation:
DL,t = w ∗D20,t + (1− w) ∗D7,t, (2.12)
w =
D20,t −D7,t
DL,t −D7,t (2.13)
where DL equals the duration of the pension liability, set equal to the average duration of
pension liabilities, 17 years. D20,t is the duration of the first fixed income security per quarter,
the 20-year treasury bond and similarly D7,t is the duration of the Corporate bond.
A crucial step in determining optimal portfolios for pension funds is the definition of the li-
ability. Each definition of the liability conceivably can result in different portfolio allocations.
Subsequently this chapter differentiates itself from previous studies as Chun et al. (2000) and
Craft (2001), Craft (2005a) by the way in which we define the return on liabilities. These
previous studies measure the returns on liabilities using the value of projected pension benefit
obligations (PBOs) of corporate-sponsored defined benefit pension plans. Projected benefit
obligations represent actuarial present value of all benefits earned by employees to the annual
reporting date, plus projected benefits attributable to future salary increases as determined by
each company’s benefit formula. To compare the effect of changing accounting practices of
the pension liabilities on allocations we model the market value of liabilities and proxy the ac-
tuarial changes using the changes related to the value of projected pension obligations (PBOs),
the latter in accordance with Chun et al. (2000) and Craft (2001), Craft (2005a). We obtain the
annual PBOs from Compustat. We construct a panel of pension liabilities using firms report-
ing over the entire available study period (1988-2007).6 Our study includes 471 firm plans.
6By 1988 firms were required by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to report PBO annually.
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Table 2.1
Sample Statistics
Mean returns and standard deviations are annualized continuously compounded quarterly total returns
related to the sample period of 1984-2008. The mean returns are also displayed in excess of the 3-month
T-bill. Stock returns are based on the U.S. MSCI index, direct real estate returns are from the NAREIT
series and indirect real estate returns are based on the MIT TBI index. Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corpo-
rate Bond (Duration 7 years) and the 3-month T-bill were obtained from the US Federal Reserve Bank
website. The 20-year Treasury bond is based on an index from Lehman Brothers. The duration matched
portfolio is constructed using the two fixed income classes to match the duration of the Fair value of
real pension liabilities. Panel D exhibits the correlation matrix of the asset classes. MSCI=Morgan
Stanley Capital International; GPR=Global Property Research; MIT TBI=Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Transaction-Based Index.
Excess Sharpe
Panel A: Annualized Return Return Return σ ratio
Stock (MSCI) 11.27% 6.53% 15.43% 0.42
Real Estate Stock (GPR) 11.56% 6.82% 16.94% 0.4
Direct Real Estate (MIT TBI) 8.59% 3.86% 7.38% 0.52
20-Year Treasury Bond 9.37% 4.63% 12.66% 0.37
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 8.70% 3.96% 4.65% 0.85
Subperiod Subperiod
(1984-1994) (1995-2007)
Panel B: Annualized Return Sub periods Return σ Return σ
Stock (MSCI) 12.99% 15.37% 9.90% 15.60%
Real Estate Stock (GPR) 11.48% 20.20% 11.62% 14.03%
Direct Real Estate (MIT TBI) 4.16% 7.44% 12.12% 6.90%
20-Year Treasury Bond 10.40% 13.62% 8.55% 11.95%
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 10.43% 5.39% 7.32% 3.87%
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics Bonds YTM Return Excess return
20-Year Treasury Bond 6.35% 9.37% 4.63%
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 7.73% 8.70% 3.96%
Duration matched portfolio 8.56% 3.87%
Direct 20-Year
Real Estate Stock Real Estate Treasury
Panel D: Correlation Asset Returns (MIT TBI) (MSCI) Stock (GPR) Bond
Direct Real Estate (MIT TBI) 1
Stock (MSCI) -0.13 1
Real Estate Stock (GPR) 0.01 0.55 1
20-Year Treasury Bond 0.01 -0.13 0.08 1
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Yield -0.03 -0.16 -0.11 0.12
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The actuarial change is approximated by the equally weighted annual rate of change of this
sample. The mean annual rate of change in pension liabilities was 9.88% and the standard
deviation 6.22%, close to those reported by Craft (2001).
For the analysis of the fair value of liability changes we assume that the returns on lia-
bilities follow the returns of the long-term constant maturity bond, estimated over the 1984
to 2008 period. A general assumption in pension studies as Nijman and Swinkels (2003),
Hoevenaars et al. (2008) and Binsbergen and Brandt (2005).
Before the introduction of the Pension Protection Act, liabilities were valued using actu-
arial principles and the present value of liabilities was determined by discounting future these
future contributions at a fixed or smoothed historical discount rate (r).
V actuarialt =
∑
n
CFt+n ∗ (1 + r)−n (2.14)
The Pension Protection Act requires a market-based valuation of liabilities. Valuation
of the fair value of liabilities comes down to discounting nominal fixed payments using the
market rates Rmt , typically market yields of fixed income securities.
7
V markett =
∑
n
CFt+n ∗ (1 +Rmt )−n
If longevity risk is ignored, the cash flows of the portfolio of nominal pension liabilities
equal those of a portfolio of bonds. Further assuming a pension fund is in stationary state
the distribution of the age cohorts and pension rights are constant over time, we can describe
its liabilities as a constant maturity bond. The fair value of liabilities is solely influenced
by changes in interest rates. The liability return is derived as a function of the log yield of
the constant maturity bond, assuming duration of 17 years, the average duration of pension
liabilities.
(1+rn,t+1) = Dn,t(1+Yn,t)−(Dn,t− 1
4
)(1+Yn−1,t+1 =
1
4
Yn−1,t+1−(Dn,t(Yn−1,t+1−Yn,t))
(2.15)
where, Yn,t is the log annualized yield of a n-year maturity bond at time t. We further
approximate Yn−1,t+1 by Yn,t+1, a common assumption also made by Hoevenaars et al. (2008).
7The new funding rules under the 2006 Pension protection Act, requires that discount rates are based on the
high quality corporate bond yield curve. Transition measures have been introduced for 2006 and 2007, but since
January 1st 2008, pension benefits are discounting liabilities using a corporate bond yield curve.
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The mean annual rate of change in the fair value of pension liabilities was 14.67% and the
standard deviation is significantly higher namely 15.27%. Fair valuation thus imposes larger
variability and with this higher risk.
The main difference relates to the choice of discount rates used to calculate the present
value of accrued benefits. If pension funds apply a higher discount rate, their liabilities will
be underestimated, especially in a low interest rate environment. Furthermore, a fixed rate
smoothes pension obligations while mark-to-market valuation induces considerable interest
rate risk, which could conceivably lead to different ALM portfolios.
Subsequently, we also define pension liabilities to include active liabilities. Active lia-
bilities are salary linked liabilities, the relationship between salary linked liabilities and asset
returns will determine the attractiveness of the various asset classes in a young versus mature
pension fund portfolio. For the calculation of active liabilities we include wage increases in
addition to the nominal liability returns. The data on wage growth was obtained using the U.S.
national average wage index.8
Finally, pension funds are long term investors who face inflation risk. Pension funds face
inflation risk not solely for real income purposes but also to provide indexation to participants.
Several papers indicate an important horizon effect in hedging inflation risk. In the short
run, many empirical studies observe a negative relation between inflation and stocks returns9,
while in the long run Schotman and Schweitzer (2000) show that stocks can be a hedge against
inflation depending on the investment horizon.10 We therefore study the hedging potential
against nominal liability returns and inflation for different investment horizons. This way, we
determine which asset class is capable of providing the appropriate payout structure to hedge
interest rate risk and aid in providing indexation also for longer holding periods.
The difference between an actuarial ALM and an ALM at fair value lies mostly in dif-
ferences between actuarial changes (mortality, longevity, projected salary increases), interest
and inflation. Active liabilities further stress the importance of hedging wage developments.
Other things being equal, an asset whose returns are highly correlated with developments in
mortality, longevity (or wages) provide better liability hedging in an actuarial ALM (active
ALM) than an asset class that hedges interest rate and inflation shocks. By allowing for vari-
8http//www.ssa.gov
9See for example, Fisher (1930), Bodie (1976), Fama (1975), Fama (1981), Fama (1990), Fama and Schwert
(1977), Geske (1983), James (1985) and Lee (1992) who find stocks to be a poor inflation hedge.
10Similarly, Brounen et al. (2007) find that the hedging capability of housing increases with extending invest-
ment horizons.
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ous definitions of liabilities we can establish the role of each asset class within various ALM
portfolios.
2.5 Asset-only Optimization
Mean-variance methodology ensures a portfolio selection that embodies diversification be-
tween assets and identifies the efficient set of portfolios that maximize expected return while
minimizing the variance of the expected returns. Risk reduction is a function of low or neg-
ative correlation coefficients between asset classes. Table 2.1, panel D, presents a correlation
matrix between the returns on stocks, long-term Treasury bonds, corporate bonds and direct
and indirect real estate. Direct real estate returns appear to be negatively correlated to stocks
and corporate bonds and positively correlated with treasury bonds. Real estate stocks in con-
trast do not appear to be highly correlated with direct real estate investments, but more with
common stocks. In the context of portfolio diversification direct real estate offers greater risk
diversification benefits. The low covariance of direct real estate with stocks and bonds should
greatly reduce portfolio risk.
Table 2.2
Asset-Only Allocation
Portfolios were derived using historical return and risk characteristics (1984-2008). The fixed income
assets consist of a 20-year Treasury maturity bond (effective duration 10 years) and Moody’s Seasoned
Aaa Corporate bond (effective duration 7 years). The tangency portfolio represents the optimal Sharpe
portfolio that optimizes the mean excess return divided by the standard deviation of returns. Panel B
reports portfolio compositions for five portfolios along the efficient frontier.
Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolios (Asset-Only)
Minimum Sharpe
Variance Optimal 1 2 3 4 5
μ 8.98% 9.07% 9.28% 9.41% 9.51% 9.61% 9.70%
σ 3.43% 3.47% 3.81% 4.16% 4.51% 4.85% 5.20%
Portfolio Weights
Direct Real Estate 24.99% 23.38% 19.71% 17.56% 15.60% 14.13% 12.62%
Stock 9.51% 11.10% 14.73% 16.87% 18.62% 20.24% 21.71%
Real Estate Stock 0.68% 2.26% 5.83% 7.97% 9.74% 11.30% 12.78%
Fixed Income 64.82% 63.26% 59.73% 57.60% 56.04% 54.33% 52.88%
Total Real Estate 25.67% 25.63% 25.54% 25.52% 25.34% 25.43% 25.41%
The efficient set of portfolios that maximize expected return for a given level of risk are
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constructed under the standard mean-variance analysis. We impose short-selling constraints
on all assets and portfolios must be fully invested. Table 2.2 reports portfolio compositions
for seven portfolios on the efficient frontier, beginning with the minimum variance portfolio
(MVP), the tangency portfolio and ending up at the high risk range of the efficient frontier.
In the selection of portfolios based on means and variances of returns the role for direct
real estate, as a risk diversifier in a portfolio, is substantial. The low correlation of direct real
estate with bonds and stocks in combination with the low standard deviation of returns results
in high allocations to this asset class in the low-risk range of the efficient frontier. The mean-
variance model, on the basis of transaction based real estate returns, estimates allocations to
direct real estate of 24.99%. At the higher risk tolerance levels indirect property investments
substitute the direct counterpart. The absence of indirect real estate in the low risk portfolios
can be explained by the high standard deviation of the asset class and the high correlation with
stocks, while direct real estate offers superior risk-adjusted returns next to risk diversification
properties. The efficient real estate allocation is relatively stable around 25%. The results
are in line with those of Ziering and McIntosh (1997), Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1997),
Kallberg et al. (1996), and Mueller and Mueller (2003), who use the NCREIF index while
accounting for the added smoothing risk and still find an optimal real estate allocation of
20%-30%. On the basis of a mean-variance asset-only optimization direct real estate warrants
inclusion in a mixed-asset portfolio because of its attractive risk-reward properties and its low
correlation with stocks and bonds.
2.6 The Liability Hedge Potential
An asset-liability model (ALM) is a model of the assets and liabilities that facilitates decision-
making with respect to asset allocation and the properties of the liabilities. An important
distinguishing feature is the interdependence between assets and liabilities. Table 2.3 presents
the contemporaneous correlations between the different liability specifications and asset re-
turns for the asset classes considered in this analysis.
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For all the asset classes we document positive correlations compared to the actuarial def-
inition of liabilities. This is most pronounced for the fixed income securities. Interestingly,
direct real estate appears to have the lowest correlation with actuarial changes, while indirect
real estate proves a better hedge in that respect. For indirect real estate we document positive
correlations compared to the actuarial definition of liabilities in line with Chun et al. (2004).
Once we define liabilities as active or salary linked liabilities hedging potential of indirect real
estate is lost. In effect direct real estate, bonds and stocks appear to be positively correlated
with wage increases. With equities correlating the most with wage changes. Once we account
for interest rate risk the correlation coefficients is positive for direct real estate, indirect real
estate and the fixed income securities. Though the magnitude of the correlation is quite small
indirect real estate in particular appears to offer hedging benefits against contemporaneous
interest rate risk, especially in comparison to stocks.
In terms of the liability utility to be derived, the liability hedge credit (LHC) follows
directly from the correlations of the asset return with the liability returns, current assets to
liability ratio and the risk tolerance.
LHCi =
2
λ
k
Lt
At
covt(Ri,t+1, RL,t+1)
The liability hedge credit is positively related to the covariance between an asset and
liabilities and to the inverse of the current funding ratio (Lt/At), while inversely related to
the risk tolerance (λ). The LHC as specified under actuarial change is positive for direct real
estate, ranging from 0.03% in the full surplus optimization scenario for fully funded funds
with a typical risk tolerance (λ=5) to 0.05% for underfunded funds (L/A=1.5) under similar
constraints (Figure 2.1). Once we define liabilities as active liabilities, indirect real estate
obtains a lower hedge credit, as the correlation with respect to wage developments is negative
(Figure 2.2). For direct real estate the liability hedging credit is slightly more pronounced due
to positive correlation with interest between salary linked liabilities and direct real estate.
Once we account for interest rate risk as under the fair value of liability, the hedging utility
becomes slightly stronger for indirect real estate, 0.16% for a fully funded fund, see Figure
2.3. Direct real estate provides significantly less hedging benefits for interest rate shock as
its liability hedge credit is close to zero. For nominal liabilities we are also able to establish
long horizon correlations and liability hedging potential, as we have a long data span. Over
longer holding periods direct and indirect real estate turn out to be perverse hedges for interest
rate changes. The liability hedge credit decreases from 0.04% (1 Quarter) to -0.38% for direct
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real estate for a holding period of 10 years. Similarly for real estate stocks, while at first the
liability hedge credit increases over a 1 year holding period to 0.36%, this decreases for longer
holding periods. In sharp contrast stocks and bonds prove to be a better interest rate hedge
over longer horizons.
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Figure 2.1
Actuarial liability hedge credit (LHC) per asset class
The liability hedge credit (LHC) quantifies the annualized utility that investors with liabilities can
derive from different asset classes. LHC is positively related to the covariance of an asset and the
liability and to the current assets to current liabilities (L0/A0), while inversely related to the risk tol-
erance (λ). LHC further depends on the weight of importance attached to it (k), full consideration of
liabilities (k=1) yields similar results as surplus optimization, while no consideration (k=0) provides
the same results as an asset-only methodology. The following graphs depict LHC’s for the actuarial
value of liabilities. We proxy the actuarial changes using the changes related to the value of projected
pension obligations (PBOs).MSCI=Morgan Stanley Capital International; GPR=Global Property Re-
search; MIT TBI=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Transaction-Based Index.
Overall, we have seen that the definition of liabilities mildly influences the liability hedg-
ing return to be derived of the various asset classes. Direct and indirect real estate provide
poor hedging utility with respect to nominal liabilities, especially for longer holding periods.
In the next section we will advance from the hedging characteristics to the implications for an
ALM portfolio and determine how the definition of liabilities influences portfolio allocations.
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Figure 2.2
Active Liability Hedge Credit (LHC) per asset class
The liability hedge credit (LHC) quantifies the annualized utility that investors with liabilities can de-
rive from different asset classes. LHC is positively related to the covariance of an asset and the liability
and to the current assets to current liabilities (L0/A0), while inversely related to the risk tolerance (λ).
LHC further depends on the weight of importance attached to it (k), full consideration of liabilities
(k=1) yields similar results as surplus optimization, while no consideration (k=0) provides the same
results as an asset-only methodology. The following graphs depict LHC’s for active liabilities. We
compute the return of active liabilities by adding wage increases to the real liability returns, the data on
wage growth was obtained using the national average wage index: http//www.ssa.gov. MSCI=Morgan
Stanley Capital International; GPR=Global Property Research; MIT TBI=Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Transaction-Based Index.
Subsequently, we look at the inflation hedging characteristics of the asset classes and calculate
hedge ratios.
2.7 ALM Portfolio Optimization
Within the mean-variance asset-only framework real estate plays an important role as a diver-
sifying asset class. Mean-variance efficient portfolios tend to contain a high level of direct real
estate and a higher portion of indirect real estate at higher risk levels. Within an ALM portfo-
lio, the portfolio composition differs depending on the definition of the liability return. Table
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2.4 shows that when liability returns solely follow actuarial changes the mean variance effi-
cient portfolio allocations shift towards fixed income securities, as compared to the asset-only
optimization. The actuarial liability hedge credit of the fixed income securities overshadows
real estate and stocks and as such the allocation towards the asset classes decreases in an ac-
tuarial ALM setting. When following the active definition of liabilities the allocation towards
stocks and real estate stocks increases with respect to the asset-only portfolio. Once account-
ing for wage developments return generating asset classes like stocks and indirect real estate
benefit. For short holding periods the allocations for direct real estate increases when account-
ing for interest rate changes. As compared to the actuarial ALM optimization the allocations
are higher for direct real estate. The change in accounting practice influences the optimal port-
folio allocation and makes direct real estate more attractive when comparing to an asset-only
scenario. Nonetheless, when allowing for longer holding periods direct real estate allocation
decreases considerably as can be seen in Table 2.5. For long holding periods indirect real
estate prevails, especially in the riskier portfolios.
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Figure 2.3
Nominal Liability Hedge Credit (LHC) per asset class
The liability hedge credit (LHC) quantifies the annualized utility that investors with liabilities can de-
rive from different asset classes. The following graphs depict LHC’s for nominal liabilities for various
pension characteristics and holding periods. For the analysis of the fair value of liability changes we as-
sume that the return on liabilities follows the return of the long-term constant maturity bond, estimated
over the 1984 to 2008 period. The fair value of liabilities is influenced by interest rate changes.
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Table 2.5
Long horizon Portfolio Allocations (Nominal Liabilities)
Table 2.5 displays the optimal portfolio allocations for both the minimum variance and tangency port-
folio for a nominal ALM model. The tangency portfolio represents the optimal Sharpe portfolio that
optimizes the mean excess return divided by the standard deviation of returns. Portfolios were derived
using rolling window regressions. MSCI=Morgan Stanley Capital International; GPR=Global Property
Research; MIT TBI=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Transaction-Based Index.
Long horizon Portfolio Allocation
Holding Period 1 Quarter 5 Year 10 Year
Portfolio Composition Minimum Variance (Nominal Liabilities)
Direct Real Estate (MIT TBI) 23.69% 23.86% 12.14%
Stock (MSCI) 9.68% 0.59% 0.00%
Real Estate Stock (GPR) 0.95% 0.00% 0.00%
Fixed Income 65.68% 75.55% 87.86%
Portfolio Composition Tangency (Nominal Liabilities)
Holding Period 1 Quarter 5 Year 10 Year
Direct Real Estate (MIT TBI) 21.94% 21.53% 0.00%
Stock (MSCI) 12.37% 0.04% 0.00%
Real Estate Stock (GPR) 0.92% 0.00% 14.24%
Fixed Income 64.77% 78.43% 85.76%
The attractiveness of real estate as an asset class is also dependent on the particular dis-
position of the pension fund (See table 2.6). As funding ratios improve or the importance
attached to liabilities deteriorate, direct real estate obtains a higher portfolio allocation. Di-
rect real estate materializes in an asset-liability portfolio as a relatively safe asset class of
particular utility to fully or over funded pension funds. In line with Chun et al. (2000) and
Craft (2005a),Craft (2005b) overfunded funds are much more likely to hold public real es-
tate than underfunded counterparts. The optimal portfolio allocations for real estate, both
direct and indirect, lingers around 20% to 25%, which result in an expected return utility of
around 9%, depending on the level of risk tolerance and funding ratio of the pension fund.
Though the hedging utility of real estate relatively to fixed income securities is limited the
return enhancement and diversification properties of direct and indirect real estate investments
ensure an allocation in an ALM portfolio, real estate can increase returns more sharply than it
increases surplus risk. Direct and indirect real estate warrants inclusion in a mixed-asset port-
folio because of its attractive risk-reward properties, its diversification potential with stocks
and bonds, and to a lesser extent to its interest hedging abilities.
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Table 2.6
Sensitivity analysis asset liability management (ALM) allocations
Portfolios were derived using historical return and risk characteristics (1984-2008). The tangency
portfolio represents the optimal Sharpe portfolio that optimizes the mean excess return divided by the
standard deviation of returns. Portfolio compositions for five portfolios along the efficient frontier are
also given. Portfolio weights are determined by maximizing the objective function given the stan-
dard deviation of the asset-only portfolios. The ALM portfolio parameters are the inverse funding
level, the current liability to current asset level (L0/A0), risk tolerance (λ) and the weight of impor-
tance attached to liabilities (k), full consideration of liabilities (k=1) yields similar results as surplus
optimization, while no consideration (k=0) provides the same results as an asset-only methodology.
For the analysis of the fair value of liability changes we use nominal liabilities as adjusted for in-
terest rate risk. MSCI=Morgan Stanley Capital International; GPR=Global Property Research; MIT
TBI=Massachusetts Institute of Technology Transaction-Based Index.
Portfolio Weights
Real
Direct Estate Total
Std. Real Estate Stock Stock Fixed Real
Portfolios Er Dev. (MIT TBI) (MSCI) (GPR) Income Estate
ALM Allocations (Nominal Liabilities)
L/A = 1.5 k = 1 λ = 5
1 9.20% 3.43% 22.09% 11.62% 2.84% 63.45% 24.93%
2 9.20% 3.43% 22.09% 11.62% 2.84% 63.45% 24.93%
3 9.47% 3.81% 18.52% 13.64% 5.46% 62.38% 23.98%
4 9.62% 4.16% 15.84% 15.30% 7.36% 61.50% 23.20%
5 9.73% 4.51% 13.54% 16.66% 8.88% 60.92% 22.42%
L/A = 1 k = 1 λ = 5
1 9.72% 3.43% 23.43% 11.68% 0.61% 64.29% 24.03%
2 9.10% 3.47% 23.02% 12.11% 0.61% 64.26% 23.64%
3 10.27% 3.81% 20.97% 14.38% 0.54% 64.10% 21.51%
4 10.57% 4.16% 19.53% 15.89% 0.55% 64.02% 20.09%
5 10.82% 4.51% 18.38% 17.15% 0.58% 63.90% 18.95%
L/A = 0.5 k = 0.5 λ = 5
1 9.06% 3.43% 22.80% 11.92% 2.76% 62.52% 25.56%
2 9.09% 3.47% 22.41% 12.33% 3.27% 61.98% 25.69%
3 9.30% 3.81% 19.46% 14.66% 6.01% 59.87% 25.47%
4 9.42% 4.16% 17.08% 16.72% 8.17% 58.03% 25.25%
5 9.52% 4.51% 15.17% 18.39% 9.98% 56.46% 25.15%
L/A = 0.5 k = 0.5 λ = 10
1 9.10% 3.47% 22.42% 12.32% 3.27% 61.99% 25.69%
2 9.10% 3.47% 22.42% 12.32% 3.27% 61.99% 25.69%
3 9.31% 3.81% 19.46% 14.66% 6.01% 59.87% 25.47%
4 9.44% 4.16% 17.08% 16.72% 8.17% 58.03% 25.25%
5 9.54% 4.51% 15.18% 18.38% 9.99% 56.45% 25.17%
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2.8 Inflation Hedge
Institutional investors like pension funds also face inflation risk not solely for real income pur-
poses but also to provide indexation to participants. As many studies have already documented
the existence of a horizon effect for inflation hedging characteristics of asset classes, we use
long horizon regression and calculate hedge ratios.11 Inflation is separated in an expected and
unexpected component. We assume that inflation expectation follows an AR(1) process. The
coefficients are estimated using rolling regressions using 10 years of history (40 quarters).
For various holding periods we calculate hedge ratios against inflation, which follow from
the degree of inflation persistence. The hedge ratio quantifies the composition adjustment of
the portfolio to reduce inflation risk. This way, we determine which asset class is capable
of providing the appropriate payout structure to hedge interest rate risk and aid in providing
indexation also for longer holding periods.
Table 2.7 presents the long run inflation hedge potential of the various asset classes.
Firstly, the results indicate that the fisher effect of a one-to-one relationship between expected
inflation and asset returns does not hold in the data. Secondly, direct real estate appears to be
a poor inflation hedge over the short and long run, both for expected and unexpected inflation.
Real estate stocks prove to provide a partial hedge against unexpected inflation for holding
periods beyond 10 years. In line with the results of Schotman and Schweitzer (2000) we ob-
serve stocks to be a good inflation hedge over long investment periods, but this pertains in
great deal to expected inflation. Similarly, bonds are a good hedge for expected inflation but
not for inflation shocks.
11See for example Schotman and Schweitzer (2000), Brounen et al. (2007)
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Table 2.7
Inflation Protection
Estimates for protection against expected and unexpected inflation (1984-2008). Expected
inflation is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process. The coefficients are esti-
mated using rolling regressions using 10 years of history (40 quarters). Newey-West HAC
Standard Errors & Covariance were used (lag truncation=3), T-Statistics in parenthesis, *
indicates significance at a 5% significance level. MSCI=Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional; GPR=Global Property Research; MIT TBI=Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Transaction-Based Index.
Expected Unexpected
Investment Horizon c β ϕ R2
Direct Real Estate (MIT)
1 Quarter 0.037 -1.758 0.142 0.61%
(2.850)* (-1.323) (0.253)
1 Year 0.246 -4.537 -0.745 26.78%
(5.450)* (-3.816)* (-0.599)
5 Year 1.405 -5.986 -2.571 75.75%
(12.030)* (-10.315)* (-2.173)*
10 Year 2.915 -5.734 -0.501 94.76%
(27.145)* (-15.613)* (-0.561)
Real Estate Stocks(GPR)
1 Quarter 0.031 -0.191 0.557 -1.91%
(1.506) (-0.078) (0.462)
1 Year 0.287 -5.515 -6.185 10.96%
(2.545)* (-1.593) (-1.775)
5 Year 1.230 -4.116 -1.341 20.58%
(4.283)* (-2.384)* (-0.519)
10 Year 1.768 -1.691 1.063 26.87%
(7.177)* (-2.098)* (0.610)
Stocks (MSCI)
1 Quarter 0.015 1.661 1.099 -1.15%
(0.571) (0.630) (0.796)
1 Year 0.022 2.502 -2.513 5.77%
(0.185) (0.803) (-1.124)
5 Year -0.099 2.647 -8.269 42.60%
(-0.323) (1.864) (-2.552)*
10 Year -0.050 2.951 -4.730 61.09%
(-0.181) (2.856)* (-2.146)*
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
Treasury Bond
1 Quarter 0.018 0.552 -0.666 -1.42%
(0.921) (0.252) (-0.569)
1 Year 0.028 1.056 -4.912 17.20%
(0.413) (0.553) (-3.529)
5 Year 0.045 2.086 -0.554 24.72%
(0.301) (2.453)* (-0.368)
10 Year 0.246 1.285 -2.333 55.84%
(1.470) (2.084)* (-2.202)*
Corporate Aaa Bond
1 Quarter 0.019 0.243 -1.090 8.55%
(3.935)* (0.446) (-3.977)*
1 Year 0.033 1.326 -1.964 31.87%
(1.425) (1.972)* (-3.704)*
5 Year 0.133 1.723 0.185 61.90%
(2.520)* (5.116)* (0.409)
10 Year 0.235 1.739 -0.113 81.28%
(2.779)* (5.456)* (-0.245)
For all the asset classes with the exception of stocks we find negative hedge ratios in
figure 2.4. To obtain inflation protection an institutional investor needs to short real estate.
For direct real estate the effective short position to hedge inflation ranges from 16% for a one
year holding period to 22% for holding periods beyond 7 years. In effect, given an optimal
allocation of 25%, the optimal portfolio weight for a pension fund seeking inflation protection,
would decrease to 8% for a one year holding period and to 3% for long term portfolios. For
real estate stocks the allocation hedge ratio is slightly lower (-9%, holding period> 9 years),
as real estate stocks provide a partial hedge against unexpected inflation for holding periods
beyond 10 years. Nonetheless, the inflation risk impact on the portfolio composition renders
zero or even short allocations. When accounting for inflation risk, the optimal portfolios come
close to reported allocations (Bajtelsmit and Worzala (1995), Dhar and Goetzmann (2006)).
Accordingly, the hedge ratios indicate a significant downgrade for real estate in an ALM
portfolio once accounting for inflation.
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Figure 2.4
Hedge Ratios
The hedge ratio quantifies the composition adjustment of the portfolio to reduce inflation risk in order
to have the optimal inflation protection for various holding periods. The hedge ratio for horizon H is a
function of the estimated inflation persistence parameter α, expected inflation hedge parameter β and
unexpected inflation parameter ϕ, and the variance of the error terms of both equations ση, σε. The
covariance matrix of asset returns and inflation changes with the investment horizon.
2.9 Return Predictability
Following pension liabilities as the starting point in determining the appropriate investment
strategies, in this final section we depart from IID assumptions that returns are independently,
identically distributed and allow for return predictability. With return predictability we mean
the use of certain conditioning information for investors to form expectations on asset re-
turns and risk. As such information changes over time, investment opportunities, drawn from
the expected return-risk dynamics, also change over time. Investment decisions are typically
made ex-ante and are characterized with future uncertainties. For example, discounted (uncer-
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tain) future cash flows determine asset prices, based on which expected returns are calculated.
A random shock like unexpected interest rate cut may immediately alter investors’ expecta-
tions. Thus systematic or common factors may cause certainties, or uncertainties, in terms of
expected return or risk characteristics, which ultimately might lead to improved investment
decision-making ex-ante.
Recently, a growing number of studies shed light on the REIT’s predictability.12. Gen-
erally speaking, real estate return predictors seem not to be so different from the other asset
classes examined. We therefore examine the influence of return predictability on the return risk
dynamics of the asset classes and consequently the portfolio allocations. Fugazza and Nicodano
(2007) and Hoevenaars et al. (2008) document time-horizon changes in the risk return dynam-
ics of property stocks due to the predictability of real estate stock returns. MacKinnon and AlZaman
(2009) find that also direct real estate is predictable and that consequently return and risk of
direct real estate differs depending on the investment horizon. In this section we examine the
time-varying risk return dynamics of both direct and indirect real estate, and verify real estates
role in a long term asset-liability portfolio.
We use a VAR model to model asset return dynamics and to capture the horizon effects on
real estate risk, inflation risk and interest rate risk. The VAR model is not only able to capture
the time-varying return dynamics over time, but is highly regarded as a credible approach in
data description and data forecasting (Stock and Watson (2001)). The risk return dynamics as
captured by the VAR(1) model are obtained by regressing the return onto a constant, it’s lagged
value, lagged values of the other asset classes and the return predictors. The predictions are
calculated by plugging the last available quarter values of the state variables and asset classes
into the VAR(1) specification. We use state variables that have been identified as return pre-
dictors by previous empirical research , such as the short-term interest rate, the dividend price
ratio and the yield spread between long and short term bonds. Furthermore, these variables
have proven to be good proxies of consumption growth (Kandel and Stambaugh (1990)). In
accordance with Fugazza and Nicodano (2007) and MacKinnon and AlZaman (2009) we also
incorporate inflation as a state variable. Rehring (2011) stresses the importance of the cap-
rate as a predictor. The cap-rate is the log of the income return over the capital appreciation.
We thus include five variables as return predictors or so called state variables, the short-term
interest rate, the dividend yield, inflation, the cap-rate and the yield spread between long and
12Bharati and Gupta (1992), Liu and Mei (1992), Mei and Lee (1994), Mei and Liu. (1994), Li and Wang
(1998), Nelling and Gyourko (1998), Liao and Mei (1998), Ling et al. (1992), Chun et al. (2004) and
Serrano and Hoesli (1994)
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short term bonds. These forecasting variables have been widely used for stock and real estate
securities.13
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the real liability returns (RRLt+1). Following the
Fisher hypothesis we decompose the nominal yield into a real return (RRLt+1) and inflation
compensation, where the inflation compensation reflects expected inflation (πt+1) and an in-
flation risk premium, which for reasons of simplicity we assume to be constant.
Y nomt = Y
real
t + Et[πt+1] (2.16)
We assume that inflation expectation follows a first order autoregressive function. The
coefficients are estimated using rolling regressions and 10 years of history. Thus we assume
that for each quarter investors form expectations on the basis of the last 10 years of quarterly
observations.
2.9.1 Methodology
Assuming return predictability allows us to condition expectations on the available informa-
tion at time t.
E[Ret+1|zt] = Et[Ret+1]
V [Ret+1|zt] = Vt[Ret+1] (2.17)
where zt is a vector that contains all the relevant information. Note that if returns are IID
(Independently, Identically Distributed) then zt does not matter and returns settle to uncon-
ditional expectations. The vector zt includes the continuously compounded quarterly excess
returns on all assets (xt+1), the real short-term interest rate, the dividend price ratio, the yield
spread between long and short term bonds and realized inflation. We use the short-term in-
terest rate, the dividend price ratio, the yield spread and realized inflation as state variables
(st+1). The state variables allow us to capture the horizon effects on the asset, inflation and
13Due to the large number of variables we extend the time period to the last quarter of 2010 to ensure we have
sufficient observations to estimate the VAR model.
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interest rate risk.
zt+1 =
⎡
⎣ rf,t+1rt+1 − rf,t+1
st+1
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣rf,t+1xt+1
st+1
⎤
⎦ (2.18)
where rf,t+1 is the log (continuously compounded) real return on the asset that we use as
a risk free asset. xt+1 is a vector of log excess returns of the asset classes and st+1 is the vector
of state variables. For the ALM modeling context the liability return is also included in the
xt+1.
In this setting we specify zt by a simple VAR(1) and assume log excess returns and the
conditioning information are linear functions of the past. Each variable zi,t+1 included in zt+1
depends linearly on a constant, its own lagged value, the lagged value of all other variables in
zt+1 and a contemporaneous random shock εi,t+1.
zt+1 = φ0 + Φ1zt + εt+1 (2.19)
φ0 is a vector of intercepts, Φ1 is a square matrix of slope coefficients and εt+1 is a vector
of zero mean shocks to the returns and the return forecasting variables. Σt denotes the matrix
of contemporaneous variance and covariance of shocks. Note we assume for the sake of
simplicity that Σt is time-invariant. Following the calibration of the VAR(1) specification
using the historical time series we calculate the k-period ahead predictions by filling in the
last available quarter values of the state variables and asset classes in the estimated model.
Forecasts from VAR models are made conditional on the potential future paths of specified
state variables and asset classes in the model. The VAR(1) predictions are subsequently used
in a multi-horizon portfolio optimization.
2.9.2 Term Structure of Risk
Predictability of asset returns alters the optimal portfolio through the effect of the term struc-
ture (i.e. variance and covariance) of risk. If returns are unpredictable their risk, return and
correlations are constant across investment horizons. Departing from the assumption of in-
dependently and identically distributed returns implies that risk, defined as the conditional
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variance and covariance per period of asset returns, may be significantly different for differ-
ent investment horizons. Investors will have different return and risk expectations based on
the changing state variables. We describe the dynamic behavior of asset returns using a first
order vector autoregressive process (VAR(1)) as in Campbell and Viceira (2005). The degree
of predictability is reported in Table 2.8. For both direct and indirect real estate the degree
of predictability is relatively large, the adjusted R2 are 37.15% and 26.72% respectively. The
coefficients of stocks, corporate bonds and lagged inflation is statistically significant in the
equation of indirect real estate. A 1% increase in stock return predicts a 0.33% increase in
real estate stocks in the following quarter. A 1% change in corporate bond returns predicts a
4.86% increase in real estate stock returns, while inflation inflation leads to a 7.08% increase
for the indirect real estate index in the subsequent quarter.
Furthermore, we see that the indirect real estate market reveals information concerning the
direct market and can aid in the forecasting of indirect real estate returns. The direct real estate
equation indicates that a increase of 1% in real estate stocks returns at t-1 predicts an increase
of 16 bp in the subsequent period for direct real estate. The GPR-index leads the MIT index,
a finding previously corroborated by Myer and Webb (1993), Barkham and Geltner (1995),
and Glascock and So (2000) who all find that the public market causes changes in the private
market.
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Figure 2.5 further reveals the standard deviation of the asset returns across various holding
periods, the term structure of risk of the asset classes. The expectation and variance of the log
excess returns depend on the state variables and on the investment horizon k. If returns are
unpredictable their risk per period and correlations are constant across investment horizons.
For the real estate asset class the annualized variances increase as the holding period increases.
The standard deviation increases from 18% in the first quarter to 31% for a holding period of
25 years, a result similar to Fugazza and Nicodano (2007). Real estate stocks furthermore
remain the riskiest asset class across all investment horizons. For direct real estate we see
an increase in annualized variances as the holding period increases. A negative shock to the
indirect market lowers the return contemporaneously and is then again likely to be followed
by a lower return, amplifying the annualized volatility of direct real estate. This result is in
contrast to the results of MacKinnon and AlZaman (2009), who find real estate to become less
risky over time. Even when using their exact sample period, data and specification, our results
show that real estate becomes riskier over time. Rehring (2011) corroborates our findings and
attributes the results of MacKinnon and AlZaman (2009) to a programming error.
In accordance with the results of Campbell and Viceira (2005) we see strong mean re-
verting properties for stocks as the annualized standards deviation decreases from 15% to 9%.
Stocks eventually become less risky than direct real estate for holding periods longer than 8
years. T-bills are the least risky asset class, nonetheless the reinvestment risk associate with
rolling over the asset class for long investment horizons magnifies the standard deviation of
returns.
Figure 2.6 shows the return predictions for the various holding periods on the basis of the
VAR model. Real estate stocks are expected to give the highest return, a 17% gross return in
the long run. The expected return for direct real estate is increasing in the investment horizon
after 3 years, while for stocks the expected return outlook is lower, 5% for long run portfolios.
Figure 2.6 also shows the correlation structure of the asset classes for various holding pe-
riods. Interestingly, the correlation coefficient between direct and indirect real estate increases
as we hold the asset classes over longer investment periods. At short horizons the correlation
between direct and indirect real estate is quite low, namely 0.25. When accounting for re-
turn predictability, the correlation coefficient between direct and indirect real estate increases
sharply to 0.81 for an investment horizon of 25 years. Indicating that over the long run the
asset classes are affected by similar return and risk dynamics. Convergence in correlation be-
tween direct and indirect real estate appears to be induced by the predictability of direct real
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Figure 2.5
Term Structure of Risk
The figure depicts the forecasts of the annualized standard deviation as specified under the VAR(1)
model. The standard deviation is depicted as a function of the investment horizon.
estate returns from real estate stock returns.
The diversification potential of real estate also differs depending on the holding period.
The correlation of real estate stocks with stocks decreases severely over time. The results are
in line with those of Fugazza, Guidolin and Nicadono (2007), who also observe a decrease
in correlation between indirect real estate and stocks and an increase with bonds. The results
indicate enhanced diversification benefits for real estate stocks with respect to common equity.
Direct real estate in contrast correlates more strongly with stocks in the long run.
2.9.3 Liability Hedge
An asset-liability model (ALM) is a model of assets and liabilities that facilitates decision-
making with respect to asset allocation and the properties of the liabilities. An important
distinguishing feature is the interdependence between assets and liabilities. Figure 2.7 depicts
the correlations between pension liabilities and the asset returns in a multi-horizon setting.
The interdependence between assets and liabilities represent the hedging qualities of the asset
classes with respect to real liabilities of pension funds. The liability returns represent both
interest and inflation risk as faced by a typical pension fund with a duration of 17 years.
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Figure 2.6
Term Structure of Return and Correlation
The top graph is the forecast of gross returns, log returns are adjusted by adding one-half their variance
to reflect mean gross returns. The bottom graph depicts the forecasts of the correlation coefficient as
specified under the VAR(1) model, as a function of the investment horizon.
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Term Structure of Correlation with Real Liability
The figure depicts the forecasts of the correlation coefficient with respect to pension liabilities as
specified under the VAR(1) model. The liability return is derived as a function of the log yield of the
constant maturity bond, assuming duration of 17 years, the average duration of pension liabilities. Real
Liabilities are adjusted for inflation and interest rate risk. We decompose the nominal yield into a real
yield and inflation compensation, where the inflation compensation reflects expected inflation (πt+1)
and an inflation risk premium, which for reasons of simplicity we assume constant. We further assume
that inflation expectation follows a first order autoregressive function.
Both direct and indirect real estate provide a poor hedge for interest and inflation risk in
the short and long run, the correlation coefficient remains close to zero for real estate stocks
and for direct real estate.
To explore more in depth how the asset classes respond to interest and inflation and liabil-
ity shocks we perform an impulse response analysis based on the VAR(1). In a VAR system a
shock to the i-th variable not only directly affects the i-th variable but is also transmitted to all
of the other endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the VAR, to account for
the contemporaneous cross-correlation between shocks we use generalized impulse responses.
The impulse response function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations
on current and future values of the endogenous variable. We set the impulses to one standard
deviation of the residuals and trace how interest, inflation and liability shocks affect the returns
of stocks, bonds and real estate.
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Figure 2.8 depicts the percentage deviations in the asset classes returns over time after a
one-time standard deviation increase in liabilities, inflation and interest rates. A shock to lia-
bilities has a positive influence on bonds, but this is relatively short-lived, after 3 quarters the
response disappears. For indirect real estate a liability increase has a negative immediate effect
which becomes positive as of the fourth quarter although the magnitude of the increase is eco-
nomically negligible after the sixth quarter. The effect on direct real estate is indistinguishable
from zero.
We can further disentangle the liability shock by looking at the response of the asset
classes to inflation shocks. Indirect and direct real estate are initially positively affected by
inflation shocks, while bonds respond negatively. Following a year both direct and indirect
real estate are negatively affected by inflation.
2.9.4 Asset Liability Portfolio using Return Predictability
In terms of portfolio allocation the assets’ covariance with the growth rate of the liabilities
are key. Other things being equal, an asset whose returns are highly correlated with liabilities
provide better liability hedging. This ultimately should result in a higher weight in the ALM
portfolio than under the traditional mean variance optimization. For an ALM investor the
objective function is formulated in the surplus of assets over liabilities. We again impose short-
selling constraints on all assets and portfolios must be fully invested. Results are computed for
a level of risk aversion γ = 5. Portfolio weights are determined by maximizing the objective
function given the standard deviation of the asset-only portfolios to enhance the comparability
of the results. By contrasting the portfolio composition in the asset-only case with the ALM
portfolio under similar risk levels we see the effect of interest and inflation risk on the portfolio
allocation problem when assuming return predictability.
Table 2.9 shows the ALM portfolios for various holding periods. The first portfolio is the
minimum variance portfolio for various holding periods. To obtain a similar standard deviation
as the minimum variance portfolio in the asset-only scenario a fully invested pension fund
would need to allocate 0.75% to direct real estate when considering real liabilities versus the
2.32%when focusing on asset returns solely, ignoring return predictability for a holding period
of a quarter. For longer holding periods the allocation towards direct real estate decreases in
comparison to the asset-only scenario due to the negative hedging utility of direct real estate
regarding interest and inflation movements.
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Figure 2.8
Generalized Impulse Response
The impulses are set to one standard deviation of the residuals of the liability return and inflation rate.
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The results are much less pronounced for the equivalent maximum Sharpe ratio portfolio.
When accounting for liability obligations, the portfolio composition for long term portfolios
contains 5.21% direct real estate in an ALM setting (25 year holding period) versus none in
an asset-only context.
Real estate stocks, in contrast, get a higher allocation in the minimum variance ALM
portfolio and a slightly lower allocaytion in the ALM tangency portfolio.
At very long holding periods (25 years) real estate stocks obtain an allocation of 2.36%.
Our results thus corroborate the findings of Hoevenaars et al. (2008) for indirect real estate,
yet the total real estate exposure is not minor.
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In accordance with Chun, Ciochetti and Shilling (2000), Craft (2001), and Booth (2004)
and the results in the IID setting we find that direct and indirect real estate warrant inclusion in
a mixed-asset portfolio because of their attractive risk-reward properties, their diversification
potential with stocks and bonds, but not because of its interest and inflation hedging abilities.
2.9.5 Robustness check
In this section we perform additional exercises to verify our results and to illustrate the sensi-
tivity of the portfolio allocations to the starting values of the state variables and asset classes,
and subsequently to changes in parameter uncertainty.
The risk return dynamics as captured by the VAR(1) model were derived using historical
return series. The predictions following the VAR(1) specification were calculated using the
last available quarter values of the state variables and asset classes. To determine how sensitive
the results are to the initial values of the state variables and asset classes we use the 20th
percentile return as the starting value for the VAR(1) predictions and create the ALM efficient
tangency portfolio. To tackle parameter uncertainty we increase the estimate of the constant
parameters of direct and indirect real estate equations downward by one standard deviation,
similar to Barberis (2000). The impact of parameter uncertainty and initial value change is
substantial for real estate allocations, as can be seen in Table 2.10. Real estate obtains a lower
allocation in the short and long horizon portfolios.
Overall, the results are sensitive to parameter uncertainty and the initial value choice. The
results are driven by changes in the expected return predictions. The covariance matrix is rel-
atively stable and forecasts similar risk dynamics. The term structure of risk and correlations
of the asset classes are robust to the exclusion of cap rates as a state variable and the exclusion
of the crises period following 2008 to 2010. The uncertainty surrounds the mean returns. De-
parting from a worst case scenario results in portfolio allocations in favor of return generating
asset classes, especially when considering a surplus optimization.
2.10 Conclusion
The average American pension funds allocate less than 5% of their assets to real estate (Dhar
and Goetzmann, 2006). While mean-variance asset-only portfolios predict allocations of 20%
to 30%. The actual and suggested weights of real estate in the institutional portfolio are incon-
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Table 2.10
Sensitivity Analysis
The first panel is the standard tangency ALM portfolio. The second panel tabulates the tangency ALM
portfolio allocation using the 20th percentile return as the starting value for the VAR(1) predictions.
The third panel shows the tangency ALM efficient portfolio in the presence of parameter changes. To
tackle parameter uncertainty we increase the estimate of the constant parameters of direct and indirect
real estate equations downward by 1 standard deviation.
Benchmark ALM portfolios
Tangency Portfolio
Holding period 1 Quarter 5 Year 10 Year 25 Year
Stocks 4.15% 4.48% 3.53% 5.37%
RE Stocks 0.87% 3.06% 2.68% 2.36%
Direct RE 12.39% 0.00% 2.97% 5.21%
Corporate Bond 67.02% 35.23% 38.12% 36.22%
Treasury 14.77% 57.23% 51.22% 46.40%
Tbill 0.79% 0.00% 1.47% 4.43%
Initial Value Change
Tangency Portfolio
Holding period 1 Quarter 5 Year 10 Year 25 Year
Stocks 6.21% 8.41% 1.87% 13.77%
RE Stocks 3.82% 3.78% 0.74% 2.70%
Direct RE 11.96% 0.00% 5.45% 0.00%
Corporate Bond 41.73% 17.11% 11.14% 4.54%
Treasury 0.00% 28.05% 26.04% 43.00%
Tbill 36.28% 42.65% 54.76% 35.99%
Parameter Uncertainty
Tangency Portfolio
Holding period 1 Quarter 5 Year 10 Year 25 Year
Stocks 3.89% 22.66% 21.20% 25.89%
RE Stocks 0.81% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Direct RE 11.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Corporate Bond 1.12% 5.30% 46.70% 34.11%
Treasury 64.41% 33.50% 28.90% 31.70%
Tbill 18.18% 38.54% 3.20% 8.30%
sistent against the classic mean-variance framework predicted allocations. We find that this
discrepancy is attributable to real estate’s poor inflation hedging capabilities. Once accounting
for inflation the projected allocations come close to reported ones. Our results further show
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that real estate offers hedging benefits against interest rates for shorter holding periods, but
not for long term institutional portfolios. Commercial real estate is a perverse inflation and
interest rate hedge in the long run and offers pension funds no additional advantage beyond its
diversification potential and its attractive risk reward characteristics.
Even when departing from the assumption of independently and identically distributed
returns and considering the time diversification properties of real estate, the portfolio compo-
sition for long term portfolios contains less direct and indirect real estate. We characterized
the term structure of risk and showed that the variance and correlation of real estate changes
noticeably with the investment horizon. Both direct and indirect real estate are closely corre-
lated at longer horizons. The return series of indirect and direct real estate fluctuate conjointly
in a long-run relationship and could act as close substitutes for long term portfolios. Addition-
ally we found an increase in annualized variances of the real estate asset class as the holding
period increases. When accounting for liability obligations real estate offers reduced hedging
benefits against inflation and interest rates and consequently, the portfolio composition for
long term portfolios contains less direct and indirect real estate.
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Chapter 3
Short Sales and Fundamental Value:
Explaining the REIT Premium to NAV∗
3.1 Introduction
Why shares of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) trade at prices that differ from their un-
derlying net asset value (NAV) is not well understood. Moreover, there is substantial variation
in share price deviations from NAVs both in the cross-section and over time. For example,
firm level NAV premiums for U.S. REITs in 2007 and 2008 ranged from -56% to 70% and
from -61% to 31%, respectively.1
The variation in NAV premiums is often attributed to firm specific characteristics (e.g.
management quality, size, age, expense ratio), market sentiment, and limits to arbitrage. Short
sale constraints are a form of limits to arbitrage. According to Miller (1977), differences in
investor opinions in the presence of short-sale constraints lead to stock price overvaluation.
More specifically, if short selling is constrained, negative information about the firm may not
reach the market. Therefore, stock prices may not reflect fundamental values but rather the
valuations of the most optimistic investors, instead.
In this chapter, we examine the empirical relation between REIT share price valuations,
short sale activity, and short sale constraints. More specifically, we answer the following
∗This chapter is based on Brounen et al. (2011). It has benefited from helpful comments by Shaun Bond,
David Brown, Mathijs van Dijk, Marie Dutordoir, Evan Dudley, Andy Naranjo, Sugata Ray, Jay Ritter, and
seminar participants at MIT Center for Real Estate, University of Cincinatti, University of Florida, RSM Erasmus
University, and the AREUEA International meeting in Rotterdam.
1Data calculated using SNL mean analyst estimates for the equity REIT sample.
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question: How much of the cross-sectional variation in REIT NAV premiums and abnormal
returns can be attributed to short sale activity or constraints?
Chen et al. (2011) and Li and Yung (1998) find that heavily shorted REITs experience
significantly lower abnormal returns, consistent with an overvaluation story. However, a stock
can subsequently decline in price without being overvalued ex ante if negative information
about future cash flows is revealed. Conversely, according to the limits to arbitrage theory of
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), overvaluation may persist, or even increase, in the short run. By
using REIT NAV values we extend previous findings to statements about the level of prices
and address the importance of relative valuation in the short sale decision.
We use a panel vector autoregression framework to examine how short sale activity and
constraints affect the variation in monthly REIT NAV premiums. We complement existing
studies by directly linking short sale activity and constraints to valuations using a unique
dataset. The short sale data we employ is the quantity of shares currently on loan to short sell-
ers as well as proprietary information on the inventory of shares made available by institutions
to short sellers.
Chen et al. (2011) and Li and Yung (1998) argue that REITs with a high short interest are
more difficult to short at the margin. That is, potential short sellers are constrained. However,
Chen et al. (2002) argue that a stock with high short interest may simply mean that the stock
is easy (inexpensive) to short. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether a stock is short constrained
by examining the current short interest.
Our primary results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that variation in short
sale activity across REITs can account for at least one-third of the variation in NAV premi-
ums. In the short run, short sale constraints amplify fluctuations in NAV premiums. More-
over, the effect of short sale constraints on NAV premiums appears to dominate the influence
of investor sentiment. Our results also show that short sale activity (i.e., the percentage of
outstanding shares currently shorted) is not an accurate measure of short sale constraints. In
fact, short sales effectively increase the supply of shares and therefore reduce prices, all else
equal. However, short sale constraints are binding, and therefore may lead to overvaluation,
when there is strong demand for shares to borrow and short but a limited inventory (supply)
of shares available for shorting. Finally, we perform an abnormal return analysis and find that
the correction of the overvaluation pertains only to premium REITs.
This study complements the existing literature by directly linking short sales and short
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sale constraints to valuation using U.S. Equity REITs, where fundamental value is estimated
every month by third party stock analysts. Our results also add to the REIT literature by
providing a new explanation for why REIT share prices deviate from NAV. In addition to
rational explanations (largely based on firm characteristics) and behavioral (noise trading)
explanations, we find that short sale activity and, especially, short sale constraints help explain
variation in the cross section of REIT NAV premiums and subsequent abnormal returns.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related liter-
ature and conceptualizes our research framework on REIT pricing and short sale constraints.
In Section 3.3, we describe our sample and the construction of our key variables. Section
3.5 presents the empirical evidence on the premium to net asset value dynamics. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Literature and Conceptual Framework
Share price deviations from NAV have been examined both in the closed-end fund litera-
ture and in the real estate literature using two types of explanations: rational and behavioral.
The rational approach hypothesizes that NAV premiums and discounts reflect market or firm-
specific factors. For example, Barkham and Ward (1999) and Gentry et al. (2003) posit that
potential capital gain taxes are a rational explanation for the existence of discounts to NAVs.
A REIT may also trade below its NAV if there are additional costs associated with operating as
a REIT versus alternative organizational forms, including the (agency) costs of potential con-
flicts of interest between managers and investors. Reputation or management skill may also
influence valuations as argued by Malkiel (1977) in the context of closed-end funds and by
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) in the REIT context. Capozza and Lee (1995) conclude that REIT
NAV discounts can be partially explained by agency costs because they are correlated with ex-
pense ratios. Barkham and Ward (1999), Clayton and MacKinnon (2001), and Anderson et al.
(2001) analyze the cross-section of NAV premiums and discounts and report that larger REITs
tend to have lower discounts. Better access to capital markets, economies of scale, and mar-
ket liquidity are possible explanations for this firm size effect. According to Anderson et al.
(2001), leverage is penalized in the public REIT market because it reduces flexibility and in-
creases the volatility of earnings and systematic risk. Finally, Bond and Shilling (2004) find
that both systematic and unsystematic risks are associated with REIT NAV premiums.
Besides these rational explanations, an alternative set of behavioral models has been de-
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veloped to explain NAV premiums and discounts. For example, Lee et al. (1991) posit that
discounts and premiums in closed-end funds reflect investor sentiment. Barkham and Ward
(1999) find a common REIT sector effect in the cross-section of REIT NAV premiums; more-
over, they suggest that investor sentiment is the major component of this common effect.
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) use mutual fund flows as an indicator of investor sentiment and
find that it predicts changes in closed-end fund discounts. Clayton and MacKinnon (2001)
use the bid-ask spread to determine whether noise traders or rational investors dominate the
public real estate market. More specifically, they argue that if transaction costs decrease (liq-
uidity increases) discounts to NAV should decrease (premiums increase) as more noise traders
enter the market. Their empirical results are consistent with this noise trader theory. Liq-
uidity, however, only partially explains the variation in REIT NAV discounts and premiums.
Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) conclude that changes in NAV premiums and discounts are
related to fundamentals at turning points of the real estate cycle; however, the magnitude of
the swings is exacerbated by noise traders.
Gentry et al. (2004) find that buying stocks trading at large discounts to NAV and, simul-
taneously, shorting stocks trading at large premiums is a profitable investment strategy. This
suggests a behavioral explanation could be justified. However, the feasibility of such an in-
vestment strategy depends in part on the ability of informed investors to short premium stocks,
suggesting a more rational explanation for the existence of a premium, namely short sale con-
straints as a limit to arbitrage. Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) provide support
for the limits to arbitrage explanation by documenting that closed-end (general equity) funds
that are difficult to replicate typically trade at a premium to their counterparts. Thus, varia-
tions in short sale constraints across firms and over time may help explain premiums to NAV
of REITs.
According to Miller (1977), short sale constraints provide an explanation for why security
prices may be upward biased. Suppose an investor is able to purchase one share of a stock
and there are N shares available. Shares will end up being owned by the N investors with
the highest valuations. The horizontal line (Curve A) in Figure 3.1 depicts investor demand
for shares of a company assuming no differences of opinion among investors regarding share
value. In the absence of short selling, the supply of shares is fixed at C and the market clears at
an equilibrium price of P1. Allowing for dispersion in investor opinions produces a downward
sloping demand curve (B). If the supply of shares remains fixed at C, the share price converges
to P2. In this new equilibrium, the share price is being determined by the more optimistic
investors in the market. Chen et al. (2011) test for this effect in a sample of U.S. REITs.
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More specifically, they use variation in the investment focus of shareholders as a proxy for
heterogeneous valuations and find that short sale activity affects REIT pricing when valuations
are uncertain.
Short sales effectively increase the supply of shares. In Figure 3.1, this is depicted by a
rightward shift of the supply curve to D, which reduces the equilibrium prices to P3. In other
words, short selling helps to mitigate the effect of optimistic investors on equilibrium share
prices. If short selling is constrained (only a small fraction of the shares are available for
shorting), the rightward shift in the supply curve will be constrained and informed investors
will be unable to undo the upward bias created by optimistic investors. This is depicted in
Figure 3.1 by a shift in the supply of shares to E and an increase in the equilibrium price to
P4.
Consistent with Miller’s (1977) hypothesis, we expect that short-sale constraints, in the
presence of heterogeneous valuations, lead to overvaluation. Moreover, we expect increased
short sale activity to reduce valuations and thus NAV premiums. However, short sale activity
and constraints should not affect pricing when shares are selling at a discount to NAVs.
Several prior papers test the overvaluation hypothesis by focusing on the relation between
short sales and subsequent returns; a negative ex post calendar time abnormal return is con-
sistent with overvaluation. Figlewski (1981), Brent et al. (1990), Senchank and Starks (1993),
Figlewski and Webb (1993), Aitken et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (2001), Asquith et al. (2005),
Desai et al. (2002), Boehmer et al. (2008) and Boehmer et al. (2010) document a negative
relation between short interest levels and subsequent stock returns. In the REIT literature,
Chen et al. (2011) find that REITs in the top quartile of REIT short interest underperform the
first quartile by 0.64% per month. Li and Yung (1998) examine equity REITs and also ob-
serve a negative relation between short interest and returns in the highest decile of REIT short
interest.
We add to the existing literature by directly linking short sales and short sale constraints
to valuation using a unique dataset. In contrast to earlier studies that rely exclusively on short
interest data, we are able to distinguish between supply and demand effects and determine how
strong demand and limited supply affect the relative valuation as measured by the premium to
NAV of REITs using a panel vector autoregression.
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Figure 3.1
Miller Framework
In this figure, we plot demand (curves A and B) against supply (curves C, D, and E) of shares. In curve
A, we present investor demand assuming no differences of opinion among investor regarding the stock
value. When allowing for a dispersion of investor opinion, curve B depicts investor demand at varying
levels of value evaluations. Supply curve C is the base case in which the supply of shares is restricted,
and short selling is banned. In case short selling is allowed, the supply curve shifts outwards to D. If
short selling is allowed, but constrained, curve E depicts share supply.
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3.3 Data
Monthly firm level NAV estimates are obtained from SNL Financial. The daily short sale data
are from Dataexplorers Ltd. Dataexplorers tracts the activity of over 100 security lending firms
that represent approximately 75 percent of the global securities market. This equates to three
million transactions a day from several custodians and prime brokers that lend and borrow
securities. The data contain firm level information on the dollar value and quantity of shares
available for lending (the inventory) as well as the value and quantity of shares currently on
loan to short sellers. Our sample period runs from September 2006 to June 2008. Our sample
contains security loan information on 144 equity REITs (SIC code 6798), of which we are
able to match 101 of these equity REITs to SNL NAV data.
We examine how short sales and short sale constraints affect variations in monthly REIT
NAV premiums using two short sale variables. The first, Shorti,t, is the quantity of borrowed
securities for firm i at time t as a percentage of shares outstanding, or2
Shorti,t =
(
#borrowedsecuritiesi,t
shrouti,t
)
(3.1)
As discussed above, Chen et al. (2011) and Li and Yung (1998) argue that REITs with a
high short interest are more difficult to short. However, Chen et al. (2002) argue that a stock
with a high (low) level of short interest may simply be one that is relatively easy (difficult)
to short. Conversely, a low short interest may actually imply that a stock is difficult (costly)
to short. Asquith et al. (2005), Nagel (2005), and Cohen et al. (2007) therefore stress the
importance of accounting for the supply of shares available to be loaned when determining
whether a stock is short sale constrained.
To obtain a measure of the time-varying difficulty or cost of shorting a stock, we introduce
Utilizationi,t as a second short sale variable. Utilizationi,t is defined as the dollar value of
shares on loan from beneficial owners (usually institutional investors) relative to the dollar
2Note that the number of borrowed securities is not completely equivalent to the short sale position, as not all
shorted shares are borrowed. Our definition slightly understates the short sale quantity, nonetheless according to
estimates of Ringgenberg (2010) the mean (median) correlation between loan quantity and semi-monthly short
interest from Compustat is 0.70 (0.78) and therefore represents a significant portion of the total short volume.
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value of the shares available for shorting (i.e., the current inventory of available shares), or
Utilizationi,t =
(
valueonloani,t
inventoryvaluei,t
)
(3.2)
If Utilizationi,t is high, it reflects strong demand for and/or a limited supply of, shortable
shares, which would mean it would be difficult and costly to short the stock at the margin.
Based on Miller’s (1977) overvaluation theory, we expect high levels of short sale activity
to reduce overvaluation, all else equal. Thus, in the cross section, we posit that REITs with
relatively high short sale positions should trade closer to their NAV. In contrast, firms with
high levels of utilization should be more difficult to short at the margin. Saffi and Sigurdsson
(2010) show that increases in the supply of equity shares available for lending relieves short-
sale constraints. Therefore, in the cross-section stocks with high utilization should trade at
higher premiums to NAV, all else equal.
3.4 Sample Characteristics
Table 3.1 provides NAV premium descriptive statistics for our sample of 101 equity REITs.
The mean and median premiums are calculated from the individual responses of analysts re-
porting to SNL. In the last four months of 2006, the average premium to net asset value was
8.35%, which is obtained from the estimates of 8.25 analysts, on average. In 2007, the REIT
market traded at an average discount to estimated NAV of 6.05%. The average discount in-
creased to 13.43% during the first half of 2008. The standard deviation of premium estimates
ranges from 13-15% across the sample period. In late 2006, premiums ranged from -32% to
53.01%. The dispersion in premium estimates was even greater in 2007 and 2008. In short,
there is substantial variation in NAV premiums both in the cross-section and over time.
Table 3.2 reports the mean end-of-month daily short selling statistics for the REITs in
our sample, as well as the corresponding statistics for the universe of public equities. Short
and Utilization are defined above. Interestingly, the mean short selling statistics for our REIT
sample are similar to general equities. The data also reveal a significant increase in REIT
short sale activity over the sample period. Chen et al. (2011) report a mean short interest of
2.19% among the most highly shorted REITs in their 1990 to 2005 sample. By 2007, however,
7.32% of outstanding REIT shares were shorted, on average, and by the first half of 2008 the
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Table 3.1
Descriptive NAV Statistics
Monthly Net Asset Value summary statistics. Sample period September 2006 to June 2008. The NAV
estimates were obtained from SNL Financial. Premium is calculated as price over the mean analyst
estimate of NAV. The NAV stdev is the dispersion in analyst estimate is calculated as the standard
deviation of all net asset value per share estimates placed in the last 120 days, from SNL Financials.
The number of analyst estimates is the number of Analyst estimates underlying the mean NAV valuation
metric.
Year Min Max Mean Stdev
2006 Mean Premium -32.06% 53.01% 8.35% 12.94%
# Analyst Estimates 1.00 19.00 8.25 3.98
NAV stdev 0.01% 24.67% 4.33% 3.84%
Mean Return -12.77% 17.12% 2.49% 4.78%
2007 Mean Premium -55.66% 70.33% -6.05% 14.88%
# Analyst Estimates 1.00 19.00 8.44 3.88
NAV stdev 0.18% 25.53% 4.56% 3.92%
Mean Return -26.38% 20.27% -2.03% 7.32%
2008 Mean Premium -60.69% 30.76% -13.43% 15.70%
# Analyst Estimates 1.00 16.00 7.18 3.25
NAV stdev 0.01% 20.15% 4.00% 3.41%
Mean Return -47.35% 32.12% -0.09% 8.77%
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average short interest position had increased to 10.49%. This compares with an average short
position in common equities of 7.1%. These relative percentages are larger than those reported
by Blau and Wang (2009) who document that REITs are shorted less than general equities in
their 2005-2006 sample period.3
Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean end-of-the month daily short selling statistics for the sample period July 2006-September 2008.
Short is the total quantity of borrowed securities as a percentage of the shares outstanding. Inventory
is the available inventory quantity from beneficial owners as a percentage of the number of outstanding
shares. Utilization is the value of assets on loan from beneficial owners divided by the total lendable
assets in percentages. Panel A consist of all equity REITs. The number of REITs are the total number
of REITs within the sample period as obtained from the CRSP/Ziman Real Estate database. Panel B
consist of all shares with share code 10 and 11 from CRSP within the Dataexplorers universe.
Panel A: Equity REIT Sample
year Obs N MCAP Short Utilization
2006 558 95 3,142,976 3.16 17.86
2007 1154 99 3,158,423 7.32 23.63
2008 1022 100 2,6196,918 10.48 27.93
Panel B: Common Equity
Sharecode=10 or Sharecode=11
year Obs N MCAP Short Utilization
2006 10277 4447 2,758,624 3.94 22.69
2007 21526 4819 2,969,551 6.53 27.31
2008 32876 4617 2,315,195 7.07 27.60
In Figure 3.2, panels A and B, we plot monthly averages of daily Short and Utilization for
our full REIT sample (solid lines) versus the corresponding means of Short and Utilization for
REITs trading at premiums to NAV (dashed lines). It is clear from Figure 3.2 that premium
REITs are, on average, more heavily shorted and generally have higher utilization levels.
In Panel A of Table 3.3, we provide additional daily short sale descriptive statistics for our
sample of equity REITs. The average daily short position is 7.35%, with a minimum value of
zero and a maximum of 41.73%. The average utilization is 23.37% while the highest recorded
utilization level is 97.36%.
In Panels B through D, we report the corresponding statistics for REITs with relatively
3This might also be due to the fact that positions might be closed right before short interest data is recorded
to hide the positions. An additional limitation of using short interest data.
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Figure 3.2
Time Series Average Short Sale variables
Daily average short sale variables for REITs trading at a premium in contrast to all equity REITs.
Premium REITs are REITs trading above Net Asset Value in the month. NAV estimate refers the mean
analyst estimate from SNL Financials. Short refers to the average daily quantity of borrowed securities
as a percentage of shares outstanding. Utilization reflects the value of the borrowed shares relative to
the inventory value.
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high short positions and utilization levels. The mean NAV premium across the entire sample
is -5% (Panel A.) However the average discount is much larger, -10% and -9%, among REITs
with relatively high short sale positions, defined as greater than 10% (Panel B) and 20% (Panel
C), respectively, of outstanding shares. Nonetheless, for REITs with high utilization levels the
mean NAV premium increases. For example, in the subsample of REITs with utilization levels
above 70% (Panel E), the average NAV premium is 3%.
3.5 Premium Dynamics: Panel VAR
We examine the variation in monthly NAV premiums over time using a panel vector autore-
gression framework (PVAR).4 Although Short and Utilization are reported daily, we employ
the levels of each at the close of the last business day of the month in our panel VAR regres-
sions. Our results are robust to using the average daily short and utilization throughout the
month.
We first perform a Fisher test for unit roots in the panel dataset for the variables used in
our VAR analysis.5 The null hypothesis of the Fisher test is that all the panels contain a unit
root. We include panel-specific means (fixed effects). The Fisher test conducts a unit-root
test for each panel individually, and then combines the p-values from these tests to produce an
overall test using the four methods proposed by Choi (2001). Since the number of panels is
finite, the inverse χ2 P test is applicable. This statistic has a χ2 distribution with 2N degrees
of freedom. Large values of the test statistic result in rejection of the null hypothesis. The test
results presented in Table 4 reveal that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.6
A significant advantage of using a panel VAR approach is that it is a multivariate simulta-
neous equation system that treats all variables as endogenous, while allowing for unobserved
REIT heterogeneity. We select the number of lags based on the AIC and the maximum like-
lihood ratio for various lag lengths. The data support the use of one lag and in general terms
4The estimation is implemented with the PVAR routine by Inessa Love. See Love and Zicchino (2006) for
computational details. We select the lag length following the AIC and the maximum likelihood ratio for various
lag lengths.
5Other tests such as those developed by Levin and Chu (2002), Harris and Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000),
Breitung and Das (2005), Im and Shin (2003), and Hadri (2000) require a balanced panel. We select the lag
length following the AIC and the maximum likelihood ratio for various lag lengths.
6All four of the tests strongly reject the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots, however we
report the the inverse χ2 p-test as it is applicable for finite number of panels.
Short Sales and Fundamental Value: Explaining the REIT Premium to NAV 65
Table 3.3
Daily Short Sale data
Average daily short sale data for the equity sample of REITs, panel A. The Premium refers to monthly
price over the mean analyst estimate of NAV, from SNL Financials. Short refers to the average daily
quantity of borrowed securities as a percentage of shares outstanding. Utilization reflects the value of
the borrowed shares relative to the inventory value. In panel B and C we look at the sub sample of
REITs with relative short positions of at least 10 to 20 percent. Panel D and E are average short sale
statistics for REITs with utilization levels above 50 and 70 percent.
Panel A: All : REITs
N Obs Stat Premium Short Utilization
101 54520 N 54520 54520 54520
101 54520 MIN -61.00% 0.00% 0.00%
101 54520 MAX 70.00% 41.73% 97.36%
101 54520 MEAN -5.00% 7.35% 23.37%
101 54520 STD 17.00% 5.78% 15.69%
Panel B: Short > 10%
N Obs Stat Premium Short Utilization
77 14565 N 14565 14565 14565
77 14565 MIN -61.00% 10.00% 13.35%
77 14565 MAX 31.00% 41.73% 86.46%
77 14565 MEAN -10.00% 15.07% 39.79%
77 14565 STD 15.00% 4.83% 12.39%
Panel C: Short > 20%
N Obs Stat Premium Short Utilization
23 1966 N 1966 1966 1966
23 1966 MIN -61.00% 20.00% 25.54%
23 1966 MAX 14.00% 41.73% 77.56%
23 1966 MEAN -9.00% 24.56% 51.65%
23 1966 STD 12.00% 4.86% 10.06%
Panel D: Utilization > 50%
N Obs Stat Premium Short Utilization
46 3713 N 3713 3713 3713
46 3713 MIN -61.00% 0.16% 50.01%
46 3713 MAX 42.00% 41.73% 97.36%
46 3713 MEAN -5.00% 15.79% 60.98%
46 3713 STD 16.00% 8.91% 8.78%
Panel E: Utilization > 70%
N Obs Stat Premium Short Utilization
16 553 N 553 553 553
16 553 MIN -36.00% 0.40% 70.01%
16 553 MAX 42.00% 26.82% 97.36%
16 553 MEAN 3.00% 9.03% 76.91%
16 553 STD 15.00% 8.05% 6.42%
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Table 3.4
Unit Root test
This table reports a Fisher-type panel unit root test. The Fisher-type (Choi 2001) tests has as the null
hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root. The Fisher test conducts a unit-root tests for each
panel individually, and then combines the p-values from these tests to produce an overall test using the
four methods proposed by Choi (2001). Since the number of panels is finite, the inverse χ2 P test is
applicable; this statistic has a χ2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom, and large values are cause to
reject the null hypothesis. We include panel-specific means (fixed effects).
Fisher-type unit root test
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Number of panels=101
Ha: At least one panel is stationary Avg. number of periods = 25.47
Inverse χ2(198)
Variable P Statistic p-value
Premium 345.04 0.00
Short 364.70 0.00
Utilization 458.28 0.00
we specify a first-order VAR model as follows:
yit = Υ0 +Υ1yit−1 + fi + dt + it (3.3)
where yit is a two variable vector including the premium to NAV and either Short or Utiliza-
tion. More specifically, the following VAR system is first estimated for Premium and Short:
Premiumit = a0 + β1Premiumt−1 + γ1Shortt−1 + fi + dt + 1,it
Shortit = a1 + β2Shortt−1 + γ2Premiumt−1 + fi + dt + 2,it (3.4)
This is followed by the estimation of the following two-variable one period lag model for
Premium and Utilization:
Premiumit = a2 + β3Premiumt−1 + γ3Utilizationt−1 + fi + dt + 3,it
Utilizationit = a3 + β4Utilizationt−1 + γ4Premiumt−1 + fi + dt + 4,it (3.5)
fi represents firm fixed effects and dt represents period-specific time dummies. The firm
fixed effects control for any time-invariant unobservable influences on the NAV premium, such
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as management skill, expense ratios, and company reputation. The time period fixed effects
control for any industry-wide influences on the premium to NAV. Together, the firm and period
fixed effects allow us to control for possible omitted variable biases. 7
The inclusion of the lagged NAV premiums in both the premium and short sale panel
regression equations may induce dynamic panel bias. Because the premium is a function,
at least in part, of the fixed effects, the lag of premium is correlated with the portion of the
error term associated with the firm effects. This bias can be quite large in short panels as
discussed by Arellano and Bover (1991), Bond (2002), and Flannery and Hankins (2010). The
VAR model is therefore estimated using a system GMM estimator to account for the dynamic
dependent variable.
The results of our panel VAR estimations are reported in Table 3.5. The left-hand panel
displays the results when Premium and Short are used as the two dependent variables. The
estimated coefficient on Shortt−1 is negative and significantly related to Premium. That is,
an increase in short positions predicts a reduction in NAV premiums. More specifically, a 1%
increase in Short in the previous month is associated with a 0.63% reduction in Premium in
the following month. Premiums, however, do not appear to influence subsequent short sale
positions.
In the right-hand panel of Table 3.5, we report results using Premium and Utilization
as the two dependent variables. Higher levels of Utilization predict an increase in premium
to NAV. More specifically, a 1% increase in Utilization is leads to a 0.74% increase in the
premium in the following month. This result is consistent with utilization being a measure
of short sale constraints. Simultaneously, increases in the NAV premium predict lower levels
of utilization. Given that we do not find a significant relation between lagged premiums and
contemporaneous short sale positions, this result appears to be driven by a supply effect; that
is, high premiums lead to a larger increase in the supply of shares available for shorting than in
the demand for shares to short. Increased premiums could also be associated with an increase
in the fee charged by lenders to share borrowers, leading to an increased willingness to lend
out securities. Overall, the results reported in Table 3.5 are consistent with the premise that
increased short sale activity reduces valuations, all else equal. In contrast, increased utilization
is a proxy for the increased difficulty (cost) of shorting shares. This increased cost makes it
more difficult for informal investors to eliminate premiums.
7There are no perfect controls for omitted variables, our results are biased only if the omitted variables are
correlated with the deviations of each included variable from its mean net of its time variation.
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Table 3.5
Panel VAR
The panel VAR approach is a multivariate simultaneous equation system that treats all variables as
endogenous, while allowing for unobserved fund heterogeneity. The lag length was selected following
the AIC and maximum likelihood ratio for various lag lengths. The data support the use of one lag and
we specify a first-order VAR model. The specification includes firm fixed effects and period-specific
time dummies. The firm fixed effects control for any time-invariant unobservable influences on the
NAV premium, such as management skill, expense ratios, and company reputation. The time period
fixed effects control for any industry-wide influences on the premium to NAV. Together, the firm and
period fixed effects allow us to control for possible omitted variable biases. The introduction of the
fixed effects requires the model to be estimated by GMM. Fixed effects are removed using Helmert
transformation (See Arellano and Bover (1995)). Estimation is by GMM with untransformed variables
used as instruments for Helmert-transformed variables. For the period-specific effects variables are
time-demeaned.
Panel VAR analysis
EQ1: dep.var: Premiumt EQ1: dep.var: Premiumt
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Premiumt−1 0.67*** 10.21 Premiumt−1 0.91*** 17.47
Shortt−1 -0.63* -1.96 Utilizationt−1 0.74** 2.35
EQ2: dep.var: Shortt EQ2: dep.var: Utilizationt
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Premiumt−1 -0.13 -0.69 Premiumt−1 -0.23*** -4.60
Shortt−1 0.90*** 8.63 Utilizationt−1 -0.13 -0.47
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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3.5.1 Response of Premium to Short Sale Constraint
We also explore the dynamic effects of shocks to short sale position and utilization on the
premium to NAV through the analysis of impulse-response functions. The impulse-response
functions, displayed in Figure 3.3, depict the reaction of the NAV premium to a one standard
deviation innovation in Short and Utilization. The premium to NAV shows an immediate re-
duction in response to a one standard deviation increase in Short (Panel A). Moreover, this
premium reduction persists for the following 6 months. The immediate response to an innova-
tion in Utilization is a substantial jump in the NAV premium (Panel B). However, this increase
occurs only in the following month, after which the premium begins to decline. Six months
following the shock to Utilization its effect on the premium approaches zero.
3.5.2 Decomposition of Premium Variation
Next, we examine how much of the variation in NAV premiums can be attributed to short sale
activity and constraints by performing a panel VAR(1) Variance Decomposition. The variance
decomposition quantifies how much of the forecast error variance can be explained by Short
and Utilization. Table 3.6 shows the percent of the variation in the column variable explained
by a shock to the row variable, accumulated over one, six, and twelve months. In Panel A,
we report the shocks to short sale positions and utilization. Shocks to short sale positions
explain 2.08% of the total variation in the NAV premium in the following month, 19.69%
in the following six months, and 34.99% in the following 12 months. Shocks to utilization
explain 21.02% of the premium variation in the short run and 32.83% over the following year.
The results are even stronger if utilization is measured in share quantities instead of share
values (untabulated results).
Lee et al. (1991) posit that discounts and premiums in closed-end general equity funds
reflect investor sentiment. Similarly, Barkham and Ward (1999) document a common REIT
sector effect in the pricing of individual REITs relative to their NAVs and suggest that investor
sentiment is the major cause of the common variation in REIT NAV premiums and discounts.
To gauge the potential influence of sentiment we also include proxies for investor senti-
ment. Following Baker and Wurgler (2006) we construct both a real estate and stock market
sentiment index. Appendix A contains details on the construction of our sentiment indices; in
Appendix B we report both sentiment indices. To control for sentiment’s influences on devia-
tions from fundamental values, we calculate for each firm in our sample the sensitivity of the
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Figure 3.3
Impulse Response Function Premium
Impulse-response functions describing the reaction of the premium to NAV to a standard deviation
shock in Short and Utilization in the following 6 months. The impulse-response functions follow from
a a first-order VAR model specification, including premium to NAV and one of the respective variables
and fund and period-specific fixed effects. Fixed effects are removed using Helmert transformation (See
Arellano and Bover (1995)). Estimation is by GMM with untransformed variables used as instruments
for Helmert-transformed variables. For the period-specific effects variables are time-demeaned.
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firm’s returns to the respective sentiment index. The betas with respect to the sentiment index
are estimated using 20 month rolling regressions.
As can be seen in Panel A of Table 3.6, real estate market sentiment explains about
20.18% of the variation in the premium 1 year ahead, and is of more economic signifi-
cance than stock market sentiment, which explains only 13.89% of the variation in premiums.
Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) suggest that noise traders can have an important influence on
the variation in premium. We approximate the influence of noise traders indirectly look at
institutional investor presence and the spread. The spread adds no incremental explanatory
power. However, institutional ownership explains 4.76% of the variation in premium in the
following 12 months.
In panel B, we report a corresponding set of results obtained after orthogonalizing the
NAV premium with respect to a set of control variables. Barkham and Ward (1999), Clayton
and Mackinnon (2001), and Anderson, Conner and Liang (2001) find that larger REITs tend to
have lower discounts. According to Anderson, Conner and Liang (2001), leverage is penalized
in the public REIT market because it reduces flexibility and increases the volatility of earnings
and systematic risk. Bond and Shilling (2004) find that both systematic and unsystematic risk
are associated with NAV premiums. To control for the potential influence of these additional
variables, we add accounting information and other REIT characteristics to our panel VAR
specification, such as firm size, performance (past returns), leverage, systematic risk, idiosyn-
cratic risk (volatility), liquidity, market-to-book ratio, institutional ownership, the fraction of
closely held shares, the number of analyst estimates of NAV, and the dispersion in analyst
estimates, next to the period and fund fixed effects already in place.
The use of residual premiums allows us to investigate the marginal influence of short sale
activity and constraints on NAV premiums. After controlling for REIT characteristics, uti-
lization still explains a significant 7.76% of the residual variation in REIT premiums in the
next month and almost all of the residual variation over the next year. However, the economic
magnitude of premium variation explained by the level of short sale activity is slightly re-
duced relative to the results reported in Panel A. Nevertheless, short sale positions still explain
13.02% of the residual variation in premiums over the next 12 months. Real estate market
sentiment explains 5.70% of the variation in the premium 1 year ahead, and remains more
economically significant than stock market sentiment, which explains only 0.37% of the vari-
ation in premiums.8 The level of institutional ownership adds little explanatory power. The
8The orthogonalized premium is with respect to the remaining controls, excluding the variable of interest.
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spread, which proxies for the influence of noise traders as in Clayton and Mackinnon (2001),
is slightly more significant in the longer run; however, it remains less important than short sale
constraints and real estate market sentiment.
In Panel C of Table 3.6, we also orthogonalize the short sale variables with respect to our
set of control variables to control for the common variation in the short sale variables due to
REIT characteristics. This in combination with the fixed effects significantly reduces the eco-
nomic magnitude of the explained variation, suggesting short sales and utilization are related
to firm characteristics. Although the influence of short sale activity and constraints on NAV
premiums is reduced, it remains larger than the rational and behavioral factor explanations
proposed in the literature.9
3.6 Return Analysis
To further substantiate that higher utilization leads to an increase in overvaluations and NAV
premiums, we examine the ex post relation between Short, Utilization and subsequent REIT
returns. The expectation is that if high utilization leads to overvaluation, we should observe a
negative alpha in the following month as prices revert toward their fundamental values. Chen,
Downs and Patterson (2011) construct calendar time portfolios by assigning the cross-section
of REITs to quartiles based on monthly short interest. To retain cross-sectional variation and
given our limited sample period, we employ pooled, cross-sectional regressions. More specif-
ically, we first estimate a single-factor abnormal return for each REIT in each quarter using
a rolling window of 20 months and the CRSP Ziman REIT index as the benchmark mar-
ket return to determine whether REITs with high utilization levels underperform the general
REIT market. We then explain abnormal returns using the previous month daily utilization in
a Fama-Macbeth regression. The Fama-Macbeth regression accounts for the cross-sectional
correlations of the individual REITs by re-sorting the REITs into quartiles each period. In
the first step, a cross-sectional regression is estimated for each month and in the second we
then report the average of the first step coefficient estimates. This approach allows us to test
how much of the correction is related to the presence of a short sale constraint and whether it
pertains to premium REITs.
In Table 3.7, we report the abnormal return results using Utilization as our measure of
short sale constraints. In the first specification, the estimated coefficient on Utilizationt−1
9Untabulated as they are zero.
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Table 3.6
Variance Decomposition
Variance Decompositions following the PVAR(1). The variance decomposition determines how much
of the forecast error variance of each of the premium to NAV can be explained by exogenous shocks
to short and utilization. The table reports the percent of variation in the column variable explained by
row variable, accumulated over time. In Panel B we first orthogonalize the premium with respect to
REIT specific control variables. We control for accounting information and REIT characteristics, such
as size, performance (past returns), leverage, systematic risk and volatility, liquidity, market-to-book
ratio, institutional ownership and the fraction of closely held shares, the number of analyst estimates
and the dispersion in analyst estimate. Additionally, we include sentiment measures, which are the
beta’s with respect to the real estate and stock market sentiment indices. The variance decomposition
of sentiment, the spread and ownership follow the orthogonalization excluding these variables from the
control set.
Panel A: Variance Decomposition Premium
Premium Premium Premium
Months Months Months
Short 1 2.08% 6 19.69% 12 34.99%
Utilization 1 21.02% 6 32.30% 12 32.83%
RE Sent 1 1.75% 6 13.63% 12 20.18%
Stock Sent 1 0.81% 6 7.73% 12 13.89%
Spread 1 0.00% 6 0.01% 12 0.01%
Institutional Ownership 1 1.23% 6 4.76% 12 4.76%
Panel B: Variance Decomposition Premium orthogonalized wrt controls
Premium Premium Premium
Months Months Months
Short 1 0.09% 6 2.09% 12 13.02%
Utilization 1 7.76% 6 99.63% 12 99.67%
RE Sent 1 0.62% 6 4.02% 12 5.70%
Stock Sent 1 0.02% 6 0.20% 12 0.37%
Spread 1 2.46% 6 2.45% 12 2.45%
Institutional Ownership 1 0.09% 6 0.75% 12 1.21%
Panel C: Variance Decomposition Premium and short sale measures orthogonalized wrt controls
Premium Premium Premium
Months Months Months
Short 1 0.01% 6 0.02% 12 0.02%
Utilization 1 0.12% 6 0.29% 12 0.29%
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is negative and highly significant. More specifically, a correction of 1.48 basis points per
month is associated with a 1% increase in utilization. In the second specification, we add
the lagged NAV premium along with an interaction term to determine whether the return
correction is increasing in the level of NAV premium. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient
on Premiumt−1 is positive and significant, suggesting our results are not driven by a mean
reverting pattern in NAV premiums (as found by Gentry et al. (2004)), but by the presence of
a short constraint. The interaction term indicates that for every 1% increase in the premium
the correction increases by four basis points.
In the third specification, we include firm size, the market-to-book ratio (MTB), and the
past 12 month returns as controls.10 Both the estimated coefficient on Utilizationt−1 and
the Utilizationt−1 ∗ Premiumt−1 interaction variable increase in magnitude. For example,
for every 1% increase in the premium the abnormal return decreases by six basis points per
month. Finally, in our fourth specification we exclude the premium level but include an indi-
cator variable that is set equal to one if the REIT trades at a premium to its estimated NAV.
The results from this fourth specification show that the magnitude of the price correction is
increasing in the level of the premium. The return correction is 1.27% greater for REITs trad-
ing above NAV. Economically, the correction is large only for premium REITs. That is, for a
1% increase in Utilization there is only a one basis point return correction, on average, in the
following month for REITs trading at a discount to their estimated NAVs.
Table 3.8 reports the abnormal return results using Short in place of Utilization. The re-
sults from the first specification show that increases in short sale activity are associated with
lower abnormal returns. More specifically, every 1% increase in short sale activity leads to a
correction of 0.5 basis points per month. In the second specification, we add an interaction
term to determine whether the return correction is increasing in the level of NAV premium.
Increased short sale activity leads to a three basis point reduction in abnormal returns. How-
ever, the reduction is not increasing in the NAV premium. This suggests that the level of short
sale interest is not a constraint to potential arbitrageurs. Rather, it serves to help align prices
to fundamentals. This result is robust to the inclusion of characteristic control variables and
to the inclusion of an indicator variable that is set equal to one if the REIT is currently trading
above its estimated NAV value.
To determine how and when the price correction takes place, we run the specification for
10The results are similar to first estimating a four-factor abnormal return in the first stage, we opt for this
approach as in the construction of the Fama French factors REITs are excluded.
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Table 3.7
Return Analysis Utilization
We first estimate the abnormal return of each REIT using a rolling window of 20 months and the
CRSP Ziman index as market return. Then we explain the abnormal returns using the previous month
daily utilization in a Fama-Macbeth regression. The Fama-Macbeth regression accounts for the cross-
sectional correlations of the individual REITs by forming a portfolio for each period. It involves two
steps, in the first step, a cross-sectional regression is estimated for each month and in the second we
then report the average of the first step coefficient estimates. The reported results are in percentages.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables ARt ARt ARt ARt
Utilizationt−1 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01***
(-14.39) (-9.72) (-7.98) (-3.32)
Premiumt−1 0.02*** 0.01**
(4.49) (2.66)
Utilizationt−1 ∗ Premiumt−1 -0.04** -0.06***
(-2.09) (-3.56)
Positivet−1 0.24**
(2.76)
Positivet−1 ∗ Utilizationt−1 -1.27***
(-2.81)
Controls
Size -0.00*** -0.00***
(-3.16) (-3.63)
MTB 0.00 0.00
(0.99) (1.00)
Past 12m Ret 0.29*** 0.28***
(25.09) (25.95)
Constant -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(-4.33) (3.37) (2.85) (2.89)
Observations 1,978 1,978 1,828 1,828
R-squared 6.90 17.60 33.32 33.33
t-statistics in parenthesis
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 3.8
Return Analysis Short
We first estimate the abnormal return of each REIT using a rolling window of 20 months and the
CRSP Ziman index as market return. Then we explain the abnormal returns using the previous month
daily short sale quantity in a Fama-Macbeth regression. The Fama-Macbeth regression accounts for the
cross-sectional correlations of the individual REITs by forming a portfolio for each period. It involves
two steps, in the first step, a cross-sectional regression is estimated for each month and in the second
we then report the average of the first step coefficient estimates. The reported results are in percentages.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables ARt ARt ARt ARt ARt
Short(t−1) -0.00** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.05* -0.04**
(-2.77) (-5.18) (-4.78) (-1.98) (-2.19)
Premium(t−1) 0.01*** -0.00
(2.81) (-0.15)
Short(t−1) ∗ Premium(t−1) 0.04 -0.05
(0.78) (-1.35)
Positive(t−1) 0.46** 0.14
(2.07) (0.71)
Short(t−1) ∗ Positive(t−1) -0.67 -2.04
(-0.18) (-0.62)
Controls
Size -0.00** -0.00**
(-2.18) (-2.37)
MTB 0.00 0.00
(0.79) (0.94)
Past 12m Ret 0.33*** 0.31***
(30.44) (31.52)
Constant -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00
(-21.27) (-2.08) (1.27) (-3.64) (1.39)
Observations 1,998 1,978 1,828 1,978 1,828
R-squared 2.00 10.40 28.00 5.50 28.61
t-statistics in parenthesis
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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each day beginning 30 days before to 30 days after the classification of high relative utilization
and short levels. The first graph in Figure 3.4 represents the coefficient of the daily single
factor abnormal returns on the dummy variable of a REIT being classified at time t to belong to
the highest short sale tercile. The dummy variable coefficient compares the abnormal returns
in the period prior and following the high short sale classification with the abnormal return of
stocks that are not classified as having high short sale levels. Alternatively, it can be interpreted
as the single factor abnormal return attributable to the presence of high relative short sale levels
at time t. The second graph depicts the cumulative abnormal return differential.
In the days leading to high short sale quantities, the abnormal returns are positive. In
the days following the high short sale quantity returns are negative. The pattern in the days
leading to high relative short sale quantity the abnormal returns are positive but flat, suggesting
short sellers position themselves in stocks that have done reasonably well. This result is also
documented by Diether, Lee and Werner (2009) and Jones and Lamont (2002). The pattern
suggests that as REITs become overpriced, they are identified by short sellers. Short sales, in
turn, increase the supply of shares leading to a price reduction and correction of the mispricing.
Figure 3.5 represents the coefficient of the single factor abnormal returns on the dummy
variable of a REIT being classified at time t to belong to the highest utilization tercile. The
dummy variable coefficient compares the abnormal returns in the period prior to and following
the high utilization classification with the abnormal return of stocks that are not classified as
having high utilization levels. Single factor abnormal returns attributable to the presence of
high relative utilization levels at time t are presented in Panel A. The graph in Panel B is the
cumulative abnormal return differential.
The time pattern of abnormal returns lines up with the overpricing hypothesis. In the
days leading to high utilization levels, the abnormal returns are positive and increasing. In the
days following the high utilization quantity returns are negative. The increase in the abnormal
returns in the days leading to high utilization, suggest that utilization leads to more overpric-
ing. This is also found in the panel VAR analysis. The pattern suggests that utilization leads
to overpricing; however, once these overpriced REITs are identified by short sellers, returns
subsequently decline as the mispricing is corrected.
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Figure 3.4
Abnormal Return High Short
The first graph represents the coefficient of the daily single factor abnormal returns on the dummy
variable of a REIT being classified at time t as the highest short sale tercile. The dummy variable coef-
ficient compares the abnormal returns in the period prior and following the high short sale classification
with the abnormal return of stocks that are not classified as having high short sale levels. Single Factor
Abnormal Returns attributable to the presence of high relative short sale levels at time t. The second
graph is the cumulative abnormal return differential.
Short Sales and Fundamental Value: Explaining the REIT Premium to NAV 79


ͲϬ͘ϬϯϬй
ͲϬ͘ϬϮϬй
ͲϬ͘ϬϭϬй
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬй
Ϭ͘ϬϭϬй
Ϭ͘ϬϮϬй
ƚͲϯ
Ϭ
ƚͲϮ
ϳ
ƚͲϮ
ϰ
ƚͲϮ
ϭ
ƚͲϭ
ϴ
ƚͲϭ
ϱ
ƚͲϭ
Ϯ ƚͲϵ ƚͲϲ ƚͲϯ ƚн
ϭ
ƚн
ϰ
ƚн
ϳ
ƚн
ϭϬ
ƚн
ϭϯ
ƚн
ϭϲ
ƚн
ϭϵ
ƚн
ϮϮ
ƚн
Ϯϱ
ƚн
Ϯϴ
ďŶŽƌŵĂůZĞƚƵƌŶĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝďůĞƚŽ,ŝŐŚ
hƚŝů
,ŝŐŚhƚŝů
Ϭ͘ϬϬϬй
Ϭ͘ϬϱϬй
Ϭ͘ϭϬϬй
Ϭ͘ϭϱϬй
Ϭ͘ϮϬϬй
ƚͲϯ
Ϭ
ƚͲϮ
ϳ
ƚͲϮ
ϰ
ƚͲϮ
ϭ
ƚͲϭ
ϴ
ƚͲϭ
ϱ
ƚͲϭ
Ϯ ƚͲϵ ƚͲϲ ƚͲϯ ƚн
ϭ
ƚн
ϰ
ƚн
ϳ
ƚн
ϭϬ
ƚн
ϭϯ
ƚн
ϭϲ
ƚн
ϭϵ
ƚн
ϮϮ
ƚн
Ϯϱ
ƚн
Ϯϴ
ƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞďŶŽƌŵĂůƌĞƚƵƌŶ
ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝďůĞƚŽ,ŝŐŚhƚŝů
Ƶŵ,ŝŐŚhƚŝů
Figure 3.5
Abnormal Return High Utilization
The graphs plot the coefficient of the single factor abnormal returns on the dummy variable of a REIT
being classified at time t to the highest utilization tercile. The dummy variable coefficient compares
the abnormal returns in the period prior and following the high utilization classification with the abnor-
mal return of stocks that are not classified as having high utilization levels. Single Factor Abnormal
Returns attributable to the presence of high relative utilization levels at time t. The second graph is the
cumulative abnormal return differential.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role short sale activity and short sale constraints play in ex-
plaining the cross sectional variance of REIT premiums to NAV. In accordance with Miller’s
(1977) framework, we expect that differences of investor opinion in the presence of short-sale
constraint result in stock price overvaluation. If short selling is banned or constrained, it is
more difficult for negative information and opinions to reach the market; thus, stock prices
may be set by the most optimistic investors. Testing Miller’s (1977) framework with REIT
data offers the opportunity to measure overvaluation with respect to fundamental value. For
REITs, fundamental value can be proxied for by the consensus estimate of the REIT’s net
asset value provided monthly by stock analysts that follow the firm.
For a sample of 101 U.S. Equity REITs, we study the monthly Price over NAV evolution
and assess the effects of both short sale activity and short sale constraints, using a panel vector
autoregression. We find that the variation in short sale activity across individual REITs can
account for at least one-third of the variation in NAV premiums. Short sale constraints am-
plify fluctuations REIT NAV premiums and the influence is of greater importance than market
sentiment. Our results also show that short sale activity is not, in itself, a constraint measure.
Short sales increase the supply of shares and therefore reduce prices. Short sale constraints are
binding when there is strong demand and limited supply. High demand relative to low supply
leads to overvaluation. Finally, we perform a return analysis and find that the correction of the
overvaluation occurs only for premium REITs.
This study complements the existing literature in several ways. First, we add to the litera-
ture on short sales by directly linking short sales and short sale constraints to valuation using
U.S. Equity REITs, where fundamental value is estimated every month by third party stock
analysts. Our results also add to the REIT literature by providing a new explanation for why
REIT share prices deviate from NAV. In addition to rational explanations (largely based on
firm characteristics) and behavioral (noise trading) explanations, we find that short sale activ-
ity and, especially, short sale constraints help explain variation in the cross section of REIT
NAV premiums and subsequent abnormal returns.
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Stock Characteristic Variables Definition
Size (MCAP) Price*shares outstanding from the CRSP monthly file
Turnover Volume over shares outstanding
Leverage ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities+ item
9, long-term debt) to item 6, assets
Market Value Assets (MVA) MVA is obtained as the sum of the market value of equity
(item 199, price-close*item 54, shares outstanding) + item
34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long term debt + item
10, preferred-liquidation value, - item 35, deferred taxes and
investment tax credit.
Market-to-book ratio MTB is the ratio of market value of assets (MVA) to Com-
pustat item 6, assets
Spread Spread is the difference between the closing bid and ask
quotes for a security over the security price
Amihud illiquidity Amihud illiquidity measure is calculated as the daily aver-
age of absolute value of return divided by dollar volume for
asset i in a month
Systematic risk (Beta) Systematic risk was calculated on a rolling window basis of
25 months with respect to the CRSP/Ziman value weighted
index
Standard deviation (stdev) Volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the
monthly returns over 20 months
Past returns moving average returns over 3 (MVAreturn3month), 6
(MVAreturn6month) and 12 months (MVAreturn12month)
as well as the last months return (Return(t-1)) Price infor-
mation from CRSP/Ziman
Institutional Ownership Compilation of the holdings of institutional investors from
13-f filings
Closely Held Shares (Clsheld) Clsheld represents shares held by insiders. The fraction of
closely held shares we obtained from Thompson.
Premium (P/NAV) Premim to Net Asset Value is calculated as the price over
NAV: ((P/NAV)-1). The NAV is the mean analyst estimate
from SNL Financials
NAV stdev The dispersion in analyst estimate is calculated as the stan-
dard deviation of all net asset value per share estimates
placed in the last 120 days. Source: SNL Financial
# Estimates The number of Analyst estimates underlying the mean NAV
valuation metric.
(Continue on next page)
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Stock Market Sentiment Definition
Stock Market Sentiment To correct for sentiment influences in the deviations from
fundamental value we calculate for each firm in our sam-
ple the sensitivity of the firm to the respective sentiment
index. The beta’s with respect to the sentiment index are
estimated on the basis of rolling window regressions of 20
months. The Stock market sentiment index is constructed
as the first principal component of six sentiment proxies
following Baker and Wurgler, (2006), dividend premium,
closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day return
on IPOs and the equity share in new issues. We use the
monthly data as used and described in Baker and Wurgler
(2007). We update the data until June 2008. The dividend
premium is defined following Baker and Wurgler (2004) as
the log difference in the value weighted average market to
book of payers and the value weighted market to book of
nonpayers. The updates were obtained from Compustat.
IPO volume and first-day returns and updates are from Jay
Ritters website. Closed-end fund discount from from CRSP
(general equity funds only). Issue information was obtained
from SDC. Lagged one year NYSE turnover from NYSE
Factbook, detrended using past five-year average. The sen-
timent variables were orthogonalized wrt macro variables
to remove the influence of economic fundamentals. We
regress, using a 50 month rolling window, each proxy on
macro variables; changes in industrial production, employ-
ment and the NBER recession indicator. The macro vari-
ables were obtained from econstat.com and the NBER web-
site. Long run S&P stock data were obtained from Shillers
website. The first principal component explains 40% of the
sample variance. In line with Baker and Wurgler (2006),
closed-end fund discount and the dividend premium load
negatively on the sentiment index,while IPO activity and
turnover load positively on sentiment.The correlation of our
sentiment index with that of Baker and Wurgler (2007) over
1969-2005 is 0.74.
(Continue on next page)
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Real Estate Sentiment Definition
Real Estate Sentiment We use four sentiment proxies related to the real estate in-
dustry to extract a principal component: the average mar-
ket turnover ratio of REITs (TR), the average volume of
Initial Public Offerings of REITs (IPO), the lagged aver-
age price-to-earnings ratio of REITs (PE), and the average
relative market capitalization between the REIT sector and
the stock market (RMC). The real estate IPO data was ob-
tained from SDC, while PE ratios and market capitalization
were obtained from CRSP and Compustat. In order to con-
trol for the effect of business-cycle factors and fundamen-
tals, we regress each proxy on the development of the REIT
market, as proxied by the FTSE/NAREIT index (We also
performed a similar analysis using the direct property MIT
Transaction Based index, the results were comparable.)and
the economy-wide factors (growth in industrial production,
growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator).
The Real Estate Sentiment index is constructed as the first
principal component of the residual series. The sentiment
index explains 32.5% of the sample variance. Figure in Ap-
pendix A.II exposes both the stock market and real estate
sentiment indices.
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Figure 3.6
Appendix A.II Sentiment Index
Sentiment is constructed as the first principal component of six sentiment proxies following Baker
and Wurgler, (2006), dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day return on
IPOs and the equity share in new issues. We use the monthly data as used and described in Baker
and Wurgler, (2007), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ jwurgler/. We update the data until June
2008. Panel B depicts the Real Estate Sentiment index. We use four sentiment proxies related to the
real estate industry to extract a principal component: the average market turnover ratio of REITs (TR),
the average volume of Initial Public Offerings of REITs (IPO), the lagged average price-to-earnings
ratio of REITs (PE), and the average relative market capitalization between the REIT sector and the
stock market (RMC). The real estate IPO data was obtained from SDC, while PE ratios and market
capitalization were obtained from CRSP and Compustat. In order to control for the effect of business-
cycle factors and fundamentals, we regress each proxy on the development of the direct real estate
market (MIT transaction based index). The MIT index was obtained from the MIT website. The Real
Estate Sentiment index is constructed as the first principal component of the residual series.
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Chapter 4
The Price of Prospective Lending:
Evidence from Short Sale Constraints∗
4.1 Introduction
The securities lending market has grown dramatically in the past decade. In July 2008, short
interest on the New York Stock Exchange reached a peak of 18.6 million shares, equal to
4.7% of the total shares outstanding.1 The US equity lending market grew in size to $320
billion in 2009.2 Greater short sale volume led to increased lending income for institutional
investors. According to Data Explorers Ltd, investment companies earned almost $1.4 billion
in 2008 from lending their securities. Mutual funds reported $1 billion in lending revenue and
pension funds added $500 million to their overall portfolio returns. Through lending shares to
short sellers, institutional investors benefit by generating lending income. Kaplan et al. (2010)
conduct a lending experiment for an anonymous money manager and estimate the returns per
year of lending high-fee stocks to be around 2.78 to 4.64% for the trial period September 5th
to 18th, 2008.
In this study, I show that this lending income is capitalized into prices. I build on the
theoretical research by Duffie et al. (2002), who present a dynamic model of asset valuation
in which short selling requires searching for security lenders and bargaining over the lending
∗This chapter is based on Porras-Prado (2011). It has benefited from helpful comments by Dirk Brounen,
Bruce Grundy, David Ling, NimalendranMahendrarajah, Andy Naranjo, Husza’R Zsuzsa Reka, Jay Ritter, Pedro
Saffi, Elvira Sojli, Marta Szymanowska, Mathijs van Dijk, Manuel Vasconcelos and Marno Verbeek. I also
acknowledge the financial support of Erasmus Trustfonds.
1http://www.nyse.com/press/1219746761185.html
2Source: Securities Lending Yearbook 2009, Data Explorers
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fee. They argue that investors are willing to pay more than their valuation of the share, if they
expect to profit from lending it in the future when the opportunity arises.
To understand how lending expectation can play a role in pricing, consider the example
of Duffie et al. (2002). Suppose there are two groups of optimistic and pessimistic investors
and two rounds of trades. The optimists assign a value of 100 to a security; the pessimistic
investors assign a value of 90. In the final round of lending, the pessimistic investors would be
willing to pay up to 10 in lending fee to short the asset. The optimists anticipate this lending
fee and are willing to buy the security for 100+10=110. The prospect of lending fees increases
prices above even the most optimistic buyer’s valuation of the security’s future dividends. In
other words, the stock price is the expected future income associated with the potential to lend
the asset, plus the expected valuation of the marginal investor.
In this study, I address the following question: are investors willing to pay a premium
associated with lending income? The purpose is to examine whether security prices incorpo-
rate lending income. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate lending profits, I
examine how prices behave following a failure-to-deliver in the equity lending market. The
search for a counter party is the mechanism that affects asset values as described by Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2002, 2007). Failure-to-deliver represents situations in which it is
difficult to locate securities available for borrowing, resulting increased bargaining power for
the lender and prospective increases in lending profits which, in turn, should lead to higher
prices. I examine whether the capitalization of future lending income leads to price inflation
by using the deviations from intrinsic value as measured by price to Net Asset Value (NAV) of
closed-end funds. If lending income is capitalized in prices there should be a positive corre-
lation between the occurrence of a failure-to-deliver on the closed-end fund and the premium
to NAV, after accounting for both rational and sentiment driven influences on deviations from
NAV.
The results show that closed-end funds with reported delivery failures trade at a 2.63%
premium. More specifically, a 1% of shares outstanding uncovered short sale position leads to
a 3.05% increase in premium to NAV. The results are robust to variations in failure measure-
ment, to alternative estimation techniques and to endogeneity concerns. The failure premium
is related to future lending fee and loan quantity. The failure premium decreases with the avail-
ability of inventory and the number of active lending agents, consistent with lower bargaining
power among lenders when demanding higher future lending fees. As additional support for
the fee capitalization hypothesis, I also find that the premium associated with a failure is less
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pronounced during the low fee period and failures lead to increased institutional ownership.
Second, I contrast the pricing of funds with reported failures to the pricing of funds with
other measures of short sale constraints in place. I look at the dynamic relation between prices,
lending fees and short sales and relate the cross-sectional variation in the pricing of various
measures of short sale constraints to the cross-sectional variation in lending expectation aris-
ing from these constraints. The empirical pattern in the pricing of the various measures of
constraints is consistent with the lending income expectations that arise from the short sale
constraint measures.
This study contributes to the literature on short sale constraints and valuation and to the
literature on the information content of short sales. Seneca (1967), Miller (1977), Figlewski
(1981), and Morris (1996), among others, argue that security prices are upward biased when
short sale constraints exist because negative information is not fully released in prices. The
results of this study suggest that overpricing is not solely due to restriction on negative infor-
mation but also partly a result of capitalized lending income.
The study provides new insights into the dynamic relation between search frictions, prices,
lending fees and short sales. Evans et al. (2009) show that the incidence of failing is related
to high equity loan costs. I find that failure-to-deliver predicts a higher probability of higher
future fees and increased short sale frequency, as measured by the amount of shares on loan.
This suggest that failures-to-deliver proxy for increased lending revenue and that the capital-
ization of lending profit drives prices up.
Additionally, evidence on the evolution of short sale price and frequency, following the
occurrence of other constraints, provides an interesting outlook on how constraints differ in
terms of future short sale activity. The analysis further stresses the large cross-sectional pricing
differences among various measures of short sale constraints. Most prior research looks at the
pricing implications of one constraint at a time. This study shows that various constraints
can have different pricing implications. Importantly, this study shows that pricing differences
originate from heterogeneous lending expectations following constraints. Failure-to-deliver
gives rise to lender expropriation and utilization and short sales lead to an increase in lending
frequency. The differences in the pricing of the constraints line up with future lending outlook.
The fact that lending expectations mirror pricing is consistent with the premise that lending
income plays a role in pricing.
The results have important implications for existing studies. Several papers conclude that
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short sales predict abnormally low future returns.3 However, there is no consensus conclusion
as to why short sales predict abnormally low future returns. Ringgenberg (2010) shows that
short sales increase the supply of shares outstanding, which leads to lower prices in the pres-
ence of a downward sloping demand curve. Boehmer et al. (2011) suggest that short sellers
are informed and impound information in prices. Engelberg et al. (2010) claim short sellers
trading advantage comes largely from their ability to analyze publicly available information.
According to Duffie et al. (2002) price reflects that a given share can potentially be lent sev-
eral times in the future. Their model predicts that as short interest accumulates over time, the
quantity of unfilled positions declines, so that the expected lending frequency for each share
is reduced, depressing the lending fee as well as the price. This suggests that the reduction of
lending income eventually accounts for the underperformance of stocks. In line with lending
income playing a role in the stock performance I report significantly higher abnormal returns
for stocks with reported failures than for stocks subject to other short sale constraints mea-
sures. The future lending profits attenuate the correction and the reduction of lending income
accounts for the underperformance of stocks.
The capitalization of lending income explains Autore et al. (2010)’s finding that stocks
reaching threshold levels of failures with low short interest become more overvalued than
threshold stocks with high short interest. Lending income could also explain Boehmer, Husza´r
and Jordan’s (2009) finding that stocks with low short interest experience positive abnormal
returns, given that D’Avolio (2002) shows that the mean loan fee is also high for the first short
interest portfolio decile of portfolios. Especially considering that for the low short interest
decile there is the potential to be lent in the future.
The results from this study imply that short selling constraints can cause prices to deviate
from the intrinsic value due the capitalization of future lending income. To the best of my
knowledge, this study is the first to empirically show that future lending expectation plays a
role in equity pricing.4
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the general
3E.g. Brent et al. (1990), Senchank and Starks (1993), Aitken et al. (1998), Aitken et al. (1998),
Dechow et al. (2001), Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), Asquith et al. (2005), Desai et al. (2002),
Geczy et al. (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), D’Avolio (2002), Angel et al. (1998), Lamont (2004),
Diether, Werner and Lee (2009), Boehmer et al. (2008) and Boehmer et al. (2010).
4In the context of the Treasury repo market, Duffie (1996) documents that special repo rates increase the
equilibrium price of the underlying instrument. In Duffie et al. (2002) the theoretical relation is extended to
equity and fixed income security lending. In Duffie et al. (2007) they provide a theory of dynamic asset pricing
that treats search and bargaining in over-the-counter markets.
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issues of short sale constraints and reviews related literature. In Section 4.3, is the description
of the loan data and the closed-end fund sample. Section 4.4 presents the empirical relation
between failure-to-deliver and valuation and explores the dynamic relation between the inci-
dence of a failure and future loan quantity and prices. Section 4.4.5 takes advantage of the
cross-sectional variation in various forms of short sale constraints and jointly explains the re-
sponse of future short sale fee, and loan quantity to the presence of the various constraints. In
section 4.5, I show the pricing implications for future common equity stock returns. Finally,
section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Short selling frictions are important in asset pricing. Seneca (1967), Miller (1977), Harri-
son and Kreps (1978), Figlewski (1981), Morris (1996), Chen et al. (2002), and Duffie et al.
(2002), among others, argue that security prices are biased upward when short sales constraints
exist. In static models, the price is as high as the valuation of the most optimistic investor (e.g.,
Miller (1977), and Chen et al. (2002)). In a dynamic setting short sale constraints can cause
prices to be higher than the valuation of all investors. In Harrison and Kreps’ model (1978),
differences of opinion, together with short sale constraints, create a speculative premium in
which stock prices are higher than even the most optimistic investor’s assessment of their
value. When short sale constraints exist, an asset owner has the option to sell to more op-
timistic investors, which leads to high turnover, overpricing and even to bubbles as reported
in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong et al. (2006). Duffie et al. (2002) attribute price
inflation to capitalization of future lending fees. They present a dynamic model of asset val-
uation in which short selling requires searching for security lenders and bargaining over the
lending fee. Search frictions allow for lender expropriation, and the expectation of lending
fees, in turn, increases the equilibrium price.
Loan income can be economically significant. Securities lending returns comprise the se-
curities lending (fee) return and the reinvestment (cash collateral) return. Securities lending
involves the temporary transfer of securities by one party, the lender, to a borrower. The se-
curities borrower is required to provide collateral to the securities lender in the form of cash
or other securities. Legal title passes on both sides of the transaction so that borrowed secu-
rities and collateral can be sold or relent. Typically, borrowers are required to post collateral
of 102 to 105 cents per dollar of security. If the borrower provides securities as collateral to
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the lender, he pays a fee to borrow the securities. If the borrower provides cash as collateral,
the lender pays interest to the borrower, the rebate rate, and reinvests the cash at the current
short term rate. The fee is then the difference between the short-term rate and the rebate rate,
expressed in basis points per annum. Stocks are considered on special if the loan fee is excess
of the short term rate.
During April 2000 till September 2001, D’Avolio (2002) documents that lending fee can
be as high as 79% per annum. In this time period the aggregate market is easy to borrow,
with the value-weighted cost to borrow a sample loan portfolio being about 25 basis points
per annum. However 1% of stocks on loan become extremely special, demanding negative
rebate rates. Since 2007, securities lending income and loan volumes have reached new highs.
Aggarwal et al. (2011) document that during 2007 to 2009, almost 10% of the stocks are on
special, with fees greater that 100 basis points. Average loan spreads widened from 20-30
basis points in 2005-2006, to over 60 basis points in 2008. Kaplan et al. (2010) conduct a
lending experiment for an anonymous money manager during 2008 and 2009 in which two
thirds of high loan fee stocks are lend out. The average loan fee is 7.3% during September 5 to
17, 2008 and 4.1% during June 5, 2009 till October 1, 2009. They estimate the total revenue
from lending to be about 1.5 to 2% per annum.
One of the most important determinants of loan fees is according to Kolasinski et al.
(2010), search costs. Kolasinski et al. (2010) study the equity loan fee across twelve lenders
from September 2003 through May, 2007. They find that the loan fee as well as the change in
loan fee is positively related to various proxies for search costs. The difficulty to find shares
gives lenders the ability to set high prices, in accordance with Duffie et al. (2002). In a per-
fect market there should be no lending fee but with the friction of imperfect competition and
having to locate shares, the lending fee is the outcome of a bargaining game. The effect of
short sale frictions on the presence of the lending fee in turn explains the overpricing. The
stock price is the expected future income associated with the potential to lend the asset, plus
the expected valuation of the marginal investor.
In this chapter, I look at the dynamic relation between prices, lending fees and short sales
to examine whether short selling constraints cause prices to be biased due the capitalization
of future lending gains next to alternative explanation of the loss of information. This chapter
builds on the prior theoretical research of Duffie et al. (2002) by investigating empirically
whether security prices incorporate prospective security lending income.
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4.3 Data and Variable Definitions
4.3.1 Data
Failure-to-deliver is the frequency and quantity, as a fraction of shares outstanding, in which
short-sellers fail to locate shares. At the time a short position is initiated, the short seller has
three days to locate and borrow the shares from a security lender. Short sellers that have not
located shares from owners by that time are said to have failed-to-deliver. See Evans et al.
(2009) for the details regarding deliveries.
The advantage of using the occurrence of a failure to determine whether security lenders
discount expected lending income in their valuation is that it is forward-looking in the sense
that it is an important determinant of lending fees. Kolasinski et al. (2010) show that the diffi-
culty of finding shares leads to a significant increase in lending fee. Moreover, in Duffie et al.
(2002) the search for a counter-party is the mechanism through which lending fees increase
and affect asset value. In the model, frictions in securities lending explain the fee of short
selling and overpricing. The total lending fee is essentially equal to the gains from a lending
transaction, multiplied by the number of times a given share is lent, and further multiplied by
the lenders’ bargaining power. Failure-to-deliver represents situations in which it is difficult to
locate securities available for borrowing, resulting increased bargaining power for the lender
and prospective increases in lending profits which, in turn, should lead to higher prices.
Failure-to-deliver data are available from the SEC, and include total number of fails-
to-deliver (i.e., the balance level outstanding) recorded in the National Securities Clearing
Corporation’s (NSCC) Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) system aggregated over all NSCC
members.5 Data prior to September 16, 2008 include only securities with a balance of total
fails-to-deliver of at least 10,000 shares as of a particular settlement date whereas data on or
after this date include all securities with a balance of total fails-to-deliver as of a particular
settlement date.
I construct two variables based on the failure-to-deliver data. The first is an indicator
variable (FAILi,t) that equals one if a failure has been reported for fund i at time t, and zero
otherwise, and the second is the quantity of reported fails as a fraction of shares outstanding
(Failurei,t).
5Available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm
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FAILi,t =
{
1 if failures− to− deliver > 0
0 otherwise
Failurei,t =
(
#failures−to−deliveri,t
shrouti,t
)
(4.1)
I match the failure-to-deliver data from the SEC with lending data from Data Explorers
Ltd., which collects data from custodians and prime brokers that lend and borrow securities.
The data comprise daily stock level information on the dollar value and quantity of shares
available for lending, and the value and quantity of shares of borrowed securities for the sam-
ple period July 2006 to December 2008. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) use the same data source
to study how price efficiency and the return distribution are affected by loan supply. For more
information regarding the equity lending data from Data Explorers I refer to their paper.
4.3.2 Closed-end Funds
I use closed-end funds to capture the full bias in pricing following the incidence of a failure-
to-deliver. These funds offer several advantages, one of which is that the intrinsic value of
these funds is known. This is the total value of all the securities in the fund divided by the
number of shares in the fund, the so called net asset value (NAV) per share. This study is
not the first to study arbitrage bounds in the context of closed-end funds. Both Pontiff (1996)
and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) underpin the validity of using closed-end funds to study
the influence of arbitrage on fundamental valuation. In a similar spirit, I identify deviations
from the intrinsic value, the Net Asset Value (NAV), and determine whether there is a positive
association between the occurrence of a failure-to-deliver on the fund level and the premium
to NAV, accounting for both rational and sentiment driven influences on the deviations from
NAV.
The number of closed-end funds (sharecode=14) within the CRSP database with the Net
Asset Value Data from the Compustat PDE file from June 2006 through to December 2008
totals 388. I am able to match 297 of these to the loan data from Data Explorers. The sample
used appears to be slightly larger funds that are also and more actively traded, the two samples
do not significantly differ in terms of premium to NAV or returns.
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I merge the loan data from Data Explorers and the SEC with information from a variety
of sources. These include data on stock returns, shares outstanding, and volume from CRSP
and institutional holdings from CDA/Spectrum. I match the monthly NAV to the daily loan
data on the last trading day of the month.
Table 4.1 shows the cross-sectional variation in closed-end fund pricing during the sample
period. On average, closed-end funds trade at a discount to NAV. The average discount over the
sample period is 5.38%. In 2006 it stands at 2.20%which steadily increases to a 7.38% average
discount in 2008. However, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the discounts.
The number of premium and discount funds is displayed in panel B of Table 4.1. Although
premium funds are a minority, 53 funds trade at a premium to NAV in a given month in
2006, 76 in 2007 and 81 in 2008. In contrast, 99 funds traded at a discount in 2006, 201 in
2007 and 265 in 2008. Premium and discount funds differ considerably in terms of fund and
loan characteristics. In panel C, I distinguish between funds trading above NAV (premium)
and funds trading below (discount) NAV. As can be seen from panel C, premium funds are
slightly larger and institutional investors appear less inclined to hold premium funds. Inventory
quantities among beneficial owners willing to lend out their shares are significantly lower
for premium funds. The lower inventory records might be the reason underlying the higher
utilization levels and possibly the larger frequency and size of the number of reported failures
for premium funds. Closed-end funds trading at a premium also have higher short sale fees,
as captured by a fee score. The fee score is a value weighted fee classification expressed
in undisclosed fee bucket, where 0 represents no fee (general collateral), a fee score of 1 is
relatively cheap and a fee score of 6 is the most expensive category.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of the failure-to-deliver data for both the common
equity universe as for the closed-end fund sample. The frequency of reported failures is greater
for the closed-end funds sample than that of the common equity. The failure quantity relative
to shares outstanding is lower for the closed-end funds. On average 21.77% of the closed-end
fund observations have a reported failure and the average failure quantity is 0.05% of shares
outstanding. For the common equity sample the average number of failure incidents is only
14.69% but the average failure quantity relative to shares outstanding is larger, 0.37%. Over
time, the number of failures increased in 2007 from 20% in 2006 to 25.52%, for the closed-end
fund sample. In 2008, the average failure incidents decreased as regulation sought to curtail
naked shorts. A similar dynamic is apparent for the common equity stocks.
In panel C, I compare funds with reported failures at a given point in time to funds without
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reported failures. Funds with reported failures are larger, and more interestingly trade at a
premium to NAV in comparison to funds without reported failures. Funds with a failure have
a larger fraction of their shares outstanding on loan, lower inventory and therefore higher
utilization levels. Funds with reported failures also have higher loan fees.
4.4 Failure and the Premium to NAV
4.4.1 Hypothesis
Miller (1977), argues that in the presence of differences of opinions security prices are biased
upward when short sales constraints exist. Negative information is kept out of the market and
the prices will be set by the most optimistic majority. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen’s model
would further suggest an increase in prices following higher expected lending profits. The
prospect of lending fees should increase prices above the most optimistic buyer’s valuation of
the security’s future dividends. This suggests that short selling constraints can cause prices to
deviate from the intrinsic value due to loss of information and capitalization of future lending
gains.
The first testable hypothesis is therefore:
H1: Failure-to-deliver leads to overvaluation as measured by an increased premium to NAV
of closed-end funds.6
For future lending expectation to play a role in prices, the premium associated with a
failure should be related to future lending profits.
H2: Failure-to-deliver positively predicts an increase in lending frequency and/or lending fee.
Failure-to-deliver represents situations in which it is difficult to locate securities available
for borrowing, resulting increased bargaining power for the lender and prospective increases
in lending profits which, in turn, should lead to higher prices. However, the failure premium
should decrease with the availability of inventory and the number of active lending agents,
consistent with lower bargaining power among lenders when demanding higher future lending
fees.
H3: The premium is decreasing in the level of inventory and the number of active lending
6Important to note is that security lending income is aggregated at the fund level and reported under invest-
ment income in the annual report, as such the presence of the expected loan income in the price can be found at
the fund level.
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agents.
If lending profits are capitalized into prices then the premium associated with the occur-
rence of a failure, should be lower in a low fee period. According to Data Explorers, the
average total return from security lending increased from 20 bp in 2006-2007 to 1.1% in
2008. If lending fees do play a role in pricing, their effects should be less pronounced in the
2006-2007 period.
H4: The premium is less pronounced during the 2006-2007 low fee period.
Finally, for expected future income associated with the potential to lend the asset to be
capitalized in prices, institutional investors need to be willing to pay a premium associated
with lending fees. I therefore expect that the occurrence of a failure would trigger the interest
of institutional investors and lead to increased institutional ownership.
H5: The incidence of a failure leads to increased institutional ownership.
Alternatively, if the short sale bias is solely due to the withholding of negative information,
then I would expect a reduction in institutional ownership following the occurrence of a failure.
4.4.2 Specification
To study the relation between valuation and search frictions, I regress the premium to NAV
on failure-to-deliver and on the fund specific control variables. I estimate a panel regression
using monthly NAV data from June 2006 to December 2008 matched to the end of the month
daily loan data.7 I include firm and period fixed effects, and panel corrected standard errors
clustered by fund to control for heteroskedasticity and within-fund serial correlation.
The premium is serially correlated and to recover consistent estimates of the parameters, I
include lags of the dependent variable.8 Simultaneity problems arise as conceivably short sales
could be determined simultaneously along with the premium to NAV. The main hypothesis is
failures lead to an increase in lending profits, which, in turn, should lead to higher prices.
However, it is not possible to rule out that the premium and short-selling constraints are en-
dogenous, i.e. it could be the case that premium funds stocks attract short-sellers, thus increas-
ing short sale quantity and the likelihood of a failure-to-deliver to occur. I attempt to mitigate
these concerns with Arellano-Bond dynamic panel instrumental-variables (IV) regressions,
7I first ascertain whether all the variables are stationary. I conduct a panel Augmented Dickey Fuller test and
reject that the series are non-stationary.
8The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable also mitigates the effects of possible stale NAV estimates.
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treating failure and the premium as endogenous variables. The estimation also accounts for
the dynamic dependent variable. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator is designed for
panels with short time dimension and larger firm dimension, independent variables that are not
strictly exogenous, fixed effects and with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within funds.
The estimation relies on the first-differences to eliminate unobserved fund-specific effects and
then uses lagged level and difference values of the endogenous variables as instruments for
subsequent first-differences.9
The regression specification for the relation between the incidence of a failure and the
premium to NAV is as follows:
Premiumit = αi+β1FAILit+γ
′xit+β2Premiumit−1+β3Premiumit−2+δt+it (4.2)
where Premiumit is the premium to NAV, for fund i at time t. The premium is calculated as
the price over net asset value minus one. δt are period-specific time dummies. The Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation dictates two lags. The necessity for lagged levels of the endoge-
nous variables reduces the sample size from 297 to 168 funds. xi,t is the vector of control
variables. Additionally, I measure the relation between the failure-to-deliver quantity relative
to shares outstanding and the premium to NAV, using the failure variable Failurei,t in place
of FAILi,t.
4.4.3 Control variables
To isolate the bias in prices created by the occurrence of a failure, I first need to account for
possible factors that might influence the deviation from NAV.
The central puzzle about closed-end funds is that the fund share prices differ from the per
share NAV. NAV premiums or discounts are considered a puzzle because they appear to con-
tradict the no-arbitrage implication of an efficient market. Because two assets, which appear
to offer a claim to the same risk-return distribution, trade at different prices. The existing ex-
plations on why closed-end funds pricing differs from NAV are related to tax considerations,
Malkiel (1977), agency costs, Barclay et al. (1991), noise, Lee et al. (1991), and the trade-off
between management fees and certain benefits that come from investing in a closed-end fund.
In Berk and Stanton (2007)’s model, the benefit to investors is the manager’s ability, whereas
Cherkes et al. (2009) suggest that liquidity is the main benefit.
9For more information I refer to Arellano and Bover (1991).
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I control for fund specific variables such as size, performance in the last 12 months, sys-
tematic risk, volatility and liquidity. Fund size and past performance are used as a proxy for
management skills. I also include fund fixed effects to control for any time-invariant unob-
servable influences on the premium such as expense ratios, fund reputation, and dividend.10
In addition, I follow Pontiff (1996) and include a replication risk measure, which captures the
difficulty in replicating the fund’s holdings.
Lee et al. (1991) propose that discounts and premiums in closed-end funds may reflect
investor sentiment. To account for the influence of market-wide sentiment on the premium
to NAV, I include period fixed effects in the panel specification. In addition, I include a sys-
tematic noise factor as in Gemmill and Thomas (2002). I follow Baker and Wurgler (2006)
in constructing a stock market sentiment index to capture sentiment. To correct for sentiment
influences in deviations from NAV, I calculate the sensitivity of the fund to the sentiment
index for each fund in the sample. This approach allows me to directly measure the interac-
tion between short selling activity, sentiment and the valuation of the closed-end funds. The
variable description appendix contains the details of data sources and variable definition and
construction.
4.4.4 Results
Failure-to-deliver and the Premium to NAV
Table 4.3 reports the results of regressing the premium to NAV on the failure-to-deliver vari-
ables and fund specific control variables. The inclusion of fund, period fixed effects and the
lags of the premium to NAV render most controls insignificant. Size and the beta are the only
significant coefficients. With regards to the valuation effect of the failure-to-deliver variables,
funds with uncovered short sale positions trade at a 2.63% premium, as can be seen from the
first specification in Table 4.3 column 1. The relation between the continuous failure-to-deliver
variable and the premium (column 2) is also statistically and economically significant. Funds
with uncovered short sale position equal to 1% of their shares outstanding have a 3.05% higher
premium to NAV. The average failure position as a fraction of shares outstanding is 0.05%,
with a standard deviation of 0.03%. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in failure
translates into an increase in premium of 0.09%.
10I include the dividend ratios, however the period and fund fixed effects make this variable redundant.
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Table 4.3
Failures and Premium
Panel regression of premium to NAV on failure-to-deliver,
fund specific control variables and period dummies. Re-
sults are reported in percentages. Period dummies are not
reported. Panel data are U.S. equity closed-end funds (share
code=14) followed from June 2006 to December 2008. The
model is estimated using Arellano-Bond (1991) system dy-
namic panel model (GMM), t statistics clustered by fund
in parenthesis. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation
and difference-in-Sargan/Hansen tests for the validity of in-
struments p-values are reported. The Appendix contains the
details of data sources and variable definitions.
(1) (2)
Variables Premium Premium
FAIL 2.63***
(5.10)
Failure 3.05**
(2.46)
Control Variables
Size 0.01** 0.01**
(2.29) (2.29)
Turnover 0.00 0.00
(-0.11) (-0.54)
Noise Beta 0.14* 0.12
(1.90) (1.44)
Replication -0.27 -0.26
(-0.59) (-0.58)
Beta Sentiment 2.94 0.595
(0.70) (0.13)
Stdev -0.01 0.05
(-0.06) (0.58)
Past 12M return -0.04 -0.04
(-1.10) (-1.23)
Beta 0.86* 0.79*
(1.86) (1.69)
Institutional Own 0.02 0.02
(0.66) (0.47)
Amihud 0.00 0.00
(1.13) (0.47)
Spread -0.03 0.01
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
(-0.18) (0.05)
Lagged Dependent variable
Premium (t-1) 0.71*** 0.72***
(12.30) (12.15)
Premium (t-2) 0.23*** 0.23***
(3.85) (4.00)
Constant -0.130*** -0.176***
(-4.00) (-4.72)
Tests
AR(1) 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.17 0.28
Sargan 0.00 0.00
Hansen 0.25 0.18
Difference-in-Hansen 0.37 0.20
Obs 1466 1466
# Funds 168 168
# Instruments 131 131
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Period Effects Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The results in Table 4.3 are robust to the estimation technique used. The results using
fixed effects, the between estimator and pooled OLS with period effects are reported in 4.4.
Additionally, I test the GMM results for robustness with respect to reductions in the instrument
set by presenting the results using 1 lag, collapsing the instrument count, using a two-step
estimation, and estimating in differences and levels. These alternative estimations produce
results that are very similar to the results in Table 4.3.
The results are also robust to alternative failure measurements, as is shown in panel B
Table 4.4. First I calculate the average relative failure position in the week leading up to the
last trading day of the month. The results are even stronger, a 1% increase in failure relative to
the shares outstanding increases the premium with 9.12%. Similarly, if I measure failure as the
average monthly failure position relative to shares outstanding. In the third and fourth column
of panel B, the number of days in which the threshold level of fails is reached throughout the
last week leading up to the last trading day of the month and the number of days in which the
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threshold level of fails is reached throughout the month. The reporting of the threshold level
of fails increases the premium with 0.33 per day during the last trading week of the month
and 0.09% for each occurrence during the month. In the last column failure and premium are
measured in changes and a 1% increase in failure increases the premium with 2.30%.
An important concern is that of endogeneity. The use of lagged values of failure as in-
struments mitigates some of these concerns. Nonetheless, I also attempt to mitigate these con-
cerns with instrumental-variables (IV) regressions, treating failure-to-deliver and premium as
endogenous variables. Although it is difficult to obtain truly exogenous instruments, I use the
total number of lending agents (intermediaries) as reported to Data Explorers, as instrument.11
The validity of this measure as an instrument requires that the number of intermediaries not
impact the fund premium except through its effect on failure-to-deliver. Empirically, the num-
ber of lending agents correlates with the failure-to-deliver variable, but it does not relate to the
premium to NAV. Agents typically include asset managers, custodians, specialist securities
lending agents and brokers. A priori it is unlikely that lending agents decide on facilitating
security lending on the basis of the existence of a premium to NAV for closed-end funds. Pro-
viding lending services requires set-up costs, rooted relationships with the industrys largest
lenders and investment in inventory. Usually investment banks have long-established lending
programs, making entering or exiting the loan intermediation market on the basis of temporary
valuation unlikely.
To test whether the instrument affect failure-to-deliver and premium, I run the following
two panel data regressions:
Failureit = αi + β1ln(#Agents)it + γ
′xit + δt + it (4.3)
Premiumit = αi + β1ln(#Agents)it + γ
′xit + δt + it (4.4)
where Failureit is the quantity of reported fails as a fraction of shares outstanding at the end
of the month, for fund i at time t. Premiumit is the premium to NAV, for fund i at time t. δt are
period-specific time dummies. xi,t is the same vector of control variables. I also include fund
fixed effects to control for any time-invariant unobservable influences. I find that the number
of lending agents does not have a statistically significant effect on the premium at even the 10%
significance but is strongly related to failure-to-deliver variable at a 1% significance level.
11I look at the total number of lending agents for each fund, not the number of custodians with open transac-
tions. The decision to make inventory available is likely endogenous to the lending fee and in turn the premium.
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As can be seen in the column 10 of Table 4.4, using the total number of lending agents as
an instrument, I still find a positive and significant relation between failure and the premium to
NAV. To rule out that the premium and failure are endogenous, in that premium funds stocks
attract short-sellers, thus increasing short sale quantity and the likelihood of a failure-to-deliver
to occur, I also include loan quantity as control variable. As can be seen in the last column,
the results are also robust to the inclusion of loan quantity as additional control variable.
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Table 4.1
Closed-end fund descriptive Statistics
Panel A contains mean monthly Net Asset Value (NAV) statistics for the closed-end fund sample.
Premium is calculated as (price/nav)-1. Sample period September 2006 to December 2008. Panel
B reports the number of funds trading above (premium) or below (discount) their NAV value, in a
particular month during the year. Panel C shows the test of equality of the means (t−test) and medians
(Wilcoxon) for premium and discount funds. Failure represents the aggregate net balance of shares
that failed to be delivered as of settlement date at the end of the month relative to shares outstanding
and the number of failures is the frequency of reported failures relative to the total number of months.
Loan is the total quantity of borrowed securities as a percentage of the shares outstanding. Inventory is
the available inventory quantity from beneficial owners as a percentage of the number of outstanding
shares. Utilization is the value of assets on loan from beneficial owners divided by the total lendable
assets. Fee score is the value weighted average fee score over 30 days. 0 represents no fee, a fee
score of 1 is relatively cheap, while 6 is the most expensive category. The description of the rest of the
variables are in the appendix.
Panel A Descriptive Statistics per year
Year Obs Mean Stdev Min Max
Premium 2006-2008 3642 -5.38% 10.22% -48.84% 84.11%
2006 575 -2.20% 9.57% -29.90% 50.76%
N=297 2007 1407 -4.08% 9.61% -38.82% 84.11%
2008 1885 -7.38% 10.45% -48.84% 48.45%
Panel B: # Obs per year
Year Obs N
# Premium Funds 2006 177 53
2007 312 76
2008 299 81
# Discount Funds 2006 398 99
2007 1095 201
2008 1586 265
Panel C: Comparison Premium Discount Funds
Diff. of means Wilcoxon
Discount Premium Difference t-test (p-value) test (p-value)
Premium -9.43% 9.27% -18.70% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Size (thousands) 417,431 462,807 -45,376 (0.04)** (0.07)*
Institutional Own 15.43% 5.75% 9.67% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Turnover 72.88% 76.81% -3.93% (0.24) (0.00)***
Inventory 1.57% 0.57% 1.00% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Utilization 6.77% 8.68% -1.90% (0.02)** (0.29)
Loan 0.36% 0.36% 0.00% (0.95) (0.00)***
# Failure 15.59% 45.94% -30.35% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Failure 0.04% 0.11% -0.08% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Fee Score 3.48 4.51 -1.04 (0.06)* (0.00)***
N 284 122
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Table 4.2
Failure Descriptive Statistics
Mean end of the month failure statistics for the sample period July 2006-December 2008. The sample
consists of all equity closed-end funds (share code=14) and common equity stocks (share code=10,
11) in the Data Explorers data. The common equity sample consist of all common equity stocks in
CRSP and averages 4630 stocks. Failure represents the aggregate net balance of shares that failed to
be delivered as of settlement date at the end of the month relative to shares outstanding and the number
of failures is the frequency of reported failures relative to the total number of months. Panel B shows
loan descriptive statistics for the closed-end fund and common equity sample. Loan is the total quantity
of borrowed securities as a percentage of the shares outstanding. Inventory is the available inventory
quantity from beneficial owners as a percentage of the number of outstanding shares. Utilization is
the value of assets on loan from beneficial owners divided by the total lendable assets. Fee score is
the value weighted average fee score over 30 days. 0 represents no fee, a fee score of 1 is relatively
cheap, while 6 is the most expensive category. Panel C shows the test of equality of mean (t−test) and
medians (Wilcoxon) for funds with reported failures and funds without.
Panel A: Failure Descriptive Statistics Closed-end and Common Equity
Closed-end funds Common Equity
# Failures Failure # Failures Failure
Sample period Mean 21.77% 0.05% 14.69% 0.37%
(2006-2008) Stdev 10.70% 0.03% 8.47% 0.09%
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25%
Max 50.00% 0.12% 25.49% 0.52%
Mean per year 2006 20.00% 0.03% 0.95% 0.53%
2007 25.52% 0.07% 16.57% 0.33%
2008 19.81% 0.04% 17.84% 0.39%
Panel B: Loan Descriptive Statistics Closed-end and Common Equity
Sample period Loan Inventory Utilization Fee Score
(2006-2008) Closed end funds 0.36% 1.33% 7.18% 3.65
Common Equity 4.55% 14.38% 22.85% 3.13
Panel C: Comparison Funds with reported Failures and funds without
Funds Funds Diff. of means Wilcoxon
with Failures without Failures Difference t-test (p-value) test (p-value)
Size (thousands) 489,705 409,113 80,592 (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Premium 1.23% -7.19% 8.42% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Institutional Own 10.83% 14.13% -3.30% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Turnover 79.48% 72.06% 7.42% (0.01)** (0.41)
Loan 0.58% 0.30% 0.28% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Inventory 1.02% 1.46% -0.43% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Utilization 12.53% 5.67% 6.86% (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Fee Score 4.33 3.65 0.68 (0.00)*** (0.01)**
N 202 283
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The economic magnitude of the premium associated with a failure seems large, but consid-
ering that stocks on special can have large fees it is possible for a failure to lead to a premium
of above 2%. D’Avolio (2002) shows that the aggregate market is easy to borrow during April
2000 till September 2001. The value-weighted cost to borrow the sample loan portfolio is 25
basis points per annum, however 1% of stocks (roughly seven per month) on loan become ex-
tremely special, demanding negative rebate rates (i.e., loan fees in excess of the risk-free rate).
Kolasinski et al. (2010) corroborate that the difficulty of finding shares leads to an increase in
borrowing costs and therefore failures are expected to lead to these exceptional 1% cases.
Table 4 in D’Avolio (2002) provides a partial list of those negative rebate stocks and their
highest measured loan fee in the loan database. The fees that short sellers pay for these stocks
are 79% per annum for CNH Global, 63% for General Motors, and 55% for Krispy Kreme.
While not a lot of stocks are on special, when they are the fee can be substantial, especially
considering that during that time period the average fee is only 25 basis points.
Considering the reported special fees by D’Avolio (2002), if a fee of 70% lasts for 5 days
the premium could be as large as 1.05%, at a discount rate of 10%. For the fee to lead to a
premium of at least 2,5% a loan fee of at least 67% needs to last 30 days. A fee of 35% can
lead to a 1.30% premium if it last for a month or 0.53% if it last for only 5 days. This excludes
the security lending income earned on re-investing cash collateral.
Since 2007, securities loan volumes and lending income have increased sharply. Average
loan spreads widened from 20-30 basis points in 2005-2006, to over 60 basis points in 2008.12
Just in a year, the U.S. equity lending market grew in size from $270 billion in 2008 to $320
billion in 2009. The business of securities lending became lucrative business for funds with
large portfolios of stocks. Dimensional Advisors for example earned $182 million in net
lending revenue for the fiscal year 2008. The resulting performance enhancement ranged from
0.04% for US Large Company Portfolio to 0.66% for Japanese Small Company Portfolio.
Kaplan et al. (2010) estimate the total revenue from lending out the full potential of all high
fee stocks for a money manager to be about 1.5 to 2%. Based on their first phase (September
5 to 18, 2008) results, they estimate lending revenue to add between 2.78% to 4.64% per year
with median fees ranging from 83 to 129 basis points.
Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that during 2005-2009 the maximum annualized fee is 19.25%
and the average number of days for which stocks are on loan is 16 days. Given these numbers
it could explain a 0.6% premium, a quarter of the observed premium.
12110 basis points including reinvestment return.
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The premise is that failure-to-deliver leads to a deviation from the intrinsic value due
to loss of information and capitalization of future lending gains. So the premium need not be
fully explained by future lending profits, all though these back of the envelop calculation show
that if the fee is large enough the reported premiums are possible.
Lending Expectation
The previous results show that a failure-to-deliver shares leads to an increased premium to
NAV. If future lending profits are capitalized into prices then the premium associated with the
occurrence of a failure should be related to future lending profits, as measured by future loan
fees and quantity.
In Table 4.5 are the transition probabilities of the change in fee score over time of closed-
end funds with no reported failures vis-a`-vis funds with a reported threshold level of fails. The
fee classification is expressed in undisclosed fee buckets 0-6, where 0 represents no fee, a fee
score of 1 is relatively cheap, while 6 is the most expensive category. Of the closed-end funds
with no reported failures 94.90% has no fee, against 94.65% of funds with reported failures.
Funds with reported failures are more likely to fall in the higher fee categories. 9.74% of the
funds with a reported failure have a high fee of 6 against 5.19% of funds with no failures.
They are also much more likely to shift from a low fee classification into a high fee category,
and stay in the high fee category. Funds with reported failures have higher fees.
To test whether failure-to-deliver positively predicts an increase in lending fee, I first esti-
mate the following daily generalized ordered logistic regression considering the fee categories:
g(PR(Feeit+n ≤| x)) = αi + β ∗ FAILit + β′zit + it+n i = 0, · · · , 6 (4.5)
where Feeit+n is value weighted fee classification expressed in undisclosed fee bucket i, which
runs from 0-6 in the following n days. α0···6 are k intercept parameters, and FAILit is the oc-
currence of failure-to-deliver. zit is the vector of control variables. D’Avolio (2002) finds that
the likelihood of higher short sale fees decreases with size, but increases with differences of
opinion. He uses institutional ownership as a proxy for loan supply and finds that it decreases
the likelihood of higher fees. I include the inventory quantity as a percentage of shares out-
standing as a more direct measure of supply. An additional benefit is that inventory is also
measured daily, while institutional ownership is only available at a quarterly frequency. The
vector of explanatory variables also includes fund characteristics such as size and turnover as
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Table 4.5
Failure and Fee Score
The table reports daily transition probabilities in percentages of the change in Fee score over time for
funds without reported failures (top panel) and funds with reported failures (bottom panel). Fee score
is the value weighted average fee score over 30 days. 0 represents no fee, a fee score of 1 is relatively
cheap, while 6 is the most expensive category.
Transition Probabilities
No Failure (FAIL=0) Fee score
Fee score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 (no fee) 94.90 2.21 0.34 0.35 0.60 0.58 1.02 100
1 (cheap) 23.55 73.08 1.10 0.38 0.37 0.67 0.83 100
2 27.55 12.16 50.97 3.36 3.88 0.65 1.42 100
3 19.79 2.11 5.19 67.05 3.17 1.54 1.15 100
4 18.77 1.00 0.65 1.55 70.79 5.14 2.10 100
5 18.54 1.78 0.42 1.03 4.40 69.01 4.82 100
6 (expensive) 16.19 0.87 0.33 0.45 0.52 2.34 79.30 100
Total 79.94 7.60 0.95 1.28 2.46 2.59 5.19 100
With Failure (FAIL =1)
Fee score
Fee score 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
0 (no fee) 94.65 1.44 0.22 0.23 0.76 0.86 1.84 100
1 (cheap) 13.16 83.32 0.92 0.17 0.42 1.17 0.84 100
2 20.69 8.28 64.14 3.45 1.38 0.00 2.07 100
3 15.19 1.90 4.43 69.62 6.96 0.00 1.90 100
4 15.56 0.68 0.34 1.37 76.75 2.74 2.56 100
5 14.89 1.40 0.42 0.56 3.93 74.72 4.07 100
6 (expensive) 14.12 0.61 0.12 0.43 0.55 1.84 82.32 100
Total 73.42 7.24 0.87 0.98 3.57 4.18 9.74 100
a measure of differences of opinions. In addition, the specification includes systematic risk
and volatility to control for short selling motivated by hedging.13. The unknown parameters
β are estimated by maximum likelihood.  is assumed to have a standard logistic distribution,
i.e g(it+n) = 11+e−it+1 .
13The addition of the controls rejects the the parallel lines assumption, which is the requirement that the β’s
be the same for each value of the categories, only the α’s differ across the categories and the regression lines are
parallel. To overcome this limitation I use a generalized ordered logit, which is less restrictive than the parallel-
lines model but more parsimonious and interpretable than a non-ordinal method such as multinomial logistic
regression. I refer to ? for more information on the generalized ordered model.
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Table 4.6 reports the marginal effects of the generalized ordered logit results of the fee
score on the occurrence of a failure for the following day and panel B for the following 5, 30,
60, and 90 days.14 The marginal effect is the change in the predicted probability associated
with the incidence of a failure.
The first column represents the likelihood of having a fee, while the remaining are prob-
abilities of a particular fee score conditional on having a fee. A reported failure increases the
likelihood of having a fee by 1.44%. Conditional on having a fee a failure incidence reduces
the likelihood of having a low fee classification by 24.80% and it increases the odds of ending
up in a high fee category. The occurrence of a failure makes it 12.30% more likely that the
fund will have the highest fee score in the following day. As can be seen in panel B, the re-
sults persist for at least 90 days, although at t+90 the likelihood of having a fee is significantly
reduced.
The expected future income associated with the potential to lend the asset is not only a
function of the lending fee, but also the lending frequency. Subsequently, I run predictive re-
gressions to test whether failures-to-deliver lead to an increase in lending frequency. I estimate
the following daily panel regression:
Loanit+n = αi + β
′
itFAILit + β
′
itzit + it+n (4.6)
where Loanit+1 is the future loan quantity relative to shares outstanding, for fund i in the fol-
lowing n days t+n. FAILit is the indicator variable which equals one following the incidence
of a failure. The vector of explanatory variables, zit, includes fund characteristics such as size,
past 12-month return, and turnover as a measure of differences of opinions. These controls
reflect findings of Dechow et al. (2001), Asquith et al. (2005) and Boehmer et al. (2010) that
short interest is related to market capitalization and momentum. Karpoff and Lou (2010) find
that short interest increases with share turnover and institutional ownership. Since at a daily
frequency institutional ownership is not available, I therefore include inventory as a supply
variable. In addition, the specification includes systematic risk and volatility to control for
short selling motivated by hedging. The results are reported in Table 4.7.
The occurrence of a failure-to-deliver predicts an increase in loan quantity in the following
days up to even two months. Funds with a reported failure experience an increase of 0.42% in
loan quantity in the following day. The fact that failures lead to an increase in loan quantity
14The signs of the estimated coefficients are cumulative probabilities. In order to be able to derive more
information from the estimated coefficients I calculate the derivatives of the six probabilities at the sample means
of the independent variables.
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Table 4.6
Predictive Fee score Ordered Logit
The table reports the percentage marginal effects of the generalized ordered logit regression of the
occurrence of a failure on fee score, controls and period fixed effects. The marginal effects are calcu-
lated as the derivatives of the six probabilities at the sample means of the independent variables and
represent the daily change in the predicted probability associated with a discrete change of the failure
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Panel A show the marginal effects of the occurrence of a failure on the
fee score in the following day. Panel B show the marginal effects of the occurrence of a failure on the
fee score, controls and fixed effects for n days ahead. Controls are not reported. t-statistics are reported
in brackets and are calculated using fund clustered standard errors. The details of data sources and
variable definitions are in the appendix.
Panel A: Marginal effects of the generalized Ordered Logit regression (t+1)
Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee Fee
vs Score= Score= Score= Score= Score= Score=
No Fee 1 2 3 4 5 6
(t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1) (t+1)
FAILt 1.44*** -24.80*** 1.78* 0.56 5.07*** 5.03*** 12.30***
(2.68) (-6.78) (1.96) (0.77) (2.64) (4.19) (4.32)
Sizet 0.01 -0.04 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.01* -0.01
(0.98) (-1.24) (2.68) (0.64) (1.06) (1.90) (-0.88)
Div ratet -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01** 0.01** 0.02*
(-0.50) (-0.58) (0.24) (-0.09) (-2.04) (2.40) (1.73)
Turnovert 0.28 -8.24*** 2.36*** 1.84** -0.35 1.67 2.72*
(0.48) (-3.07) (2.86) (2.47) (-0.37) (1.39) (1.94)
Stdevt -0.23*** -2.11*** 0.39** 0.45*** -0.56** 0.79*** 1.03***
(-3.18) (-3.75) (1.98) (2.99) (-2.00) (3.92) (4.94)
Betat -1.27*** -1.45 1.28* -0.55 1.73*** -0.51 -0.50
(-3.54) (-0.75) (1.75) (-1.36) (2.60) (-0.87) (-0.55)
Inventoryt 0.32** 1.24 1.15*** -0.08 0.24 -0.85** -1.69***
(2.00) (1.09) (2.70) (-0.34) (0.71) (-2.49) (-2.88)
Panel B: Long Horizon (t+n days)
(t+5) (t+5) (t+5) (t+5) (t+5) (t+5) (t+5)
FAILt 1.64*** -21.80*** 1.21 1.23 0.44 3.94*** 15.00***
(3.19) (-6.09) (1.32) (1.57) (0.34) (3.18) (5.52)
FAILt (t+30) (t+30) (t+30) (t+30) (t+30) (t+30) (t+30)
1.82*** -18.90*** 1.47* 0.41 2.88** 3.50*** 10.60***
(3.57) (-4.85) (1.80) (0.48) (2.36) (2.60) (3.95)
FAILt (t+60) (t+60) (t+60) (t+60) (t+60) (t+60) (t+60)
1.60*** -16.60*** -0.47 1.99** 3.03*** 3.10*** 8.99***
(3.25) (-4.64) (-0.49) (2.26) (3.31) (2.66) (3.29)
(t+90) (t+90) (t+90) (t+90) (t+90) (t+90) (t+90)
FAILt -5.30 -18.80*** -0.69 -1.51** 1.80 3.81*** 15.41***
(-14.45)*** (-10.15) (-0.93) (-2.37) (1.61) (3.21) (9.42)
Robust t−statistics in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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long after the initial failure indicates that the failure premium cannot be attributed to a short
squeeze or closing of the fail position. A short squeeze leads to a forced coverage of the short
sale position leading to a reduction not an increase in the number of borrowed shares. Funds
with reported failures trade at a premium with respect to funds with no failures and the failure
premium is related to future lending fee and loan quantity.
Table 4.7
Predictive Loan Quantity Regression
Predictive regression of the daily occurrence of a failure on loan quantity over shares outstanding,
including controls and period fixed effects. The results are reported in percentages. t−statistics are
reported in brackets and are calculated using fund clustered standard errors. The details of data sources
and variable definitions are in the appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Loan Loan Loan Loan Loan
(t+1) (t+5) (t+30) (t+60) (t+90)
FAILt 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.27** 0.18
(3.18) (3.11) (2.62) (2.07) (1.35)
Sizet 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.00) (0.99) (1.11) (1.00) (0.89)
Div ratet 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(3.52) (3.53) (3.47) (3.30) (3.36)
Turnovert 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.28***
(5.19) (5.39) (4.95) (4.01) (3.85)
Stdevt -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02**
(-0.84) (-1.44) (-0.96) (1.29) (2.19)
Betat 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(0.99) (1.08) (0.15) (-0.87) (-0.79)
Inventoryt 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.24***
(9.76) (9.75) (9.51) (8.36) (7.15)
Past 12m rett 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.00 0.01
(2.54) (2.12) (2.34) (0.12) (0.90)
Constant -0.99* -0.96* -0.86 -0.69 -0.58
(-1.92) (-1.87) (-1.65) (-1.22) (-0.97)
Observations 94167 94163 94138 94108 94078
R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.41 0.35
Robust t−statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Interaction Effect
To illustrate that search frictions play a role in prices and that the price inflation cannot solely
be attributed to a reduction in the information content of prices, I rerun the GMM specification,
with an interaction effect between the occurrence of a failure variable and inventory. The
availability of inventory from beneficial owners should lower the bargaining power of lenders
and decrease lending fees.15 To test this premise, I interact the failure variable with three
inventory measures in the following regression specification.
Premit = αi+β1FailIDit+β2Iit∗FailIDit+β3Iit+γ′xit+β4Premit−1+β5Premit−2+δt+it
(4.7)
where Premit is the premium to NAV, for fund i at time t. Iit is the interaction variable. δt are
period-specific time dummies. The first interaction variable is the available inventory quantity
from beneficial owners relative to the shares outstanding. The second represents the number
of inventory accounts held by beneficial owners and the third is the number of active lending
agents. Since the interactions are also assumed to be endogenous, I set a lag limit of two and
collapse the instrument count as suggested by Roodman (2008) to reduce the risk of overfitting
the endogenous variables.
As shown in the first specification in Table 4.8, a reported failure leads to 2.70% increase
in NAV premiums. The interaction term, however, is not statistically significant though of
the correct sign. However, when allowing for a larger instrument set, the coefficient on the
interaction variable is statistically significant, this suggest that larger inventories reduce the
bargaining power of lenders. The number of active agents significantly reduces the premium
associated with failures, both in the collapsed as using the full instrument set. An additional ac-
tive agent reduces the premium by 0.91%. The number of active agents give rise to a stronger
effect, since more lending agents equates to lower bargaining power or decreased possibility
of lender expropriation. In fact, Kolasinski et al. (2010) and Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) find
that inventory and especially, concentrated ownership leads to an increase in lending fees.
15Inventory at the occurrence of a constraint can best be interpreted as a reduction in bargaining power in
extracting higher fees from lenders. Alternatively, inventory might also indirectly relax the binding nature of
the constraints. Inventory can, a priori, mitigate the occurrence of a constraint, but it is not clear that once a
constraint is in place, inventory would relax the binding nature of the constraint. The latter is a more indirect
effect than the former.
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As additional support for the fee capitalization hypothesis, I interact the incidence of a
failure with a period indicator variable set to one for the 2006-2007 period. During 2006 and
2007, the average fee and total return from lending shares was considerably lower. According
to Data Explorers, the average total return from security lending increased from 20 bp in
2006-2007 to 1.1% in 2008. If lending fees do play a role in pricing, their effects should be
less pronounced in the 2006-2007 period. As can be seen from the fourth specification, the
interaction term of failure and the low fee indicator is indeed negative. A failure in 2008 is
associated with a 1.72% lower premium. The fact that the coefficient of the failure indicator
variable is larger in the fifth specification can be attributed to the higher reported threshold
quantity. Data prior to September 16, 2008 include only securities with a balance of total
fails-to-deliver of at least 10,000 shares as of a particular settlement date whereas data on or
after this date include all securities with a balance of total fails-to-deliver as of a particular
settlement date.
Finally, for expected future income associated with the potential to lend the asset to be
capitalized in prices, institutional investors need to be willing to pay a premium associated
with lending fees. To measure whether the occurrence of a failure would trigger the interest
of institutional investors and lead to increased institutional ownership in the following quarter
I look at how the occurrence of a failure in the past quarter affects the change in institutional
ownership. In column 5 of Table 4.8 you can see that the occurrence of a failure leads to
a 0.87% increase in institutional ownership, consistent with a failure triggering the interest
of institutional investors. In the last column I also examine whether institutional investors
respond to high loan fees by looking at the relation between funds with a fee in the previous
month and the change in subsequent institutional ownership. A fee score leads to a 0.68%
increase in institutional interest per increase in fee category. For a fund that goes from a low
(fee score=1) to a high fee score of 6 that means that institutional ownership increases with
3.40%.16
16I also estimated the results using a monthly frequency and Arellano bond system GMM and the results are
robust.
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Table 4.8
Interaction Failure
Interaction effects of the the occurrence of a failure on the premium. The specification includes the
failure-to-deliver variable, fixed effects, the controls, lagged (2) dependent variables and period dum-
mies. Results are reported in percentages. Period dummies, lagged dependent variables and controls are
not reported. The first interacting inventory variable is the available inventory quantity from beneficial
owners relative to the shares outstanding. Inventory accounts variable is the number of inventory ac-
counts held by beneficial owners. The number of active lending agents is the number of custodians with
open transactions. The details of data sources and variable definitions are in the appendix. The model is
estimated using Arellano-Bond (1991) system dynamic panel model (GMM), t−statistics clustered by
fund in parenthesis. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and difference-in-Sargan/Hansen tests
for the validity of instruments p-values are reported. Regression 5 and 6 examine the quarterly change
in institutional ownership in response to a occurrence of a failure (t-1) and in response to an increase in
fee (t-1). The last two regressions are standard panel fixed effects regression using period and fund fixed
effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change Change
Prem Prem Prem Prem Instit. Instit.
Variables (%) (%) (%) (%) Own (%) Own (%)
FAIL 2.70*** 2.87*** 2.96*** 3.44***
(5.17) (4.96) (5.85) (4.41)
Inventory 0.33
(0.79)
FAIL*Inventory -0.31
(-1.08)
FAIL*Inventory Accounts -0.17
(-1.53)
Inventory 0.21***
(3.07)
FAIL*Active Agents -0.91**
(-1.99)
Active Agents -0.43
(-0.68)
FAIL*Lowfee -2.10**
(-2.39)
Low Fee 3.09***
(3.12)
FAILt 0.87**
(2.25)
Fee Scoret 0.68**
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 – continued from previous page
(2.28)
Tests
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.22
Sargan 0.18 0.22 0.03 0.31
Hansen 0.57 0.51 0.64 0.57
Difference-in-Hansen 0.48 0.79 0.90 0.75
Obs 1466 1466 1466 1466 694 109
# Funds 168 168 168 168 159 63
# Instruments 40 40 40 40
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t−statistics in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The premise is that failure-to-deliver leads to a deviation from the intrinsic value due to
loss of information and capitalization of future lending gains. Consistent with the premise,
the failure premium is related to future lending fee and loan quantity, and it decreases with
availability of inventory and active lending agents. The premium associated with a failure
is less pronounced during the low fee period and triggers institutional investor interest. The
combination of effects suggests that failure-to-deliver premium cannot solely be driven by a
reduction in the information content of prices. To explore this latter premise, I contrast the
pricing of the premium associated with a failure-to-deliver to the pricing of other forms of
short sale constraints in the following section.
4.4.5 Other Short Sale Constraint Measures
In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that security prices are biased when short sales constraints
exist. For one short sale constraints restrict information but also because future lending expec-
tations play a pricing role. To test that effect I take advantage of the cross-sectional variation
of short sale constraints.
I focus on the constraints that have been found to lead to overvaluation. Several stud-
ies confirm that stocks with high short interest, short quantity relative to shares outstanding,
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experience low subsequent returns.17
The first additional measure of short sale constraints will be a proxy for short sale quan-
tity, namely number of borrowed securities a fraction of shares outstanding. According to
estimates of Ringgenberg (2010) the mean (median) correlation between loan quantity from
Data Explorers and semi-monthly short interest from Compustat is 0.70 (0.78).
Loani,t =
(
#borrowedsecuritiesi,t
shrouti,t
)
(4.8)
Cohen et al. (2007) identify demand shifts using price-quantity pairs and find shorting
demand to be an important predictor of future stock returns. Stocks that have experienced at
least an outward demand shift (DOUT), have seen both their loan fees and their loan quantities
rise. According to their findings, following a demand shift, stocks have a negative abnormal
return of 2.98% in the following month.
The second measure therefore follows the methodology proposed by Cohen et al. (2007)
to identify demand shifts using price-quantity pairs. Funds that experienced an outward de-
mand shift (DOUT), see a rise in both their loan fees and their loan quantities.
DOUTi,t =
{
1 if ΔFee score > 0 andΔShort Sale Quantity > 0
0 if ΔFee score ≤ 0 orΔShort Sale Quantity ≤ 0 (4.9)
I use the fee score as price variable. This is the value weighted average of all applicable
loan fees weighted by loan value.
The final measure is short utilization, which is the value of assets on loan from beneficial
owners (beneficial owner value on loan) relative to the total lendable asset value (beneficial
owner inventory value).
Utilizationi,t =
(
value on loani,t
inventory valuei,t
)
(4.10)
The regression specification for the relation between short sales constraints and the pre-
mium to NAV is as follows:
Premiumit = αi+β1CONSTit+γ
′xit+β2Premiumit−1+β3Premiumit−2+δt+it (4.11)
17Figlewski (1981), Senchank and Starks (1993), Aitken et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (2001), Asquith et al.
(2005), Desai et al. (2002), Aitken et al. (1998), Angel et al. (1998), Diether, Werner and Lee (2009),
Boehmer et al. (2008) and Boehmer et al. (2010)
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where Premiumit is the premium to NAV, for fund i at time t. The premium is calculated as
the price over net asset value P/NAV-1. xi,t is the vector of control variables and CONSTit is
the corresponding constraint variable; failure-to-deliver and subsequently short sale quantity,
demand shift (DOUT), and utilization. δt are period-specific time dummies. Kolasinski et al.
(2010) examine the shape of the share loan supply curve and show that the average loan supply
schedule is non-monotonic and that supply curves tend to become steep at high levels of short
sale quantity. To account for this non-monotonicity, funds are ranked high if they are assigned
to the highest tercile in terms of utilization and short sale quantity. The Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation again dictates a lag length of two.
The results in table 4.9 show that the relation between demand shifts and NAV premiums
and the loan quantity and premiums is not statistically significant. High level of borrowed
securities, as measured as the fund belonging to the highest tercile, lead to a 1.01% increase
in premium. Utilization, in turn, has a significant relation to the NAV premium of closed-end
funds. For every increase in utilization of 10%, the premium increases by 0.17%. Funds with
high utilization levels, belonging to the top tercile, trade at a 0.76% premium, although this
is not significant except when collapsing the instrument count. The premium associated with
failures is economically significantly higher than that associated with other forms of short sale
constraints. I standardize the continuous variables to facilitate comparison. A one standard
deviation increase in failure raises the premium by 0.52%, while a one standard deviation
increase in utilization leads to a 0.33% premium. The occurrence of a failure causes a 2.63%
premium, while high relative loan positions, lead to increases of 1.01%.
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The analysis reveals large pricing differences for the various short sale constraints. One
plausible explanation for these differences is that each constraint gives rise to different lending
expectation and that the lending profits increase the premium as predicted by Duffie et al.
(2002). Both D’Avolio (2002) and Boehme et al. (2006) use proprietary lending data to show
that shorting demand is related to the cost of lending and find that stocks with high levels of
short interest have high lending fees. Kolasinski et al. (2010) document that an increase in
demand triples the abnormally high lending fees for stocks with high short sale demand. The
lending income, in turn, might explain the premium for high short sale funds.
Alternative explanations for the large cross-sectional differences in the prices of the var-
ious forms of constraints do not seem to hold. The short sale constraints can differ in terms
of risk of shorting, recall risk or arbitrage risk. When controlling for arbitrage risk in the gen-
eral specifications by including sentiment, replication and noise proxies, the results persist.
Moreover intuitively, recall risk should lead to a lower premium (risk premium). I find that the
constraint that would be subject to recall risk as failure-to-deliver is not associated with lower
premiums. In the following analysis, I explore the dynamic relation of the various constraints
and future lending profits in more depth.
4.4.6 VAR Analysis
The premise is that the short sale constraints give rise to different lending expectations and are
therefore priced differently. If future lending plays a role in pricing, I expect the differences
in premiums across the constraints to be related to the variation in the relation between the
constraints and future loan fees and quantity. To jointly explain the response of future loan
fee, and quantity to the presence of the various constraints, I use a panel vector autoregression
approach (VAR).18 This is a multivariate simultaneous equation system that treats all variables
as endogenous, while allowing for unobserved fund heterogeneity.
First, to capture the fee development as a function of shocks to the short sale constraints,
I specify a first-order VAR model as follows:
yit = Υ0 +Υ1yit−1 + fi + dt + it (4.12)
where yit is a vector including premium to NAV, fee score and one of the respective constraint
variables: loan quantity, demand shift (DOUT), utilization or failure-to-deliver. fi introduces
18The estimation is implemented with the PVAR routine by Inessa Love. See Love and Zicchino (2006) for
computational details.
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fund fixed effects and dt period-specific time dummies. The particular ordering of the speci-
fication is important. The variables that appear earlier in the system are assumed to be more
exogenous while the later ones are assumed to be more endogenous. I also assume that the
constraints are endogenous to the premium and the fee score in the short run.
I will focus on the impulse-response functions. Theses functions describe the reaction of
the premium, short sale fees, and loan quantity to the innovations in the constraints, while
holding all other shocks at zero. Figure 4.1 illustrates the response of the premium to the
respective short sale constraint shock. The premium to NAV shows an immediate reduction in
response to a demand shift shock and this persists for 6 months. A demand shock is accompa-
nied by a reduction in fee score that persists up to two months and subsequently reverts. The
premium to NAV increases following an innovation in loan quantity, utilization and failure-to-
deliver.
The second graph depicts the impulse-response functions with the reaction of the fee
score to the innovations in constraints. The response of the fee score to a shock in failure-to-
deliver reduces the fee score at immediate horizons, but raises it in the following months. As
depicted in panel B, an innovation in fee score in turn, has a negative influence on utilization
and DOUT, but a positive influence on failure-to-deliver. Higher fees increase the likelihood
of a failure-to-deliver. In line with Evans, Geczy, Musto and Reed’s (2009) findings, short
sellers strategically fail-to-deliver shares when borrowing costs are high although the results
also show that failures, in turn, increase future lending fees. A demand shock has a negative
influence on future short sale fees, while shocks to utilization and failure-to-deliver positively
influence future lending fees.
The third graph in 4.1 shows the impulse responses to illustrate the differing influences
of the short sale constraints on loan quantity. A demand and utilization shock translates into
an immediate reduction in short sales, as measured by the number of borrowed securities. In
contrast, failure-to-deliver innovations increase in lending frequency in the short run. The
impulse-response analysis illustrates that a demand shock has a negative influence on future
short sales. Demand shocks reduce future loan quantity and fees and therefore future lending
gains and prices. Utilization predicts a reduction in loan quantity. Failure-to-deliver, in turn,
leads to a short run increase in loan quantity, holding all other influences constant.
The predictive regressions and the impulse-response functions show that the various short
sale constraints give rise to different future lending expectation in terms of lending fees and
loan quantity. DOUT predicts a reduction in fees and loan quantity, high utilization forecasts
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Figure 4.1
Impulse Response Function Premium, Fee Score and Loan Quantity
Impulse-response functions describing the reaction of the premium to NAV, fee score and loan quantity
to a one standard deviation innovation in the constraints: DOUT, Loan, Utilization and Failure-to-
deliver. The impulse-response functions follow from a first-order VAR model specification, including
premium to NAV, fee score, and one of the respective constraint variables and fund and period-specific
fixed effects. Fixed effects are removed using Helmert transformation (See Arellano and Bover (1995)).
Estimation is by GMM with untransformed variables used as instruments for Helmert-transformed
variables. Variables are time-demeaned for the period-specific effects.
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an increase in fees, but a reduction in future loan quantity and loan quantity and failure-to-
deliver lead to a persistent increase in fees. The differences in the pricing of the constraints line
up with future lending outlook. The fact that lending expectation mirrors pricing is consistent
with the premise that lending income plays a role in pricing.
Intuitively, the information restriction hypothesis on its own cannot account for the large
pricing differences across the constraints. The variation in short sale constraints pricing is
consistent with the variation in lending expectation.
Economic Significance
To gauge the economic significance of the short sale constraints in influencing the pricing of
closed-end funds, I present variance decompositions. Table 4.10 shows the percent of the vari-
ation in the row variable explained by a shock to the column variable, accumulated over time.
The variance decomposition indicates the amount of information each variable contributes to
the other variables in the VAR model. I report the accumulated effect from 1 month to 1 year.
Demand shifts (DOUT) only account for 0.4% of the total variation in premium 1 year ahead,
while utilization explains 0.14% of the variation. Loan quantity and failure-to-deliver account
for 25.91% and 17.74% respectively of the variation 6 months ahead, which accumulates to
87.43% for loan quantity and 31.56% for failure-to-deliver for a horizon of a year. Loan quan-
tity explains a large fraction of the variation at the expense of the fee score, which accounts for
about 20% of the variation in the other specifications. Short sale constraints are economically
significant in explaining the variation in premium.
According to Chopra et al. (1993), the variation in closed-end fund discount is related to
investor sentiment. In panel B, I also report the variance decomposition including sentiment
as opposed to the constraint variables. While sentiment explains almost 12% of the total vari-
ation in premium 1 month ahead, this reduces to 8% for a 6-month horizon. In the short-run,
sentiment has an economically significant influence but in the long-run short sale constraints
explain a significant part of the variation in the premium to NAV.
4.5 Portfolio Analysis
The capitalization of future lending income has important implications for future common eq-
uity stock returns. Empirical evidence confirms that binding short sale constraints are associ-
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126 Chapter 4
ated with low future returns. Figlewski (1981) finds evidence that heavily shorted firms under-
perform less heavily shorted firms.19 More recently, Boehmer et al. (2008) and Boehmer et al.
(2010) show that stocks with minimal short interest have higher abnormal returns than their
heavily shorted counterparts. The positive abnormal returns on intensively traded stocks with
low short interest are much larger and persistent. Heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly
shorted stocks by a risk-adjusted average of 1.16% over 20 trading days. Aitken et al. (1998),
Angel et al. (1998), Diether, Werner and Lee (2009) study daily short sales and subsequent
returns and find that high daily short sales are followed quickly by negative abnormal returns.
Boehme et al. (2006) find that underperformance of stocks with high short interest ratios is
concentrated among small stocks with high dispersion of investor opinions.20 Cohen et al.
(2007) find shorting demand to be an important predictor of future stock returns. An increase
in shorting demand (DOUT) leads to a negative abnormal return of 2.98% in the following
month. The consensus conclusion reached by the literature is that short sale constraints pre-
dict abnormally low future returns. The common interpretation is that short selling constraints
lead to overvaluation which in turn leads to low returns. However, there is still a debate regard-
ing where the overvaluation comes from. Seneca (1967), Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps
(1978), Figlewski (1981), and Morris (1996), among others, argue that security prices are
upward biased when short sale constraints exist because negative information is not fully re-
leased in prices. Nonetheless, if prices are biased upward due to the capitalization of lending
profits I would expect that the reduction in lending income accounts for the underperformance
of stocks.
Given that future lending expectations varies across the short sale constraint measures, I
take advantage of the cross-section of short sale constraint measures to see whether stocks
with low lending income expectation underperform stocks with high lending income expecta-
tion. I perform a calendar time portfolio analysis on all the common equity stocks in the Data
Explorers data. Due to the limited time series available, I study daily and weekly portfolio re-
turns to maintain statistical validity of the results.21 Each day (week), I sort the common equity
19Many studies, Brent et al. (1990), Senchank and Starks (1993), Aitken et al. (1998), Dechow et al. (2001),
Asquith et al. (2005), Desai et al. (2002) confirm that stocks with high short interest experience low subsequent
returns.
20The relation between short selling activity and future stock returns is found to be even stronger when there
are no exchange-traded stock options Figlewski and Webb (1993), Senchank and Starks (1993), Christophe et al.
(2004), if institutional ownership is larger D’Avolio (2002), Nagel (2005), Boehmer et al. (2008), if analyst
coverage is low Pownall and Simko (2005), and following earnings announcements Reed (2003), Berkman et al.
(2009)
21Note that I am not presenting a viable portfolio strategy, as first the data is not publicly available and second,
daily horizon portfolios are not practical for re-balancing reasons. The sole purpose of this analysis is to illustrate
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stocks into a portfolio based on the short sale constraint considered. After assigning funds to
the portfolios, I calculate the value weighted return over the subsequent day (week). The one
and four-factor alpha are calculated using the market and factor returns available in French’s
data library. The four-factor alpha controls for the market, size, value, and momentum factor
returns.
The prediction, following the intuition as discussed by Miller (1977), is that when con-
straints inhibit the market’s ability to impound relevant information, future returns decrease
as the correction of the bias sets in. However, if short sale constraints also represent an in-
crease in future lending profits, as failure for example does, the correction caused by the bias
will be attenuated. The advantage of examining the pricing implications in the cross-section
of short sale constraint measures is that the inferences are drawn by comparison of lending
expectations.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the portfolio of reported failures and the portfolio of high
short sales have the lowest underperformance, while the high fee portfolios and demand shifts
lead to the highest reduction in prices. These results, presented in Table 4.11, cannot be
explained by differential exposure to risk factors. The four-factor alpha of the highest loan
portfolio is -0.15% lower in the following day than that of the low short sale portfolio. Simi-
larly, I observe a -0.51% return in the following day for stocks that experience a demand shift.
There is a 34 bp difference in performance between stocks which have experienced a demand
shift and stocks which have not. Utilization follows the ranking of producing the subsequent
largest discrepancy in performance, with the highest utilization portfolio underperforming the
lowest by 14 bp. There is a monotonically decreasing relation between returns and fees; the
higher the fees, the lower the following day’s performance. Finally, the return difference for
failure-to-locate shares is only 8 bp.
the differential returns associated with the various short sale constraints.
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In Table 4.12, I extend the horizon to a week. Here again, demand shifts and utilization
show the lowest abnormal returns. Stocks that have experienced a demand shift during the
week, earn a -0.45% lower excess return in the following week. The results are consistent
with Cohen et al. (2007), who find that shorting demand is an important predictor of future
stock returns. Demand shifts measure the extent of overpricing but do not lead to an increase
in future loan quantity and loan fees, and as such the correction of the overpricing is the largest
as compared to the other short sale constraints.
Table 4.12
Weekly Portfolio Analysis
Portfolio Analysis of the common equity sample in the Data Explorers data. Each week I sort the
common equity stocks into a portfolio based on the short sale constraint considered. After assigning
funds to the portfolios, I calculate the value weighted return over the subsequent week. Funds are
classified according to whether a demand shift (DOUT=1), failure-to-deliver (FAIL=1) or high fee,
special, (Fee score>= 5) has taken place. Funds are classified as ranking high if they are assigned to
the highest tercile in terms of utilization and loan quantity. The four-factor alpha is calculated using
the market and factor returns available in French’s data library.
Horizon: Week
Raw Four-Factor
Return Alpha t−stat
High Loan -0.49% -0.28%*** -3.38
High Util -0.51% -0.31%*** -3.77
Failure -0.45% -0.27%*** -3.88
DOUT -0.63% -0.45%** -2.16
Special -0.49% -0.40% -1.45
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The negative abnormal returns for those constraints that represent an increase in future
lending profits, are lower than the other constraints. The largest corrections are for those
constraints that do not lead to future lending profits. Both the difference in prices of the
various constraints as well as the return analysis suggest that information restriction capacity
is not the only dimension on which these constraints differ. The findings are consistent with
future lending profits being capitalized into prices.
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4.5.1 The 2008 Ban on Short Sales
One of the predictions by Duffie et al. (2002) is that a higher price can be obtained in the
presence of binding short sale constraints than during a short sale ban. The 2008 ban on short
selling of financial stocks provides an opportunity to test these predictions. From September
19 through October 8, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) halted short
sales on 797 financial stocks.22 On September 21, the SEC modified the list by including
additional stocks, bringing the list up to 827 companies.
If expected lending fees capitalize into prices, the presence of binding short sale con-
straints would lead to greater overvaluation than a complete short sale ban. At the onset of the
ban, the restricted financial stocks would be expected to have lower positive abnormal returns
during the ban period than banned stocks that also fall under the short sale constraint clas-
sification. Put differently, one would expect the abnormal returns of the banned stocks that
are also in high short sale, utilization, fees or have reported failures-to-deliver to have higher
abnormal returns than banned stocks without these short sale constraints.
To test the premise that higher prices occur for stocks with tighter constraints ex-ante,
I sort the banned stocks into a portfolio based on the short sale constraint and track their
performance with respect to the total banned portfolio of stocks. The portfolio returns are the
average value weighted four-factor abnormal returns of the classified stocks on the particular
day.
On September 18, 2008, the about-to-be-banned stocks are ranked according to the short
sale constraints. The banned stocks fall into the high short sale portfolio and into the banned
utilization portfolio respectively if they are in the highest loan tercile on September 18. They
are placed in the special portfolio if the fee score is above or equal to five on this date. Banned
stocks with a reported failure on this date are assigned to the fail portfolio. The DOUT port-
folio, consists of the stocks in the ban portfolio experiencing an increase in loan fees and loan
quantities, a so called demand shift.
On September 18, 2008, the about-to-be banned stocks have an average abnormal return
of -1.05%. On the first day of the ban, the average abnormal return of the banned stocks in-
creases to 2.07%. In contrast, the banned stocks with high levels of loans increase by 2.20%.
Banned stocks with reported failures have an average abnormal return of 2.38%. Stocks on
22The official announcement (release no. 34-58592) was made Thursday, September 18, 2008, after the U.S.
market closed for the day.
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special experience the highest increase of 4.87%. The banned stocks with high reported uti-
lization earn 3.05% in the same day. The presence of the short sale constraints lead to greater
overvaluation than during the complete short sale ban.
During the ban period, the banned portfolio with failures has the highest abnormal return
of 1.31%. When the ban is lifted on October 8, 2008, the banned stocks show a much lower
correction than the other banned stocks with the short sale constraints in place the day prior to
the ban. The correction is highest for the failure portfolio.
This result corroborates Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen’s (2002) prediction that a higher
price can be obtained in the presence of binding short sale constraints than during a ban on
shorting.
4.6 Conclusion
By lending shares to short sellers, institutional investors benefit by generating lending income.
In this chapter, I show that the expectation of lending income increases the premium to NAV
of closed-end funds. To determine whether investors are willing to pay a premium associated
with lending fees, I look at how prices behave following a failure-to-deliver in the equity lend-
ing market. Failure-to-deliver represents situations in which it is difficult to locate securities
available for lending, leading to high bargaining power for the lender and prospective increases
in lending profits. High prospective lending gains, in turn, translate into higher prices.
The results show that closed-end funds with reported failures trade at a 2.63% premium. A
1% of shares outstanding uncovered short sale position leads to a 3.05% increase in premium
to NAV. The results are robust to variations in failure measurement, to alternative estimation
techniques and to endogeneity concerns. The failure premium is related to future loan quantity
and price and is decreasing in the level of inventory and the number of active lending agents,
consistent with lower bargaining power of lenders when demanding higher future lending
fees. As additional support for the fee capitalization hypothesis, I also find that the premium
associated with a failure is less pronounced during a period in which the average fee was low
and leads to increased institutional ownership.
The premium associated with failures is economically and statistically significantly higher
than the premium associated with other measures of short sale constraints. The empirical
pattern in the pricing of the various measures of constraints appear to be related to the reduced
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lending income expectation.
The results from this study imply that short selling constraints can cause prices to deviate
from the intrinsic value due to the loss of information and the capitalization of future lending
gains.
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Appendix Variable Description
Fund Characteristic Variables Definition
Noise Beta Following Gemmill and Thomas (2002), noise beta is the
individual fund sensitivity to the value-weighted average
discount of the funds in the sample.
Replication Risk Following Pontiff (1996), replication risk is the residual
error from a regression of NAV returns on the CRSP value
weighted index
Size (MCAP) Price*shares outstanding from the CRSP monthly file.
Turnover Volume over shares outstanding
Spread Spread is the difference between the closing bid and ask
quotes for a security over the security price
Amihud illiquidity Amihud illiquidity measure is calculated as the daily av-
erage of absolute value of return divided by dollar volume
for asset i in a month in logs
Systematic risk (Beta) Systematic risk was calculated on a rolling window basis of
25 months with respect to the CRSP value weighted index
Standard deviation (stdev) Volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the
monthly returns over 20 months
Past returns Average returns over 3 (return3month), 6 (return6month)
and 12 months (return12month) as well as the last months
return (Return(t-1)). Price information from CRSP
Institutional Ownership Compilation of the holdings of institutional investors from
13-f filings
Premium Premium to Net Asset Value is calculated as the price over
NAV: ((P/NAV)-1). The Closed-end fund NAV information
comes from CRSP (general equity funds only).
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Stock Market Sentiment Definition
Stock Market Sentiment To correct for sentiment influences in the deviations from
NAV, I calculate for each closed-end fund in the sample
the sensitivity of the fund to the sentiment index. The
betas with respect to the sentiment index are estimated
on the basis of rolling window regressions of 20 months.
The Stock market sentiment index is constructed as the
first principal component of four sentiment proxies fol-
lowing Baker and Wurgler (2007), dividend premium, the
number and first-day return on IPOs and the equity share
in new issues. I use the monthly data as used and de-
scribed in Baker and Wurgler (2007), I exclude the closed-
end fund aggregate premium and update the data until De-
cember 2008. The dividend premium is defined following
Baker and Wurgler (2004) as the log difference in the value
weighted average market to book of payers and the value
weighted market to book of nonpayers. The updates were
obtained from Compustat. IPO volume and first-day re-
turns and updates are from Jay Ritters website. Issue infor-
mation was obtained from SDC. Lagged one year NYSE
turnover from NYSE Factbook, detrended using past five-
year average. The sentiment variables were orthogonalized
wrt macro variables to remove the influence of economic
fundamentals. I regress, using a 50 month rolling window,
each proxy on macro variables; changes in industrial pro-
duction, employment and the NBER recession indicator.
The macro variables I obtained from econstat.com and the
NBER website. Long run S&P stock data were obtained
from Shillers website. The correlation of the sentiment in-
dex with that of Baker and Wurgler (2007) over 1969-2005
is 0.74.
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Short Sale Variables Definition
Loan The quantity of borrowed securities as a percentage of
shares outstanding
Utilization The value of assets on loan from beneficial owners relative
to the lendable asset value.
Fee Score Value weighted average fee score over 30 days. Zero being
the cheapest to borrow and 5 being the most expensive.
Special Fee Score>=4.
DOUT Indicator variable equal to 1 in the advent of a demand
shift. Demand shift identification follows the methodology
proposed by Cohen et al. (2007).
Failure Total fails-to-deliver, represents the aggregate net bal-
ance of shares that failed to be delivered as of settlement
date. Data obtained from the Federal Reserve website:
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm
FailID Indicator variable equal to 1 when a share failed to be de-
livered.
Inventory The available inventory quantity from beneficial owners as
a percentage of shares outstanding.
Inventory Accounts Total number of inventory accounts. Separate count for
each row of inventory held by each underlying beneficial
owner or fund that owns the security.
SL Tenure Weighted average number of days from start date of the
short position to date for all open transaction.
#Open Loan Number of open transactions from beneficial owners only.
Active Agents Number of custodians with open transactions.
Inactive Agents Number of custodians and lending agents with inventory
but without open transactions.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion
This thesis consists of three studies in the investments field, which look at the interaction be-
tween long and short positions and their impact on market participants, prices and portfolio
allocations. In Chapter 2, we start examining the optimal ”long” portfolio choice of institu-
tional investors. The needs of the institutional investors differ from those of a small individual.
Institutional investors like pension funds are not solely aspiring for maximum returns at a se-
lected level of risk in their portfolio choice. Their focus in making asset allocation decisions
is on considering risk on a relative basis versus liabilities to optimize their risk adjusted sur-
plus. When taking pension liabilities as the starting point and coordinating the management
of assets and liabilities in order to maintain a surplus of assets beyond liabilities the role for
real estate in a portfolio seems much more limited.
Particularly, we examine the liability hedging characteristics of both direct and indirect
real estate, in the advent of fair value accounting obligations for pension funds. We explicitly
model pension obligations as being subject to interest and inflation risk to analyze the ability
of real estate investments in hedging the fair value of pension liabilities and to quantify its
role in an asset liability management (ALM) portfolio. we find that the portfolio composition
differs depending on the definition of liability return. When liability returns solely follow ac-
tuarial changes, the mean variance efficient portfolio allocations towards direct real estate and
fixed income decrease compared to the asset-only optimization. When accounting for nominal
liability obligations real estate offers hedging benefits against interest rates for short holding
periods, but not for long-term institutional portfolios. The inclusion of inflation risk renders
a limited role for direct real estate in an ALM portfolio while indirect real estate obtains no
allocation. Inflation is at the heart of the discrepancy between reported and predicted pen-
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sion plan allocations. Once accounting for inflation the projected allocations come close to
reported ones.
In Chapter 3, we turn to the impact of short positions of market participants on prices
by showing that limits to shorting lead to biased prices. In particular, we find that the pres-
ence of short sale constraints can explain the existence of a premium to NAV for REITs. The
relation between public and private market pricing of real estate assets exhibits substantial
variation and the question why investors would be willing to pay these large premium remains
a daunting question. Traditionally, time and cross-sectional varying price divergence is often
attributed to firm specific characteristics (e.g. management quality, firm size, age, expense
ratio), market sentiment, and limits to arbitrage. Pontiff (1996) and Gemmill and Thomas
(2002) support the limits to arbitrage explanation by showing that closed-end funds that are
difficult to replicate trade at a premium to their counterparts. Another form of limits to arbi-
trage are short sale constraints. According to Miller (1977), differences of investor opinion in
the presence of short-sale constraints lead to stock price overvaluation. More specifically, if
short selling is constrained, negative information is kept out of the market. Stock prices will
not reflect fundamental value but rather the valuation of the most optimistic investors.
We use proprietary information on short sales between June 2006 and September 2008,
with which we study how short sales and short sale constraint affect the variation in monthly
NAV premium of REITs using a panel vector autoregression. We find that the variation in
short sale activity across individual REITs can account for at least one third of the variation in
NAV premiums. Short sale constraints are binding when there is strong demand and limited
supply. High demand relative to low supply leads to overvaluation and the correction of the
overvaluation pertains to premium REITs.
Alternatively to the traditional long portfolio choice, institutional investors benefit by gen-
erating lending revenue through lending shares to short sellers. Securities lending involves the
temporary transfer of securities by one party, the lender, to a borrower. The securities borrower
is required to provide collateral to the securities lender in the form of cash or other securities.
Legal title passes on both sides of the transaction so that borrowed securities and collateral can
be sold or relent. If the borrower provides securities as collateral to the lender, he pays a fee
to borrow the securities. If the borrower provides cash as collateral, the lender pays interest to
the borrower and reinvests the cash at a higher rate, earning a spread. Typically, borrowers are
required to post collateral of 102 to 105 cents per dollar of security. Furthermore, borrowers
are willing to pay a short sale fee for highly demanded stocks.
Summary and Conclusion 141
In Chapter 4, I show that securities lending is a cash flow stream capitalized into prices. I
build on the theoretical research by Duffie et al. (2002), who present a dynamic model of asset
valuation in which the search for a counter party is the mechanism through which lending fees
increase and affect asset value. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate lending
profits, I look at price behavior following a failure-to-deliver in the equity lending market.
Failure-to-deliver represents situations in which it is difficult to locate securities available
for borrowing, resulting in high bargaining power for the lender and prospective increases
in lending profits. I use closed-end funds to measure how failures influence deviations from
intrinsic value. The results show that the prospect of future lending profits pushes the price
of closed-end funds above its NAV. Closed-end funds with reported failures trade at a 2.63%
premium with respect to their NAV. The failure premium is positively related to future loan
quantity and price. The results of this study imply that overpricing caused by the presence of
short sale constraints is not solely due to the restriction of negative information but also partly
a result of rational capitalized lending revenue.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie studies op het gebied van investeringen. Hierin wordt gekeken
naar de interactie tussen ’long’ en ’short’ posities en hun invloed op de markt deelnemers,
prijzen en samenstelling van beleggings portefeuilles.
In hoofdstuk 2 starten we het onderzoek naar de optimale samenstelling van een porte-
feuille voor institutionele beleggers. De behoeften van de institutionele beleggers verschillen
van die van een individuele belegger. Institutionele beleggers, zoals pensioenfondsen, streven
niet alleen naar het behalen van maximale rendement ten opzichte van risico. Zij maken allo-
catie beslissingen op basis van het risico ten aanzien van de verplichtingen waaraan ze moeten
voldoen.
In dit hoofdstuk nemen we pensioenverplichtingen als uitgangspunt voor het bepalen van
de optimale beleggingsmix van vastgoed, vastgoed-aandelen en effecten in e´e´n Asset Liabi-
lity Management (ALM)-portefeuille. De ALM-studie verschaft inzichten in de onderlinge
afhankelijkheden in de ontwikkeling van de activa en de pensioenverplichtingen. Pensioen-
verplichtingen worden onderworpen aan rente-risico en inflatie-risico en we kijken expliciet
of vastgoed, vastgoed-aandelen en effecten die afhankelijkheden in de ontwikkeling van de
pensioenverplichtingen kunnen afdekken.
De portefeuilleconstructie verschilt door hoe we de verplichtingen definie¨ren. Wanneer
de verplichtingen uitsluitend actuarie¨le wijzingen volgen, bevat de optimale beleggingsmix
in een ALM-analyse meer vastgoed en obligaties. Zodra rente en inflatie meewegen, is de
allocatie naar vastgoed veel beperkter en vinden we een portefeuille-samenstelling die dichtbij
de realiteit komt.
In hoofdstuk 3 gaan we in op de rol van short posities van marktpartijen op prijzen. Dit
doen we door te laten zien dat short sale-beperkingen leiden tot overwaardering van vastgoed-
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aandelen. De waarde-relatie tussen de publieke en de private vastgoed-markt vertoont aan-
zienlijke variatie. De vraag is dan ook waarom vastgoed aandelen afwijken van de funda-
mentele waarde, de ’Net Asset Value’ (NAV). Traditioneel worden de prijsverschillen vaak
toegeschreven aan fonds-specifieke kenmerken (bijvoorbeeld kwaliteit van het management,
de fondsgrootte, leeftijd, kosten), marktsentiment, en de arbitrage mogelijkheden. Een moge-
lijke vorm van arbitrage limitaties zijn short sale-beperkingen. Volgens Miller (1977), kunnen
short sale-beperkingen leiden tot overwaardering. Als short selling wordt beperkt, wordt nega-
tieve informatie niet verwerkt in aandelen-koersen. De aandelen-koers zal dan worden bepaald
door de waardering van de meest optimistische beleggers en dus afwijken van de fundamentele
waarde.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we of short sale-belemmering de variatie in de maandelijkse
premie ten opzichte van NAV van vastgoed-aandelen kan uitleggen. De variatie op korte
termijn kan ten minste een derde van de variatie in NAV-premies verklaren. Short sale-
belemmering vindt voornamelijk plaats als er veel vraag is ten opzichte van het aanbod in
de effecten-lening-markt en leidt dan tot overwaardering.
In hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat de prijs-inflatie verder kan worden toegeschreven aan ver-
wachte toekomstige inkomsten in verband met het potentieel om aandelen uit te lenen. Institu-
tionele beleggers kunnen aandelen uitlenen aan short sellers en daarbij inkomsten genereren.
Het uitlenen van effecten betreft de tijdelijke overdracht van effecten door een partij, de bezit-
ter van de aandelen, aan een lener, de short seller. De effecten lener is verplicht om onderpand
te verstrekken aan de effecten bezitter in de vorm van contanten of andere waardepapieren.
Indien de lener voorziet van effecten als onderpand, betaalt hij een vergoeding om de effecten
te lenen. Indien de lener contanten aanreikt als onderpand, betaalt de eigenaar van de aandelen
rente aan de short seller en herinvesteert die geld tegen een hoger tarief. Daarbij behoudt de
eigenaar het marge-verschil. De beloning kan in sommige gevallen matrieel zijn. In hoofd-
stuk 4 toon ik aan dat institutionele beleggers bereid zijn om een toeslag te betalen voor deze
vergoeding betreffende effecten-lening.
Om te bepalen of institutionele beleggers anticiperen op toekomstige kas-stromen door ef-
fectenleningen, kijk ik naar de prijs ontwikkeling van beleggingsfondson na een zogenoemde
failure-to-deliver in de uitleen markt voor aandelen. Failure-to-deliver vertegenwoordigt si-
tuaties waarin het moeilijk is een aandeel te lokaliseren, wat resulteert in hoge onderhande-
lingspositie voor de aandelenbezitter. Volgens het theoretisch model van Duffie et al. (2002)
zou dit kunnen leiden tot een hogere prijs als toekomstige vergoedingen voor effectenleningen
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worden verdisconteerd in prijzen.
Ik gebruik closed-end beleggingsfondsen om te kunnen meten of failures leiden tot een
toeslag ten opzichte van de intrinsieke waarde. De resultaten tonen aan dat het vooruitzicht van
de toekomstige leningen de prijs verhoogt boven de intrinsieke waarde van closed-end beleg-
gingsfondsen. Fondsen met gemelde failures zijn met 2.63% overgewaardeerd. De resultaten
in deze studie geven verder aan dat deze overwaardering te wijden is aan de verwachtingen
ten aanzien van toekomstige kas-stromen door effectenleningen. Deze studie is de eerste die
empirisch aantoont dat vergoedingen voor effectenleningen worden verdisconteerd in prijzen.
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This thesis consists of three studies in the investments field, which examines the
interaction between long and short positions and their impact on market participants,
prices and portfolio allocations. In chapter 2, I examine the optimal portfolio composition
for institutional investors when considering liabilities. Institutional investors, by taking
into account their short positions, which in effect are their liabilities, make different asset
allocation decisions (long positions). Important in the optimization in excess of liabilities
is the role of the asset classes in hedging the market value of liabilities. In chapter 3, I turn
to the impact of short positions of market participants on prices by showing that limits to
shorting lead to biased prices. In particular, I find that the presence of short sale constraints
can explain the existence of a premium to Net Asset Value for Real Estate Investment
Trusts. Miller (1977) argues that as short-sale constraints keep more pessimistic investors
out of the market, prices tend to reflect a more optimistic valuation than they otherwise
would. The results of 4 suggest that overpricing caused by the presence of short sale
constraints is not solely due to restriction on negative information but also partly a result
of capitalized lending income. I show that revenue associated with security lending is
capitalization in prices, as investors are willing to pay a premium associated with lending
fees.
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